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INTRODUCTION

My article studies a critical era in the history of the
Uniform Commercial Code: the era in which the proposed
Code of 1949, a product of the academic drafters, entered into
the political world and changed to meet political realities.'
Marking the end of this era was the start of the New York
State Law Revision Commission's (NYLRC)2 study of the
1. For a general description of the 1949 Code reception, see J. Francis Ireton,
The Commercial Code, 22 Miss. L.J. 273 (1951). "At that time several affected
industries came out with strong pleas against it and publicized their position all
over the country." Id. at 279.
2. Zipporah Wiseman points out that the conventional analysis of the Code's
history starts at the NYLRC's Report of 1954-56, at which time the Code had
already gone through significant compromise. Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The

2001]

HISTORY OF THE U.C.C. 1949-1954

361

U.C.C. in 1954. In these few years, the drafters of the U.C.C.
made several fundamental decisions about its nature which
today form the basis of the nation's and the world's
commercial jurisprudence.3
Uptown Act and Downtown Code, the titles of my two
articles in the history of the U.C.C., represent my view that
the present Code is a product of two conflicting visions of
what commercial law should be-one, a regulatory system
based on self-regulation by the trade, judicial supervision
according to commercial norms, and legislative dictate, as
opposed to one based on an autonomous business world
operating under a regime of unregulated contract. The
history of the Code's drafting during these years can be seen
as the triumph of the latter vision. In the words of Soia
Mentschikoff, "special interests" won over the drafters' desire
to protect small merchants and consumers.
The drafters in the main placated those commercial
interests they had to in assuring the Code's passage. There
was some rebellion among the drafters, especially concerning
the banking provisions of article 4, and some holding the line,
as in keeping the unconscionability section,5 but generally
bankers, manufacturers, retailers, and secured financiers got
what they wanted.
A metaphor of two colliding tectonic plates serves to
describe the collision of the two visions, and a great deal of
the problematic sections of the U.C.C. exist along the fault
lines formed by that collision. Commercial issues that were
the subject of debate, compromise, victory, and defeat in the
years 1949 to 1956 constitute the troublesome Code sections
today.6
Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and The Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465,
467 (1987).
3. "Judged by its reception in the enacting legislatures, the Code is the most
spectacular success story in the history of American law." JAmEs F. W=rTE &
ROBERT S. SUIMMERS, UNIFORMI COMMERCIAL CODE 5 (3d ed. 1988).

4. The title of Gilmore's Death of Contract(1974) is ironic in that he witnessed
the triumph of contract over regulation in the Code's drafting. See, e.g., Meeting of
the Enlarged Editorial Board 284 (Jan. 27-29, 1951) (on file with American Law
Institute (A.L.I.) Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library and the
Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter Enlarged Editorial Board] (statement of Soia
Mentschikoff).
5. See infra p. 415.
6. See the following portions of JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMIERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th ed. 1995): Chapter 4, "Unconscionability";

Chapter 9, "Warranty"; Chapter 11, "Defenses to Warranty Action"; Chapter 12,
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This story, which is a political one, differs from the
generally accepted history of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The Code's drafting "continues to be represented, as a
neutral, balanced, expertise-based process."' The reality is
that the Code is a political document-the product of political
realities of the early 1950s on the state level.
Overall, the 1949 Code contained much more regulatory
law, much more control over commercial activity then does
the modem U.C.C. The earlier code's consumer protection
sections, the pervasive good faith provisions, the mandatory
application of trade usages, the presumption that Code
sections were mandatory, all worked to control merchants'
conduct. These sections empowered judges to regulate the
reasonableness of contract and to police commercial behavior.
How we got from the primarily academic draft of 1949 to
that of 1954 is a complicated story which has to be pieced
together from the American Law Institute (ALI) archives, the
Llewellyn Papers, the Code drafts, the records of meetings,
and the secondary literature. As Professor N.E.H. Hall points
out, academic lawyers engage in private as well as public
discourse.8 The private discourse in the correspondence and
the private meetings reveals many more drafting conflicts
"Disclaimers of Warranty Liability and Modification of Buyer's Remedies";
Chapter 17, 'The Effect of Regulations J and CC"; Chapters 18, § 18-2, "The
Deposit Contract"; and Chapters 22-25.
7. Edward L. Rubin, The Code, The Consumer, and the InstitutionalStructure
of the Common Law, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 11, 13 (1997).
8.
There are two contemporaneous, parallel levels of discourse in
academic jurisprudence. There is a public level of discourse-the
exchange of arguments in articles, speeches and books-in which great
minds reveal their secrets to the world. This is the source material for
the student of "schools" and "movements," enabling-indeed forcingthe scholar of public discourse to group these articulations into
preconceived categories. The historian who attempts to reconstruct the
reality of what the jurisprudents themselves were doing at the time
that they created the public discourse, penetrates to a second deeper
level of discourse, a private level. This private discourse consists in
correspondence
and
informal
discussion
among
academic
jurisprudents. The student of the private discourse reconstructs the
reality of these intellectual exchanges, revealing the authors' intended
meaning of words used in the public discourse.
N.E.H. Hull, Networks & Bricolage, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 309 (1991).
Professor Hull's views on historiography are also set out in her excellent histories
of the ALI, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins of the
American Law Institute and Back to the "Futureof the Institute" in THE AMERICAN
LAW INsrrTE SEVENTY-Ff 1 ANNrERSARY 1923-1998 49, 105 (1998).
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than does the public discourse. Partly due to a desire to have
the Code enacted and partly due to pressure not to air their
disagreements in public, the Code drafters presented the face
of the bland, value-free expert to the world. The reality is
much more interesting.'
My topic is a complex one and may interest different
types of readers. Some may be interested in the general story
of the Code, while others may be in how specific Code articles
and sections developed. Some may be interested in the
history of the Code as a case study on the fortunes of a
proposed progressive statute in the post-war era. I have
attempted to write this article to serve these groups.
I start with a description of my heretical view of the
Code's development, and then discuss the general conditions
surrounding its drafting. The drafting was done with little
publicity or public awareness. I also describe the main
players, many of whom were crucial to the Code's drafting
but are forgotten today." The article will describe the 1949
Code, what it was, and how it differed from earlier proposals;
the drafters' hopes for their Code, the unfavorable reaction to
it by the organized bar and the affected commercial interests,
and the realities of the political world that greeted the Code.
After discussing the changes in the certain sections which
were the main subjects of controversy, the article will
describe briefly the Code's entry into the process of review by
9. Professor Hull points out that the public discourse comes to dominate and
the private is lost.
True, seen from a distance over time, the public discourse comes to
dominate the private discourse. Aided by intellectual debtors of the
great jurisprudents, public exchanges sever themselves from the
private discourse and take on a life of their own-an externally defined
jurisprudential dialogue. The public discourse becomes the focus of
later interpretation and analysis. the private discourse, so vital to the
intellectual process-the human social, intimate, interactive context of
intellectual history-is lost. While later jurisprudents and legal
scholars are entitled to abstract the public discourse from its original
informing, nurturing, private dialogue, the historian is not so free. We
historians must rediscover the private discourse and use it to
reinterpret the public discourse.
Hull, supranote 8, at 309-10.
10. An example is Walter Malcolm, the subject of a bitter controversy involving
Grant Gilmore, Soia Mentschikoff, and William Schnader. His participation in
drafting article 4 is largely ignored. White and Summers list Fairfax Leary, Jr. as
the principal drafter of article 4, but it was Malcolm who rewrote that article after
the drafters decided to omit it in 1951. WHiTE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 4;
Walter Malcolm, Article 4-A Battle With Complexity, 1952 WiS. L. REV. 265, n.*.
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the NYLRC. The ultimate fate of the Code provisions we have
been studying will be given before we contemplate what this
history could mean.
My history and conception of the Uniform Commercial
Code differs from the usual perception of its drafting,
purposes, and nature. The U.C.C. is generally presented as
"legislation which achieves certain goals, such as uniformity,
clarity, and technological moderni-V, while being politically
acceptable to all state legislatures." 1 The U.C.C. is seen as a
product of an institutionalized drafting system, in which two
august, expert institutions, the American Law Institute (ALI)
and the National Conference of Commissioners (NCC) on
Uniform State Laws, together produced the U.C.C. in
consultation with academics, lawyers, and business. The
Code is thus seen as a product of an apolitical consensus
rather than one formed by the clash of opposing interests.
The drafters themselves promulgated the impression of a
neutral, expertise-driven, detail-oriented process, in which no
one group or set of interests was favored over another. Karl
Llewellyn always characterized sales law as "non-political."12
Llewellyn's statement to the NYLRC3 presented his Code as
the product of "ten years of expert study and critique" as well
as the institutional critique of the ALI and the NCC, and
having "the benefit of consultation and criticism by informed
representatives of industry after industry and group upon
group occupied in various areas of commerce or of commercial
11. Rubin, supra note 7, at 12.
12.
One characteristic of private law, and especially of sales law when
regarded as rules governing professional businessmen, is that there is
little clash of interests. "[Miost of the Sales field is uncolored as most
other law is not by the clash of class and passion." In a report
accompanying an early draft, the Sales statute is referred to as "both
non-political, and non-criminal, in character," Defending the Code

before the New York Law Revision Commission, Llewellyn again
stressed the "non-political" character of commercial law. By his
suggestion that article II rules be limited, in many cases, to

transactions between merchants, Llewellyn limits the rules to
situations where experience shows that all interests are satisfied by

the rule.
Peter Winship, Jurisprudenceand the Uniform Commercial Code: A "Commote",
31 Sw. L.J. 843, 861 (1977) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Karl
N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback,52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 726 (1939)).

13. See Statement to the Law Revision Commission by Professor Karl N.
Llewellyn, reprintedin 1 State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law
Revision Comm'n for 1955 (1955).
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finance; and the general critique of bar association
committees and of an extraordinary number of independent
legal experts." 4
Llewellyn described the drafting process as one of
exhaustive attention to detail, with constant criticism and
revision."6 Llewellyn's wife and co-drafter, Soia Mentschikoff,
had also previously described the Code as a product of
revision upon revision, with consultation every step of the
way. She described the process as one inwhich the individual
drafters would submit their proposals to the drafting staff,
who would consult with advisors and lay groups and then
resubmit the modifications to the initial drafter. The draft
would go through at least three such cycles before being
submitted to working groups of the ALI, then the tentative
draft would go to the ALI, then
to specific ALI sections and
6
then back to the Conference.
Standard histories of the Code also present the drafting
of the Code as done by experts working in an institutional
setting. The story is told again of the ALI and NCC coming
together and sponsoring a drafting process in which
practitioners and professors acting with advisors come up
with draft after draft. Braucher and Riegert do mention the
attack on the Code by Emmet Smith, house counsel to the
Chase National Bank, as well as academic criticism,' 8 but do
14. Id. at 23.
15. Id. at 26.
Article by article there was one draftsman, or a team of two,
preparing, presenting, revising. The drafter's work was under steady
criticism and revision, typically in three-day sessions every six to ten
weeks, by a group of advisors which included experts in the field of law
concerned, experts in the field of business of finance concerned, and
also lawyers or judges of general experience and no expertness whose
important business was to see that it all made sense and that each part
could be understood by men who were not experts. Results of any
meeting were worked over, tested out, and brought in again for any
misguess to be gone over afresh. There was constant correspondence
and consultation with any outside experts in the business or law
concerned who could be discovered and who would give the time.
Id.
16. See Soia Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code, An Experiment in
Drafting,36 A.B.A.J. 419, 420 (1950); see also WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN
AND THE REALIST MOVEMNT 285-86 (1973).
17. See WHrTE & SULMMIERS, supra note 3, at 2-4; William Schnader, A Short
History of the Preparationand Enactmentof the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U.
MLAn L. REv. 1 (1967); ROBERT BRAUCHER & ROBERT A. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO
COMzmRCIALTRANSACTONS 19-31 (1977).
18. Id. at 27.
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not mention our specific political controversies. By the 1980s,
in symposiums like "Origins and Evolution: Drafters Reflect
Upon the Uniform Commercial Code," 9 the drafters looked
back at the drafting of the Code through a rose-colored haze,
congratulating themselves for a job well done.
This public description of a neutral drafting process
engaged in by expert commercial law specialists is in stark
contrast to Mentschikoffs contemporary description of the
proposed Code being changed into "a special-interest type of
legislation."0
The Code itself does two things which effectively hide its
history. It explicitly presents itself as value-free, as in its
statement of purposes:
(a) to simplify, clarify
commercial transactions;

and

modernize

the law

governing

(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices
through custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c)

to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.

21

19. Soia Mentschikoff et al., Orgins and Evolution: Drafters Reflect Upon the
Uniform Commercial Code, 43 0HIO ST. L.J. 535 (1982).
20.
In the last two years as amendments have been made to the Code,
and changes in policy made, the Code has consistently moved onto a
special-interest type of legislation and away from a public-interest type
of legislation.
I think that Section by Section as the changes have been made they
have not been changes which in and of themselves have been dramatic
or have meant anything particular, and that each one of them by itself
is a change which cannot only be lived with but considerable argument
can be made for it as well as against it.
I think there will have to be a line drawn at which that type of change
section by section and provision by provision on the Code has got to
cease. I don't know whether this Section is the Section on which we
have got to say, "This far we move in terms of special interest, and no
further." It is certainly a Section which raises the general problem....
I think it is something none of us has considered, because I don't think
any of us-with the possible exception of the Reportorial Staff-are
fully aware of how many of the changes made in the Code in the last
two years were special-interest changes.
Enlarged Editorial Board, supranote 4, at 284-85.
21. U.C.C. § 1-102 (1991).
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The Code also does not refer to any rejected versions.
Deleted sections which were the subject of intense debate and
prolonged negotiation simply disappear from view. The early
consumer protection sections of article 9, for example, are
simply not there, and no mention of their disappearance is
made in the comments or anywhere else. The comments do
not give any indication of the struggles that produced the
sections. For example, objective good faith was applicable
throughout the Code until the May 1951 draft.2 2 Then, due to
ABA criticism, the standard of subjective good faith was
adopted in article 1, with articles 2 and 3 retaining objective
good faith, until it was dropped in article 3 after the NYLRC
process. Soia Mentschikoff felt strongly enough on the issue
to submit a memorandum to the NYLRC on the issue.23 In
1990, the phrase "observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing" was added to the article 3
definition (section 3-103(4)).' The present section's comment
points out the 1990 change, but makes no reference to the
controversy in the 1950s. The issue is an important one,
involving questions of autonomy and freedom from regulation
versus the desirability of regulating commerce by trade
norms, which was Llewellyn's prime goal for the Code.25 The
comment, however, ignores any description of conflicting
policies or even that the section makes a choice between
22. U.C.C. § 1-201(19), Proposed Final Draft No. 2 (Spring 1951), reprinted in
12 U.C.C. DRAFTS 35 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984). In commercial law talk,
"objective good faith" is defined in terms of objective standards; "subjective good
faith" just requires no bad intent.
23. Memorandum from Soia Mentschikoff on Section 3-302(1)(b) (Aug. 16,
1954) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library and
the Buffalo Law Review).
24. See WHIrE & SuMiErS, supranote 6, at 517-21.
25. The ABA position was that:
Prima facie it is reasonable to require good faith in the performance of
contracts. However, it is of interest that this provisions and certain
others in the same vein have produced quite a violent reaction on the
part of some businessmen and business lawyers. They say: "Why
should the Code draftsmen tell us to be good? Businessmen, or at least
most of them, carry on business ethically and did so long before the
Code was ever conceived. The Code should not try to prescribe morals."
Walter Malcolm, The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw., 113, 127
(1950). For Llewellyn's emphasis on trade norms see Allen R. Kamp, Between the
Wars Social Thought:Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform Commercial
Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REv. 327 (1995), and Uptown Act: A History of the
Uniform Commercial Code: 1940-1949,51 S.M.U. L. REV. 275 (1998).
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them.
The student of the Code would then think he or she is
faced with a statute of non-controversial, technical
provisions, put together by commercial law experts who
arrived at a consensus as to what a technical framework for
commerce should be through a meticulous and painstaking
drafting process.
What are the problems with the standard history of the
bureaucratically produced Code? One is that the temporary
compromises made to get the Code enacted have become
permanent principles of American commercial legislation.
These principles include the exclusion from the Code of
affirmative consumer protection and the allowance of
variation of the Code sections by agreement." An example of
the confusion of compromise with tradition is Professor Fred
H. Miller's discussion of the "exclusion, consistent with the
traditional U.C.C. approach, of affirmative consumer
protection provisions from revised articles 3 and 4. "2' He

states, "A review of state law also will demonstrate that
consumer law in relation to articles 3 and 4 has grown
outside of the U.C.C. and as an appendage to it in the area of
commercial paper since consumer law represents the later
development in this context." 8 He points out that consumer
protection sections were "thought to be inappropriate" in part
because "the U.C.C. is not a regulatory statute for the most
part. Consumer provisions are regulatory in nature, cannot
and require
be made a subject to variation by agreement,
29
sanctions for violation to insure compliance."
But the original intent of the drafters was that the Code:
was to include affirmative consumer protection, was to be
mandatory instead of being subject to agreement, and was to
have a strong regulatory component. Consumer protection
does not represent a later development, but a taking up by
individual states and Congress of the Code's consumer
protection provisions after they were dropped.
They were dropped because of a lack of political support
or even interest. At the time, there was no organized support
for consumer protection legislation. As noted by Grant
Gilmore, the proposed Code drew little public interest: "It is a
26. See Fred H. Miller, U.C.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A. A Study in Process and
Scope, 42 ALA. L. REV. 405, 410-16 (1991).
27. Id. at 412.
28. Id. at 413.
29. Id.
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technical statute for specialists. Unfortunately all the
specialists are on the same team and there is no opposition."

The organized bar and the affected industries just did not
accept any change towards greater regulation and the
proponents of such change (with the exception of Llewellyn)
judged their prospects of getting such legislation passed as
hopeless."
At the meeting of the Enlarged Editorial Board of
February, 1951, the participants debated the political support
or lack thereof for the proposed consumer protection sections
of article 9. These sections provided for disclosures of
insurance and interest charges similar to those mandated by
Truth-in-Lending in 1964. Mentschikoff argued for such
disclosures. Although she saw gettig such legislation
enacted as "extremely tough sledding," she thought that
groups, especially labor and women's, could be aroused to
deliver effective political support.'
Ireton observed that he had tried to get consumer
protection legislation passed and had received no support
30. Grant Gilmore, The Secured TransactionsArticle of the Commercial Code,
16 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 27,48 (1951).
31. For a general discussion of the political realities in the Truman years,
see PHYLLIS DE LUNA, PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE POWER DURING THE TRUmAN
ADMINISTRATION (1997), and ALONZO

L. HAMBY,

HARRY S. TRUMAN IN LEADERSHIP

AND THE MODERN PRESIDENCY 68 (1988).
32.
For this reason, practically speaking, the disclosure provisions
separating the two charges have not had much effect as yet. We feel
that this is a question of education. And on this I perhaps feel more
deeply than Mr. Llewellyn; it is a question of education of women's
groups as to what it means when you buy a refrigerator or washing
machine or a stove. I am speaking now not only of the automobile field,
which of course is the primary interest or one of the primary interests
of the secured-lender situation here.
I think that if people realized generally that there was availability of
shopping for rates of interest, that that would materially reduce the
rates which are now being charged.
Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 281-82.
33. Id. at 284.
34.
We think part of the answer to that again lies in the education of the
groups that have not been consulted about the Code, know nothing
about the Code (and here I speak of labor union groups and women's
groups in particular), and that political power of such groups, if it is
subject to arousement at all, is really in our opinion considerable [sic]
more effective than the political power of the groups which have been
effectively organized up to this point.
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from labor unions. 5 He predicted that the local time sellers
(dealers who sold on credit) would provide pervasive
opposition while the public would be apathetic:
"Your opposition is going to come from your local time
seller who lives at every cross-roads throughout any state you
go into, who wields a powerful influence. Your public support
would be somewhat apathetic, I think.
3 6 I don't think you could
arose much support over this thing."
Schnader noted that they could not wait for the labor
unions and the women's groups to get involved.37
At the conclusion of this discussion, Mentschikoff and
Gilmore attempted to make a deal, dropping consumer
protection for Ireton's support of the Code:
MISS MENTSCHIKOFF: I don't want to put you on the spot, but I
want to ask you one question, Jerry, to illustrate my point. You
have been working with this group for a year or two years.
Suppose this provision goes out. Will your group support the Code?
Are you in position to tell us?
MR. IRETON: Well, Karl asked me that question last fall, and
frankly I can't commit anybody to anything.
MISS MENTSCHIKOFF: What is your judgment on it?
MR. IRETON: I think I could get them to support it.
PROFESSOR GILMORE: With this Section out?

35. "I went to a labor union to enlist their aid, and got nowhere. They just
weren't interested." Id. at 293. For a biographical description of Francis Ireton,
William Scbnader, Homer Kripke, and Grant Gilmore see infra notes 56-102 and
accompanying text.
36. Id. at 296.
37.
I might say in response to what Ben said, that if we wait until all the
women and the labor unions, and groups like that, go to the legislature
and say they want the Commercial Code passed, we might as well
adjourn now because we will never get the Code passed in any state, in
my opinion.
Id. at 293.
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MR. IRETON: Yes."8

The drafters' exclusion of consumer protection thus was a
response to the particular political situation they faced.
Another problem with the standard history is that it
leaves out the human drama. The conflicts between "town"
and "gown," among William Schnader and Homer Kripke and
Grant Gilmore and Soia Mentschikoff, have disappeared. The
arduous task of drafting, negotiating, and disseminating the
Code is ignored. The petty squabbles and the deep divisions
over values have disappeared from the official record. And it
is that disappearance of the debate over values which is the
problem. The Code is not just a product of expertise-it
represents significant choices about significant values. Like
all legislation, it helps some people and interests and hurts
others. The denial that there are value choices prevents us
from thinking about them and re-deciding them again.
I. BEFORE THE STRUGGLE
As in reviewing the order of battle before a conflict, we
need to review the plans for enactment, the personnel of the
drafting teams, the limitations of the ALIfNCC drafting
process, and the specific and general aspects of the responses
to the proposed Code.
A. The Two Visions
The academic reformers, the world of "Uptown," wanted
a "business commonwealth," a regulated system of
commerce, in which a modern, efficient commercial law
based on good business practices and judicial oversight
would replace antiquated formal laws and unregulated
private agreement. The commercial world, "Downtown," did
want the efficiency of a modern statute, but did not want
regulation. It wanted autonomy and freedom from oversight
by trade groups, statutes, and judges.
1. The Academic Reformers. The vision of the reforming
drafters was a peculiar combination of a modernistic
realism, which imposed order and control with the goal of
realizing a regime of efficient high speed production,
38. Id. at 294.
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financing, and distribution, and of a humanistic desire for a
kinder and gentler commercial world, based on cooperation,
reasonableness, and decency. 9
The Code was to be a practical statute that would make
for an efficient commerce by removing impediments to mass
production and mass distribution. By 1949, the flexible
contract rules of today's Code were largely in place. Article 2
had rejected title and formalistic rules of offer and
acceptance. 0 The banking and secured transactions article
would also evolve to provide for efficient, flexible
frameworks for transactions, unburdened by older,
restrictive doctrines.
Still to be decided, however, was just how secured
financing interests and banking were to be regulated, and
how much consumer and small business protection, judicial
oversight, and imposition of trade norms were to be included
in the Code. The initial Code proposals would have provided
for a nicer commercial world than the enacted version. To be
sure, there is a connection between the "efficiency" concerns
and the "cooperation" concerns-both were seen by the
drafters as necessary for prosperity.4' But the second set of
concerns were a much harder sell politically.
The reformers' vision was manifested in the early Code's
39. Professor James Whitman writes that, although Llewellyn drew on
German Romanticism, it was based on American social vision:
To be sure, Llewellyn's 1940-41 conception of the "friendly[, ...
neighborly" Volk was not a German one. The Llewellyn of 1941 was
guided as much by the social vision of Frank Capra as by the legalhistorical vision of Levin Goldschmidt; behind Llewellyn's theorizing
lay a Depression-era longing for small-town cooperation and social
normalcy, in which the power of the community would stand by the
"'little man" in his conflict with the "big man."
James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on
Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J.
156, 173 (1987).
40. As stated by the introductory comment to article 2:
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale
and the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are
stated as following directly from the contact and action taken under it
without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to
pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making
practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an
intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by
evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and
actions of a tangible character.
U.C.C. § 2-101 Comment (1995).
41. See Kamp, supra note 25.

2001]

HISTORY OF THE U.C.C. 1949-1954

373

provisions and commentary. For example, the first two
sentences of Llewellyn's General Comment emphasize the
basic principles of good faith, reasonableness, and
commercial standards.42 Commercial contracts were not to be
adversary but cooperative.43 The secured transactions article
required the inventory lienholder to liquidate the collateral
for the benefit of all the creditors." The provisions for a direct
action against the manufacturer for breach of warranty were
to relieve "from actual suit those smaller dealers who might
otherwise be put out of business by' 5an injury which they have
no adequate means of preventing. 4
The direct action and the warranty provisions sought to
protect the consumer; similarly, the secured transactions
article sought to provide for notice before repossession, for
non-waiver of consumer defenses, and for disclosures of
interest rates and fees for credit buyers. In 1949, Code
provisions would apply unless it was specifically stated that
they would be subject to agreement. The unconscionability
section and others gave the judge the tools to police contracts
for reasonableness. The entire Code imposed objective good
42.
Underlying every sales contract are the basic principles of good faith,
the elimination of surprise and technical traps, and the interpretation
of all phases of the formation and performance of the contract in the
light of reasonable behavior under the existing circumstances. When
the parties to a sales contract are commercial men, the reasonable
meaning of either language or actions is the commercial meaning in
the commercial circumstances, and commercial good faith calls for
observance of commercial standards by men of commerce.
General Comment on Parts II and III Formation and Construction 1, Llewellyn
Papers, A.A.J.2. (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review). Citations to the "Llewellyn Papers" are to
the Llewellyn Archives at the University of Chicago Law Library and are indexed
in University of Chicago Law Library, The Karl Llewellyn Papers:A Guide to
the Collection, in UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND GUIDES TO
RESEARCH 46-67 (1970). This General Comment is discussed infra at n.222 and
accompanying text.
43. "This Act adopts the principles of those cases which see a commercial
contract not as an 'arm's length' adversary venture, but as a venture of material
interest, when successful, and as involving due regard for commercial decencies
when an expected favorable outcome fails." U.C.C. § 1-203, cmt. 10, Proposed
Final Draft (1950), reprintedin 10 U.C.C. DRAFTS 68 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
44. U.C.C. Article VII, Tentative Draft No. 2 (1948), reprinted in 5 U.C.C.
DRAFrs 435 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
45. U.C.C. § 2-79, cmt., May 1949 Draft (1949), reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS
266-67 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
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faith, which meant that all commerce had to be conducted
according to commercial norms. Thus, drafters' proposals
required merchants to be under the control of trade norms,
judicial supervision, and legislative dictate.
2. The Representatives of Business. Business rejected
the reformist program of the drafters. Business wanted to
be autonomous-it did not want its freedom of action
regulated by judge, statute, or trade. It did not want to be
forced into a reasonable, cooperative mode. It did not want
new theories of liability.
Bernard Broeker, who represented Bethlehem Steel,
expressed the hard-bargaining mood of business: "I see no
reason why I should not be allowed to make an unreasonable
contract .... Quite often I know each party to a contract

thinks there are some unreasonable provisions in it, but it is
the best deal he can make. ' As to the good faith
requirement, the American Bar Association's response was
"Why should the Code draftsman tell us to be good? '"7
Business did not want any increase in potential liability,
created either by an objective good faith requirement or by
new warranty actions.
Business expressed its desires positively by positing the
goal of freedom of contract. Any proposed regulatory
legislation was judged by whether or not it restrict business's
freedom to operate.
There is a contradiction in the assumptions of the
business representatives. They utterly rejected reform
legislation that would reallocate power in society, but they
did want legislation that would empower business. They
wanted, for example, the unified article 9 security interests
that allows a financier to have priority qn almost all the
debtor's assets but did not want any provisions for consumer
disclosures or limitations of obtaining or realizing on a
security interest. They did not see the creation of the article 9
security interest as a reallocation of power to the financier,
but they did see consumer and small business protection as
46. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 172 (statement of Bernard
Broeker).
47. Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code/Developments
since September 1949 Report (1950), Llewellyn Papers J.XII.1.g (on file with the
Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review), reprinted in 6 Bus. LAW. 119 (1951) [hereinafter September 1949 Report
Developments].
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unwise paternalism. The representatives of business, then,
were willing to accept and support the vision of a modern
commercial code, but fought against any regulatory
proposals.
The history of the U.C.C. and its present content was
created by the struggle between these competing visions.
B. The PlansForEnactment
1. The ProposedFederal Code. Of course, the U.C.C. is
uniform state legislation, and the most widely adopted
uniform state law. It has been adopted by every state except
Louisiana, as well as the District of Columbia and the
Virgin Islands," but never as federal law. It is ironic that it
was first proposed as a federal statute and that its adoption
on the state level rather than on the federal level was seen
by some of its proponents as a second-best solution.
The entire U.C.C. project grew out of a proposed Federal
Sales Act, which was introduced in Congress in the late
1930s. Llewellyn contacted the federal act's proponents and
involved himself in the project. He "saw a Federal Sales Act
as a means of promoting general reform of the law of sales. If
Congress acted, it would be difficult for the states not to fall
into line. '" 9 Considering the arduous process of seeking the
Code's adoption at the state level, Llewellyn's statement in
1942 predicting quick Congressional enactment seems
painfully naive.
The drafts of the Code contained provisions dealing with
the Code as a federal statute until the Spring 1951 draft. 1 In
48. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 1.
49. TWINING, supra note 16, at 278; see also Federal Sales Bill (1937), reprinted
in 1 U.C.C. DRAFTS 1 (E.Kelly ed., 1984).
50. Llewellyn wrote in 1942:
The Conference foresaw that a Congressional Act would come close to
forcing adoption of a parallel act by the States-and very speedily. It
foresaw also that the main work of uniformity, to wit, the ironing out of
cross-state transactions, would be done at a single stroke by a
Congressional Act.
Letter from Karl Llewellyn to William Draper Lewis (Feb. 27, 1942) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review). Later in the letter, he proposed for the commercial code as a whole,
stating, "On the matter of adoption, the procedure should follow that proposed for
the Revised Sales Act. The way to get rid of the troubles of the Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, and to offer to international commercial transactions a single, clear and
modernized law, is by Congressional action." Id.
51. The provisions do not appear in Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final
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1951, Robert Braucher, a Code drafter, states in his Federal
Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code that "[a] state
should not enact the Code unless there is a reasonable
assurance that it will shortly be enacted by Congress."52
Braucher 53
felt that only federal enactment could insure
uniformity.
Also, Schnader mentioned that the ALI/NCC had made a
commitment to the New York Merchants Association (which
had sponsored the Federal Sales Act) to seek Congressional
enactment.' I have found no record of the proponents giving
up making the Code federal law, but the federal provisions
were dropped in the Spring 1951 draft. It is probable that the
proponents never explicitly gave up on federal enactment but
that their hopes for it just faded away.
The fact that the U.C.C. is a state, rather than a federal,
statute has several important repercussions. It means that
the Uniform Commercial Code is not uniform; it varies
significantly from state to state." It also means that the Code
is subject to federal preemption. The Federal Reserve's
Regulation CC on check collection for example, has
invalidated huge portions of article 4 6 Federal preemption
Draft, No. 2, Text Edition (Spring 1951), reprintedin 12 U.C.C. DRAFrS 1 (E. Kelly
ed., 1984). Compare the provision for the "Federal Version" in U.C.C. § 1-105,
Proposed Final Draft (Spring 1950), reprintedin 10 U.C.C. DRAFMS 51 (E. Kelly ed.,
1984).
52. Robert Braucher, FederalEnactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100, 113 (1951).
53. Id. at 104.
54.
Chairman Schnader: I differ with Mr. Llewellyn. I think we are under
an obligation to fix up Article 2 so that it can be introduced in
Congress, because that was the original understanding between us and
the Merchants Association of New York when they delayed their
pushing of the Federal Sales Act.
Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 207. My version of the history of the
proposed federal enactment differs from Professor E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., who
writes that Schnader reacted strongly against Congressional action and that
Llewelyn had induced the backers of the federal bill to hold off until the NCC took
action. In any case, Schnader's statement in 1951 shows that he was not against
any Congressional enactment but rather wanted the NCC to take part in charting
any Congressional legislation. See E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Uniformityof Commercial
Law and State-by-State Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions,30 HASTINGS
L.J. 337, 340-41 (1978).
55. See WHITE & SuMll.ERS, supra note 3, introduction § 3, at 7.
56. See Regulation CC Availability of Funds and Collection of Checks, 12
C.F.R. pt. 229 (2000); Edward L. Rubin, Thinking Like a Lawyer, Acting Like a
Lobbyist: Some Notes on the ProcessofRevising UCC Articles 3 and 4,26 LOY. L.A.
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has complicated commercial law, with the interaction
between federal law and the U.C.C. creating complex,
difficult, and often insolvable legal problems."
For our purpose, the most important repercussion was
the forcing of the proponents into the state political arena. No
quick Congressional legislation was to occur, rather the Code
was to be subject to the slow lobbying process in several state
capitals. As stated above, the proponents ran into various
roadblocks and were shunted into the New York Law
Revision Commission process. Federal adoption of the
Revised Sales Act, the 1949 Code, or the 1951 Code would
have resulted in a very different commercial law than the one
we now have.
2. The Hopes for Adoption. The proponents of the Code
hoped for adoption by the early 1950s. J. Francis Ireton
reports that "the sponsors of the Code had originally
intended to approve it finally in September 1949. ..."'8 The
sponsors originally planned to concentrate "on some of the
principal commercial states, especially California, Illinois
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania."4
Although William Schnader was successful in getting the
Code adopted in Pennsylvania, the Code elicited too much
opposition and hit too many roadblocks for quick adoption."
The banking opposition led by Emmet Smith of the Chase
National Bank was successful in having the Code referred
to the New York Law Revision Commission in late 1952.
Then all the states (except Pennsylvania) were willing to
wait until the Commission had done its work.6
We may infer from the provisions of the 1949 Code that
the drafters still wanted a commercial law that regulated
commercial behavior through the imposition of trade usages,
trade norms, and the Code provisions that were assumed to
be mandatory. The Code provisions provided for consumer
and small merchant protection, regulated secured lending,
L. REV. 743,774-76 (1993).
57. See Allen Kamp, IncreasingComplexity in Commercial Law: The Failureof
the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 CORP. CouNs. REv. 60,67-73 (1991).
58. Ireton, supra note 1, at 279.
59. TWINING, supra note 16, at 293.
60. See Ireton, supra note 1, at 279 ("At that time [1949] several affected
industries came out with strong pleas against it and publicized their position all
over the country.").
61. TWINING, supra note 16, at 293.
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and allowed meaningful consumer law suits by warranty
beneficiaries against manufacturers. Provisions such as
section 2-302, unconscionability, allowed judicial policing of
contracts on the ground of reasonableness.
In 1951, Grant Gilmore felt that the Code proponents
were offering the business world a reasonable deal: a statute
that would allow efficient secured lending in return for some
regulation and consumer protection.
Financing institutions have much more to gain by the
enactment of Article 9 than they can possibly lose. Their gain will
be in large part the debtor's gain as well. No one should expect
something for nothing, and the lenders are being asked to pay a
price. The price is stated in the imposition of duties of care on the
part of the lender which cannot be contracted out of; in the
incorporation of provisions designed to protect the borrower and
his other creditors from the undesirable effects of permitting one
lender to achieve a monopoly position by tying up all of a debtor's
assets; in the requirement of public filing for all non-possessory
security interests; and in casting on the lender certain business
risks, which arise from the chosen debtor's fraudulent activity.
Some of the new provisions are introduced as effective substitutes
for outworn protective devices. Others make explicit doctrines
which have been implicit in the law, and thus in a position to be
conveniently overlooked. The price asked is not unreasonable; the
bargain offered allows for a fair profit on the transaction.6 2

As stated by Gilmore, "Article 9 with a liberal hand
removes most of the restrictions and limitations on lender's
operations which have grown up over a century at common
law and under statute.' These liberal provisions include the
floating lien, the repeal of Benedict v. Ratner " which required
the secured party's monitoring of the debtor's accounts, the
assignment of future accounts, the rejection of outmoded
formalities, and the abandonment of restrictions on the
lender's actions after default.65
It was in return for this freeing of the secured party that
the financing industry was supposed to accept some
consumer protection and disclosures and other regulation
which limited the power of financiers. One could generalize
from Gilmore's statement to the entire U.C.C.-the proposed
62.
63.
64.
65.

Gilmore, supra note 30, at 47 (citations omitted).
Id. at 34.
268 U.S. 353 (1925).
Gilmore, supra note 30, at 34-35.
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Code would free commerce from outmoded formalism, but in

return trade usage, the Code, and judges would police
commercial activities. Gilmore felt that the deal offered the
financiers was a fair one. "The price asked is not
unreasonable; the bargain offered allows for a fair profit on
the transaction."' Gilmore, however, had an uneasy feeling
that the affected groups might not be so reasonable: "In
dealing with the special interest groups over the past few
years I have, however, at times found it difficult to escape the
impression that what was being demanded was a free
statutory subsidy... .""
Even if, however, the academics were not to be able to get
what they wanted, the stage was set for a compromise. The
academics were willing to compromise to get some of their
proposals enacted. An analysis of Llewellyn's letters to
Emma Cortsvet (his second wife) about a drafting session in
1941 concludes, '"he letters show that Llewellyn's concern
for the Code was so great that he was able to put his own
ideas aside for the sake of compromise."68 In my prior article,
I argue that Llewellyn's commitment to "realism," his disdain
for the impractical intellectual whose "physique mentally
turn[s] soft and gooey like a spotted apple,' made him
especially want to compromise to achieve something real."
Schnader's attitude is expressed in one of his statements: "we
are not just working on this Code for mental exercise; we
want to see something enacted."' The drafter's desire to
achieve something was a powerful spur to compromise.
Business also expected to make some compromises and
get the Code enacted. In 1951, Ireton stated that the
American Bar Association would ultimately approve the Code
and that it would be adopted. 'Ultimately we are going to
approve this Code. Now let us make it as good a code as we
66. Id. at 47.
67. Id.
68. Dom Calabrese et al., Karl Llewellyn's Letters to Emma Cortsvet
Llewellyn from the Fall 1941 Meeting of the National Conference of
Commissionerson Uniform State Law, 27 CONN. L. REv. 523, 531 (1994).
69. Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Present Intellectualism, Llewellyn Papers,
B.V.3.h. (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library,
and the Buffalo Law Review).
70. Kamp, supra note 25, at 337-38.
71. Consideration of Proposed Final Draft of the UNIFORm CONMERCIAL
CODE 97 (May 18, 1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter AL.IJN.C.C.
Consideration].
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can."7 2 Thus the negotiation process was constrained by two

parameters: the drafters needed the approval of the
organized bar and the affected industries, and the organized
bar and the affected industries (except the bankers) realized
that there would be a Code. The two groups had to reach a
compromise and thus outside interests were in the main
trying to suggest changes that would benefit themselves
rather than trying to kill the Code. The strategy of the
commercial interests was to work with the ALIINCC, not to
defeat it. Even the Chase National Bank was able only to
postpone the Code's adoption.73
C. The Players
1. The Change in Personnel. Those working on the Code
changed in the late 1940s and early 1950s. We have to have
some understanding of the personalities of those who had
prepared the initial drafts in order to understand what
happened to the UCC during our period. First, two
important drafters died in the late forties. Hiram Thomas,
the lawyer for the New York Merchants Association,
represented the practitioners' viewpoint in the early Code
sections. He wanted the Code to preserve "fundamental
contract rules" and was against some of Llewellyn's more
radical ideas, such as the extensive merchant rules and the
merchant tribunals.74 Thomas had chaired the committee
which introduced the Federal Sales Act in Congress in
1937, thereby starting the entire U.C.C. drafting process.75
It is to Thomas, not Llewellyn, that we owe the introduction
of the equitable concept of unconscionability into sales law.
Thomas suggested, in an off-hand way, the use of
72. ABA Meeting 24 (Jan. 13, 1951) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of
Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
73. Ireton stated, "Please come in with suggestions. Ultimately we are going to
approve this Code. Now let us make it as good a code as we can. We don't want to
be in a position of criticizing code without having an affirmative position." Id.
74. See TWINING, supra note 16, at 284-85. For Thomas' insistence on contract
rules, see Joint Advisory Committee Meeting, May 21 and 22, 1945, at 1, Llewellyn
Papers, J.VUI.2.a. (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review), and Letter from Hiram Thomas to Herbert
Goodrich (Apr. 29, 1948) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review). For Thomas' role in the rejection of
Llewellyn's merchant rules and juries, see Wiseman, supranote 2.
75. Federal Sales Bill (1937), reprinted in 1 U.C.C. DRAFMS 1 (E.Kelly ed.,
1984); see also TWINING, supra,note 16, at 277.
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"unconscionable,"
rather
than
Llewellyn's
term,
"unreasonable," in invalidating disclaimers of remedies. "I
would suggest 'or oppressively,' some word like that. If you
are going to have some standard, let it not be pure reason.
You might use 'unconscionable' or something the court can
look at and say, this is so arbitrary and oppressive and
unconscionable that we won't stand for it." 76 By 1948,
He soon
however, Thomas was ill and working at home.
77
ceased his involvement in the Code's drafting.
William Draper Lewis, the founder and Director of the
ALI, was a patrician figure who created the Restatements. He
died in 1949.78 In his place, William Schnader, a former
attorney general of Pennsylvania, became the political
manager of the Code.79 It was due to Schnader's efforts that
Pennsylvania became the first state (and the only one until
1957) to adopt the Code in 1953.8 ° His authoritarian nature
was revealed by his sobriquet, "General Schnader."' He took
Alison Dunham to task for asking for an honorarium and
attempted to prevent Grant Gilmore and Soia Mentschikoff
fiom criticizing Walter Malcolm's article 4 as being too probank." He had a low regard for Dunham's and Gilmore's
abilities 3 and analogized Gilmore and Mentschikoffs position
as drafters to lawyers hired to do a job. He saw the august
law professors who drafted the Code as hired help.'
76. NCC, 52nd Annual Conference, Detroit, Michigan 33-34, indexed at J.IV.2.f
(August 18-22, 1942) (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago
Law Library and the Buffalo Law Review).
77. Letter from Hiram Thomas to Herbert Goodrich (April 29, 1948) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
78. 2 WHO WAs WHO IN AIIERICA 1943-1950 322 (1950).
79. "On behalf of the Commissioners he largely directed the campaign for
adoption of the UCC by the states." Peter Coogan, Reflections of a Drafter,43 OHfo
ST. L.J. 545, 546 n.3 (1982).
80. Braucher, supra note 17, at 25.
81. Homer Kripke, Reflections ofa Drafter,43 OmHO ST. L.J. 577, 582 (1982).
82. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
83. See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
84.
So far as concerns the propriety of a member of the drafting staff
attacking any part of the Code, it just seems to me that you and I have
different standards of professional ethics. It is not a case of academic
freedom about which the teaching staffs of our educational institutions
sometimes get themselves excited.
Rather, it is a situation similar to one in which a lawyer employed to
do a reorganization job for a corporation, accepted compensation for his
work, and then stepped out and attacked the plan with a view to
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Llewellyn, although he lived until 1962, withdrew
somewhat from the drafting process. The reasons may have
included his declining health, due in part to his alcoholism,
his disinterest in the minutia of drafting, and his renewed
interest in jurisprudence. According to a recent article,
Llewellyn experienced a profound crisis in 1945-46. He was
suffering from alcoholism, depression, and the trauma of
separating from his second wife.85 Of course, Llewellyn's ideas
and participation informed the U.C.C. from beginning to end,
as well as profoundly influencing tort law and contract law.
He is the most significant figure in twentieth century private
law.86 His role was partially taken by his third wife, Soia
Mentschikoff" The Karl Llewellyn Papers reveal that she
took charge of such details as arranging transportation and
hotel rooms for the drafting conferences, as well as leading
the political negotiations, such as those with Frank
Dierson
88
over the warranty and direct action provisions.
Two other drafters, William Prosser and Fairfax Leary,
ceased having any great involvement with the U.C.C.
Prosser, who had no experience in negotiable instruments,

getting the stockholders to defeat it.
Goodness knows, nobody on the drafting staff was silenced at any
time as far as the Editorial Board or the membership of either
Conference or Institute was concerned; but after a joint meeting has
spoken and placed its approval on the product, it seems to me that it
would be the worst of bad taste, to say the least, for any of the paid
staff to start a campaign to defeat all or any part of the Code.
Letter from William A. Schnader to Soia Mentschikoff (Nov. 8, 1951) (on file with
AL.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review).
85. James Connolly, Peggy Pschirrer, & Robert Whitman, Alcoholism and
Angst in the Life and Work of Karl Llewellyn, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 43, 98
(1998).
86. For a recent description and analysis of Llewellyn's jurisprudence, see
N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AiERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1997).
87. TWINING, supra, note 16, at 286. Soia Mentschikoff had been Llewellyn's
student, research assistant, and associate Chief Reporter of the Code. After
marrying Llewellyn, she accepted a joint appointment with him at the University
of Chicago Law School in 1951. Id.at 112.
88. See Letter from Frank T. Dierson to Herbert F. Goodrich (Mar. 16, 1951)
(on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library and the
Buffalo Law Review) (describing the negotiation between counsel for the food and
drug manufacturing industries and Mentschikoff); see also Connolly, supra note
85, at 103 (stating that Mentschikoff provided "the organizing and 'policing'
function he [Llewellyn] required to avoid self-destruction.").
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had been picked by Llewellyn to draft article 3.V9 In the
forties, Prosser was in Minnesota, struggling with the
comments to article 39' Article 3 elicited little controversy
and Prosser did not participate in political discussions.
Prosser's article 3, characterized by Gilmore as "a museum of
antiquities-a treasure house crammed full of ancient
artifacts whose use and function have long since been
forgotten," went on to ultimate enactment. 91
Fairfax Leary was replaced as the drafter of article 4 by
Gilmore, who was then replaced by Malcolm. Leary too
ceased having any great involvement in the Code.92
As the U.C.C. article on negotiable instruments was
drafted by an expert on torts, that on secured transactions
was drafted by a Ph.D. in French literature. 93 Llewellyn chose
Grant Gilmore in 1948 to start work at $250 a month to
assist Alison Dunham on what became article 9.94 Gilmore
writes, "Neither Dunham-for whom I had and have the
highest admiration-nor I had even the slightest practical
experience in the field."95 Gilmore would go on to lead, along
with Mentschikoff, the fight against the pro-bank article 4. In
the period under study, he and Dunham, under pressure
from financial institutions, would create the all-powerful
article 9 security interest and drop that article's consumer
and small business protection sections. Later, Gilmore would
repent of his creation, the article 9 floating lien, but he
showed no such remorse during its drafting."
89. Grant Gilmore speculated that Llewellyn wanted someone he could control
rather than an expert in the field. Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson
(Oct. 8, 1980), in Donald J. Rapson, Review, 41 Bus. LAw., 675, 676 (1986).
90. Letter from William Prosser to Karl Llewellyn (November 17, 1945) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
91. Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 441, 461 (1979).
92. Rapson, supranote 89, at 677.
93. "Then there was Gilmore's Ph.D. in French Studies (1936). His 350-page
Yale doctoral dissertation, Stphane Mallarmd: A Biography and Interpretation,
examined the life and work of the highly unorthodox nineteenth-century French
symbolist poet. Afterwards, Gilmore taught French at Yale University from 1937
to 1941." Ronald K.L. Collins, Gilmore'sGrant,90 Nw. U. L. REV. 7,9 (1995).
94. Alison Dunham was hired in 1947. Minutes of Meeting of Joint Editorial
Board (Jan. 30, 1948) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
95. Grant Gilmore, Dedicationto ProfessorHomer Kripke, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 9,
10 (1981).
96. Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea, and the Uniform
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Alison Dunham and Homer Kripke both lived in
Westchester County, New York, in the late 1940s and knew
each other socially. Kripke was working with the CIT
Financial Corporation, giving secured credit to enterprises
that the banks were ignoring.97 Concerned about the Code's
first draft on inventory financing, he asked Dunham to
introduce him to Llewellyn. So started a collaboration in
which Kripke represented the interests and expertise of the
financing industry in the drafting of article 9.9
Kripke was joined by J. Francis Ireton, a Baltimore
attorney and chair of the ABA's Division of Mercantile Law,
which oversaw the work of the ABA committees on
commercial law.99 Ireton was a member of a firm which
practiced corporate and commercial law; his correspondence
reveals that he was familiar with secured transactions. 0 He
was critical of the first drafts of article 9 as being "leftist," as
being social legislation, and as revealing a total unfamiliarity
He was
with actual secured transactions practice.'
instrumental in eliminating article 9's consumer disclosure
provisions." 2
Three other practicing attorneys had a great effect on the
Code. Frank Dierson represented manufacturing interests in
a successful attempt to change the Code's warranty and
remedy provisions. An ABA document listed him as
representing "grocery and drug manufacturing businesses." 3
He worked for Charles Wesley Dunn, a New York attorney
who represented national food and pharmaceutical
associations. 4 Dierson reached a satisfactory compromise
Commercial Code: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605
(1981).
97. "So we had the field all to ourselves, and we frequently said what someone
else here has already said today, that we existed only because the banks were so
dumb." Kripke, supra note 81, at 577.
98. Article 9 started as article 6 moving through the numbers to its present
designation. Rather than say "the secured transactions article," I use article 9 to
refer to that article in all of its stages.
99. 6 Bus. LAw. 217 (1951).
100. 1 MARTiNDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 1430 (1952).
101. Ireton, supra note 1, at 282; see Letter from J. Francis Ireton to Milton
Kupfer (June 4, 1948) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
102. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 292-96.
103. ABA Meeting, supranote 72, at 1.
104. Dunn served as general counsel for the Grocery Manufacturers of
America, the American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, the Premium
Advertising Association of America, was President of the Food Law Institute, and
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with the Code drafters and withdrew his opposition to the
Code.'
Walter Malcolm, Chairman of the ABA's Committee on
the Proposed Commercial Code, was a Boston attorney who
represented the First National Bank of Boston." 6 He was a
graduate of Harvard Law School who had practiced in Boston
since 1929 and had busied himself in community and bar
activities.0 7 A strong believer in free enterprise, he had
written Soia Mentschikoff in a plea to make the Code
provisions subject to agreement: 'Without appearing to wax
eloquent, to me, two of the greatest virtues of Anglo-Saxon
legal system as well as the free enterprise economic system
are the ability of these systems to adjust to changes and thus
to encourage, rather than discourage, dynamic forces in
society."' 8 His proposals form the basis of article 1's
provisions on variation of the Code's provisions by agreement.
Violating the precept "never volunteer," he stepped into draft
a revised article 4 and comments in the summer of 1951 after
the ALI/NCC voted to delete article 4. His draft, the basis of
today's article 4, set off the most serious rebellion in the
Code's drafting history, with Mentschikoff and Gilmore
leading the protest.
2. Les Liaisons Dangereuses. Those who acted as
liaisons with business and finance played out a peculiar
role.0 9 The position of Malcolm, Kripke, Ireton, and Dierson
was analogous to that of a border lord who owes allegiance
to two kings and has to balance his duties to both. On one
was Editor, Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law Journal. 3 Who Was Who in America
242 (1952).
105. See infra note 321 and accompanying text.
106.
Bingham, Dana & Gould has for many years been general counsel to
the First National Bank of Boston and since I first came with the office
in 1929 I have spent a major portion of my time on bank matters.
Consequently, my personal background is that of a bank lawyer
meeting from day to day the various operating problems of a large
metropolitan bank.
Letter from Walter Malcolm to J.F. Sharman (Oct. 22, 1951) (on file with K.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
107. 7 WHO WAS WHO IN AMERICA 370 (1981).

108. Letter from Walter Malcolm to Soia Mentschikoff (October 31, 1950)
(on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
Buffalo Law Review).
109. Cf. CHODERLOS DE LACLOS, DANGEROUS ACQUAINTANCES (LEs LIASONS
DANGEREUSES) (Richard Aldington trans., 1957).
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side, they participated in the drafting process of a set of
laws that was to be neutral, balanced, and fair to all parties
concerned. On the other hand, they were representing
clients (Malcolm, the banks; Kripke, a secured lender;
Ireton, financiers; Dierson, the food and drug industry) who
had definite objectives for any new commercial law.
Writing about their role retrospectively, those who had
acted as liaisons were self-congratulatory, concluding that
they had been able to separate the role of impartial drafter
from that of advocate."' The rancor between the drafters, for
example Soia Mentschikoffs towards Walter Malcolm, was
forgotten. In 1951, Mentschikoff wrote to Schnader protesting
Malcolm's redrafting of article 4: "First, Walter Malcolm has
not been a friend of the Code and his services have not
produced anything which will make Code passage easier. In
the case of article 4, his contribution will make Code passage
more difficult.""' By 1983, the time of an Ohio State Law
Journal Symposium on the drafting history, all2 this bad
feeling was history, and unknown history at that."
Recent commentators on today's Code drafting process
have been much more critical. Professor Edward L. Rubin
writes how the bank lawyers who participated in the recent
revision of articles 3 and 4 thought of themselves as being
impartial and fair but could not rid themselves of their
110. Homer Kripke, Reflections of a Drafter: Homer Kripke, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
577, 578 (1982). For example, Homer Kripke writes:
Well, at any rate, I was working with them on these drafts, but for
some time I felt a stand-offishness, resting on the fact that I was
employed by a finance company and they didn't quite trust me. I knew
that the feeling existed when the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York organized its first committee to consider the drafts of this
Code as it came out, and Charlie Willard, who was the first chairman
of that committee, kept me off the committee and told me that Soia
(Mentschikoff) had told him not to let the finance companies capture
the committee.
Well, Soia's attitude subsequently changed. She has on more than one
occasion expressed the point that she and the others had come to learn
that I was able to wear two hats, as she put it-to know when I was an
advocate for my client and when I was trying to function as a member
of the Code team.
Id.
111. Letter from Soia Mentschikoff to William Schnader (November 4, 1951)
(on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
Buffalo Law Review).
112. See Reflections of a Drafter: Soia Mentschikoff, 47 OHO ST. L.J. 537
(1982).

2001]

HISTORY OF THE U.C.C. 1949-1954

387

ingrained attitude that banks generally are right and that
bank customers generally are unreasonable. The result is a
statute which is pro-bank and effectively shuts off consumer
redress. It is not that bank counsel set out to harm the bank
customer, it is just that a lawyer identifies with bank
interests after spending his or her professional life
representing banks."' Professor Rubin notes that the bank
lawyers stated, as did Kripke before them, " 'When I
participate in an advisory committee, I check my clients at
the door.' ,',He points out, however, that although such
lawyers do not represent the specific interests of their clients,
they do not check their conceptual framework at the door:
Lawyers cathect with their clients.... It is all the more true for
corporate attorneys who work within a single industry, or
specialized litigators who always represent one side. When that
single industry consists of people whose social class and economic
status are the same as the attorney's, bonds of friendship will be
added to the process of client identification. Over time, these forces
generate a conceptual framework, a general orientation toward the
world. It is possible for lawyers to check their clients at the doorattorneys in law firms switch clients fairly regularly, and in-house
lawyers can always imagine moving to a different company within
the industry. What they cannot leave behind them is a set of
identifications, beliefs and personal bonds built up over decades of
practice. These identifications, beliefs and bonds constitute their
career, their sense of themselves as productive members of society,
and form a comprehensive framework
through which lawyers
5
perceive the issues in their field."

On the other hand, a commercial statute cannot be
drafted without input from the relevant industry. What
William Schnader wrote Mentschikoff in response to her
criticisms of Malcolm was and is true-a business code has to
be acceptable to those who work under it:
I have never said, and am not now saying, that the Code should be
framed for the advantage of banks to the prejudice of depositors;
but, after all, the purpose of the Code is to facilitate commerce,
including banking, and I cannot for the life of me understand how
anyone can take the position that the Code should be unworkable
from the bankers' standpoint. They are the people who will work

113. Rubin, supranote 56, at 749.

114. Id. at 749.
115. See id. at 752-53.
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under the Code day in and day out, and it seems to me that it ust
feasible.
must be legislation which they believe practicable and

Drafting a commercial code without the participation of
commercial attorneys would be a purely academic exercise,
but involving them in the process can produce a law that
ignores consumer interests. This is a problem which has
never been solved.
D. Limitations of the DraftingProcess
The drafting of the Code and the drafts themselves were
not widely publicized, due to the limitations of information
technology at that time and the lack of resources to publicize
the Code. Thus it was possible for the Surety Association to
find to its surprise in 1953 that a Uniform Commercial Code
was being promulgated and that it contained a section117
which limited a surety's rights in relation to a secured party.
The "word processing system" of the ALI was Ms. Eleanor
Twohig, secretary to the ALI President, who pounded out the
stencils for the mimeographed copies of the drafts."'
There were not many copies of the Code available. Those
were the days before the Xerox machine, to say nothing of the
Internet. In 1947, Ferson Merton of the University of
Cincinnati Law School requested a copy of the Code from the
ALI and was lent a copy by W. D. Lewis, the Director of the
ALI, "Please return it to me when you are through with it as
this is one of my four remaining copies." In 1951, Charles
116. Letter from William Schnader to Soia Mentschikoff 2, Llewellyn Papers,
AA.J.XXV.1 (November 8, 1951) (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of
Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
117.
Strange as it may seem, the Surety Association's lawyers say that they
did not have any knowledge, until quite recently, of the fact that the
Code was being prepared and argue that even if they had had such
knowledge they would have had no reason to suspect such a
revolutionary change in the law of suretyship, even in an article
entitled "Secured Transactions."
Letter from William Schnader to Herbert Goodrich (Feb. 9, 1953) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review).
118. Letter from Mildred, Secretary to Llewellyn, to Eleanor Twohig, Secretary
to the ALI (Jan. 20, 1948) (on file with A.L.I.Archives, University of Pennsylvania
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
119. Letter from W.D. Lewis, Director, A.L.I., to Merton L. Ferson (January
31, 1947) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library,
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Bunn, who was organizing a symposium in Wisconsin on the
U.C.C.,12° had to beg 100 or 300 copies of the Code.' from the
ALI.
The ALI/NCC did not have the resources to publicize the
Code or to lobby widely for its passage. In 1951, Goodrich
stated that there was no money for mimeographing.

22 There

were limited resources to send people around the country
talking up the Code. It was decided to fund travel only to
states in which the Code was being considered for adoption.'23
Llewellyn and Mentschikoffs travels raised eyebrows.'24
Alison Dunham had the temerity to ask for an honorarium
and was12"spanked"
by Herbert F. Goodrich and Schnader of
5
the ALI.

and the Buffalo Law Review).
120. See A Symposium on the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 1952 WIs.
L. REv. 197 (1952).
121. Letter from Charles Bunn to Herbert F. Goodrich (October 9, 1951) (on
file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review) ("We can make good use of quite a lot of copies. They can be on cheap
paper, they need not be free, and they need not contain the comments.").
122.
P.S. We cannot possibly mimeograph Comments for distribution for
any but certain selected sections or Articles. At the Editorial Board
meeting yesterday we counted up the approximate paging. There is not
enough money in the Falk Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation,
The Carnegie Foundation or even the Ford Foundation to pay for
mimeographing expense of all these pages.
Letter from Herbert Goodrich to Charles Bunn (Nov. 15, 1951) (on file with A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
123.
I think Soia and Karl should be told very plainly that any trips to such
states as North Dakota and Maine are out as far as they are concerned.
They should be limited during the summer to visit only states which
intend to introduce the Code in 1951 and press for its immediate
adoption.
Letter from William Schnader to Herbert F. Goodrich, Director, A.L.I. (Apr. 25,
1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and
the Buffalo Law Review).
124. "I hear from Mr. Dinkelspiel this morning that Soia is to go to California.
He does not say who is paying for the trip. Who is?" Letter from Herbert F.
Goodrich, Director, A.L.I. to Professor Karl Llewellyn (Apr. 12, 1950) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review).
125. In response to Dunham's request for money, Schnader wrote Goodrich, "I
think the time has come for somebody to 'spank' this guy, and I think perhaps as
Chairman of the Editorial Board and Director of the Law Institute, you are the
person to do it." Letter from William A. Schnader to Herbert F. Goodrich (May 5,
1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and
the Buffalo Law Review). Schnader himself wrote Dunham on May 5, 1950: 'The
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Thus there was a lack of communication about the Code.
Because of the lack of funds and the lack of such facilities as
faxes, duplicating machines, the internet, and jet travel, the
drafting process was concentrated on the Eastern Seaboard.
Exceptions included William Prosser who was working in
Minneapolis, 26 and Charles Bunn, in Wisconsin, but most of
the work took place in New York and Pennsylvania. Because
of this, legislators in Indiana felt that they were far removed
from the drafting process.'
Furthermore, few people outside of the drafters
themselves participated in the drafting, and there was little
sustained academic interest in the developing Code. Although
there was a plethora of articles giving a general description of
the proposals, few came to grips with the Code's underlying
premises or policies. The main academic critics included
Samuel Williston 29 who generally argued that the U.C.C.
represented unneeded charges from his Sales Act. The
Harvard Law School faculty made several technical
comments, 13 0 and there was a symposium in the Wisconsin

Law Review, organized by Charles Bunn, who had been
redrafting the Code and comments. Professor Frederick
Beutel, who felt himself snubbed by the ALI, wrote The
idea that you would expect an honorarium for work of this sort never entered my
mind. I must confess that I think you are pursuing a very short-sighted policy.
When I was your age, I considered it worthwhile to make all the professional
contracts I could. I hoped they would pay dividends later." Letter from William A.
Schnader to Allison Dunham (May 5, 1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
126. See Letter from William Prosser to Karl Llewellyn (Nov. 17, 1945) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
127. See Letter from K.F. Panzer to William A. Schnader (Mar. 23, 1953) (on
file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
128. Kripke noted that large law firms did not, to a large extent, participate in
the drafting, Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying The Drafting of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. F. 321, 330, n. 43.
129. See Samuel Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561, 587 (1950).
130. See Report on Article 2-Sales by CertainMembers of Faculty of Harvard
Law School, 6 BUS. LAW. 151 (1952)
131. Beutel wrote:
Dear Herbert:
Over a month has now passed since we had our exchange of
correspondence on correlating the terminology in the Commercial Code.
I had a short letter from Prof. Bunn before yours came, written in reply
to the carbon copy of the first letter which I sent you, but have had no
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Proposed Uniform (?) Commercial Code Should Not Be
Adopted 13 2 in opposition to the Code. But that was about it. In

any case, the drafters paid little attention to the academic
criticism. They modified the Code primarily in response to
organized groups such as the American Bar Association and
the food and drug industry.
The lack of publicity affected the Code in several ways.
One, it meant that outlying states such as Indiana were not
going to adopt the Code before the Eastern states did so.
More importantly, there was no public interest to counterbalance the industrial, commercial, and financial interests
that lobbied for their own gain. 33
Besides the limitations of technology, the ALI/NCC
approach was elitist in having a small team of academics,
drawn the from the prestigious law schools located on the
Eastern seaboard, draft the proposed legislation with almost
no public involvement. Such an approach worked for the
Restatements but was ineffective in persuading state
legislatures. Although Mentschikoff talked of involving labor
further indication that the editorial board is interested in any
comments from me.
I take it I live on the wrong side of the tracks. Let's forget the whole
matter.
Letter from Frederick Beutel to Herbert Goodrich (July 19, 1951) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
132. Frederick Beutel, The Proposed Uniform ?) Commercial Code Should Not
Be Adopted, 61 YALE L.J. 334 (1952).
133. As Grant Gilmore stated:
By its nature Article 9 cannot become a matter of any great public
interest-although there is a certain amount of fun in imagining the
Governor of Connecticut or of North Carolina running for re-election on
the issues of the after-acquired property clause and the floating charge.
It is a technical statute for specialists. Unfortunately all the specialists
are on the same team and there is no opposition. Financing operations
in this field have become so complex that no one, except the operating
men and their counsel, any longer understands them. It is a fair guess
that at legislative hearings, apart from the local Commissioners on
Uniform Laws, no one will show up except bank and finance company
counsel, appearing either in that capacity or as representatives of local,
state and national bar associations. To the extent that the passage or
defeat of legislation depends on rational grounds, Article 9 will pass or
fail depending on the attitude to be taken by the representatives of the
financing industry.
May their choice be wise.
Grant Gilmore, The Secured TransactionsArticle of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CoNTEir. PROBS. 27,48 (1951).
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and women's groups, there was no attempt to consult anyone
besides academics, bar associations, and businesses. The
drafters, to use a Chicago phrase, just had no clout.
E. The PoliticalRealities
First, we are talking about the political realities facing a
proposed commercial code in a short period of time, from
1949 to 1954, but more precisely in a two year period from
summer 1950 to summer 1952. It was then that the
fundamental changes in the Code's provisions were made.134
That era was perhaps the worst era in American history
to seek social reform, to try to extend proposals that stemmed
from the Depression era. The general political ideology which
was turning away from collectivism to individualism. In my
article Between-the-Wars Social Thought,"5 I argue that
Llewellyn's views and his original program for the Code grew
out of the matrix of the collectivist mentality of the 1930s.
Llewellyn's emphasis on the enforcement of group norms by
the imposition of trade usages, with the norms being decided
by merchant tribunals, shows his commitment to
institutionalism, a view which saw society as being made up
of groups, each with its own usages and norms. Llewellyn
was once part of an academic avaunt guard, a supporter of
FDR in his court-packing plan, a folk dancer, a student of
Boas' anthropology,
part of a 1930s radical, collectivist
36
milieu.
134. The changes included the changes in the Code's "Purposes," the switch
from objective to subjective good faith, from Code sections being mandatory unless
expressly made subject to agreement to the opposite, new limitations on warranty
actions, the deletion of the consumer protection sections of article 4. The details of
these changes are discussed infra at notes 229-67 and accompanying text.
135. Allen R. Kamp, Legal Development: Between-the-Wars Social Thought:
Karl Llewellyn, Legal Realism, and the Uniform CommercialCode in Context,
59 ALB. L. REV. 327 (1995).
136. A 1937 letter to him from an attorney, Louis Weiss, reveals the radical
world of the 1930s that Llewellyn had been in. The letter recommends a Tom
Tippet, who authored WHEN SOUTHERN LABOR STims (1931), an analysis of the
Southern textile strikes, and coauthored YOUR JOB AND YOUR PAY (1931), a
textbook "which... is a little red for good advertising." According to the letter,
Tippet "had lectured widely all over the countries to colleges and bourgeois
audiences." Letter from Louis Weis to Karl Llewellyn (June 14, 1937) (on file with
the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review).
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But intellectual fashions may change as radically as
those in Vogue. It is the most fashionable which age the
worst. In Oscar Wilde's An Ideal Husband, Lady Marby,
speaking to the advanced young woman Mabel Chiltern, put
it well: 'You are remarkably modem, Mabel. A little too
modem, perhaps. Nothing is as dangerous as being too
31 7
modem. One is apt to grow old-fashioned quite suddenly."
By the late 1940s, Llewellyn's institutionalist views were outof-date. A painful example is Llewellyn's What Law Cannot
Do for Inter-Racial Peace,"8 in which he applies an
anthropological "folkways" view to racial integration. He

balances the desires of those who want integration with the
strain

of

changing

one's

social

customs.

Llewellyn's

collectivist vision was obsolete in our era of individual
contracting and individual rights. Making the Code
acceptable to the world of commerce meant in large part
basing it on an individualistic system based on freedom of
contract. 139
Grant Gilmore reports that article 9 was criticized as
betraying "an earnest reformist zeal reminiscent of the lush
days of the early New Deal ... ,,14o
Eisenhower was about to
137. Oscar Wilde, An Ideal Husband, in COMPLEE WORKS OF OsCAR WnDE 514
(1966).

138. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Law CannotDo for Inter-RacialPeace, 3 VIL. L.
REV. 30 (1957). In his article, Llewellyn attempted to balance the ideal of racial
equality with the danger of provoking too much resistance from interfering with
local folkways. Id. at 31. He works out the balance in specific situations, hotels,
restaurants, bars, and beaches. For example: "Beaches: There is little alcohol, but
any crowded beach is a place of constant intrusion and of constant need for
restraint. There is rarely such continuity of personnel as can lead to
understanding. And crowds can mobilize too easily into trouble." Id. at 34.
139. In explaining what he done in redrafting article 4, Malcolm stated:
The last basic issue, or key issue in the change, outside of detailed
changes, was the matter of extending and solidifying the basic
principle of freedom of contract.
There was indicated in the discussion this morning of the two points
of view which Mr. Tweed characterized as that of the ivory tower and
that of the market place, to a very substantial extent, that same issue
and problems exists with respect to Article 4, and without any question
the effort that I have made has been in part to move the draft to a
point where it would be acceptable by the market place.
One of the key areas where that movement is made is in solidifying
this principle of freedom of contract.
PROCEEDINGS 848-49 (Joint Sessions, National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws and American Law Institute) (Sept. 15, 1951) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library).
140. Grant Gilmore, The Secured TransactionsArticle of the Commercial Code,
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be elected and the country was not eager for reform. On the
contrary, there was a virulent anti-communism which spilled
over to attack any proposals for change. One of the many
bankers opposed to the Code stated that it was "communist
inspired.'M1
Under the pressure of McCarthyism, the country was
turning away from the collectivist programs of the 1930s.
Even-or especially-the academic left was valuing
individualism. Paul Carter writes how Adlai Stevenson in
speeches and David Riesman in The Lonely Crowd stressed
individualism and personal autonomy.' This trend left the
proponents of collective, institutional approaches behind.
Parallel to the collectivist-individualist and reformistconservative divides, was the division among the drafters
between "town and gown," the practitioners and the
academics. The practitioners (e.g., Schnader, Ireton, Kripke)
had little respect for the academics who had written the early
drafts. Generally, the practitioners felt that the academic
drafters were hopelessly impractical and out of touch with
the realities of commerce. 4 It comes as a shock today to
realize the little respect shown the secured transactions
drafters, Dunham and Gilmore.'
The view of the
16 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27,37 (1951).
141. As stated by Grant Gilmore, the history of the banking provisions: "Article
4 became the bloodiest battleground in the entire history of the Code. While
Steffen (and others) attacked it as being 'pro-bank,' bank counsel (particularly the
New York group) attacked it as a Communist plot designed to destroy the
American banking system." Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson
(August 8, 1980), in Donald J. Rapson, Book Review, The Law of Modern Payment
Systems and Notes by Fred H. Miller & Alvin C. Harrell, 41 Bus. L. 675, 677
(1986). Malcolm reported such a comment in April of 1954: "Would you believe it,
but in a recent meeting of some fifteen or twenty banks from an equal number of
large cities of the United States, the representative of the one New York bank
present contended that the Code was communist inspired." Letter from Walter
Malcolm to William A. Schnader (April 13, 1954) (on file with A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
142. PAULA. CARTER, ANOTHER PART OF THE FIF1lEs (1983).
143. E.g., Letter from Irvin I. Livingston to William A. Beers (June 25, 1948)
(on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
Buffalo Law Review) ("The foremost thought that I have is, without any reflection
on the reporters, that the draft gives rather conclusive evidence that it was
formulated without an adequate knowledge or understanding of practical and
functional operations of inventory financing from either the borrower's or the
financier's standpoint.")
144. Letter from Homer Kripke to the A.L.I. (Aug. 21, 1950) (on file with A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review)
stated:
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practitioners, that the drafters were leftist, impractical, out of
touch amateurs, which was shared by the vice president of
ALI, meant that the academic drafters were in a weak
position. This weakness showed itself later in the controversy
over article 4. Schnader sided with Malcolm and the bankers
over Gilmore and Mentschikoff, using strong language to
express his disapproval of the latters' going public with their
protest over the pro-bank redrafting of article 4: "It is
extremely difficult for me to understand what Grant Gilmore
and you are trying to do." 45
One of the recurring criticisms of the Code was that it
was "reform," "paternalist," "leftist," or "social" legislation,
not good things. 6 In response to Mentschikoffs complaint
Bluntly, the history of the Article on Secured Transactions
demonstrates that the joint meeting of the two bodies has been an
entirely inadequate forum to obtain the considered judgment of
experienced persons in this field of law. Every printed draft of this
Article, including even the fantastic first draft, and the almost equally
unrealistic second draft of the chapter on Inventory and Account
Receivable Financing which was presented to the Seattle meeting in
1948, has been approved on the floor by the joint houses with
comparatively little change and little informed discussion. While the
Reporters themselves have recognized the inadequacies of their
successive drafts and have gone on to revise them drastically, the joint
houses have never shown any real familiarity with the problems
involved, nor have even the obvious 'bugs' in each draft been mentioned
on the floor. It was not until the May 1950 meetings when
representatives of big city bar associations and specialist groups spoke
from the floor that the discussions at the joint meetings began really to
grapple with the issues in a decisive way.
Id.William Schnader agreed in a letter to Herbert Goodrich, dated Aug. 25, 1950:
As I was thinking the matter over yesterday, I came to the conclusion
that no one ought to undertake a project of the importance of the
Commercial Code with amateur draftsmen such as Article 9 has had.
It seems to me to be just inexcusable for so many different drafts to
have gone out on that article.
It seems that nothing that is done is given enough thought to give it a
semblance of finality. However, there is no use crying over spilled milk,
but we certainly were not smart in entrusting the drafting of that
particular article to people who just didn't have any facility in that type
of work.
Letter from William A. Schnader to Herbert Goodrich (Aug. 25, 1950) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review).
145. Letter from William A. Schnader to Soia Mentschikoff (November 8, 1951)
(on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
Buffalo Law Review).
146. E.g., Letter from Homer Kripke to A.L.I. ("The vice to me of the
paternalistic view of the role of law in a commercial code is not lessened by the fact
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that the Code was being changed to accommodate special
interests, by which she meant favoring "a single economic
segment of the community at the expense of the general
public," Schnader stated: "It seems to me we are drawing an
Act to regulate special interests, and the way they do
business. And I don't think any of us entered into this
147 Code
project as a reform measure in any sense of the word."

"Social legislation" had a definite meaning in the postwar era, meaning legislation that was designed to reallocate
power and wealth within society. Robert G. Swain (of the
New York white shoe firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore)
wrote of "social legislation" in the 1949 American Bar
Association Journal:
Over the last fifteen years the charge that the Bar serving
business is anti-social has emanated principally from those who
have espoused the more extreme so-called social legislation, whose
objective has been the transfer of wealth from the industrious and
thrifty to the indolent and prodigal and the substitution of
government planning and control for our old system of private
enterprise.

A more positive definition was given by Ben W. Palmer
in the same A.B.A. Journal volume, using terms that fit the
Code proposals, under the section, "Adherents of the New
Philosophy Criticize the Courts":
But all of these joined in the criticism of the courts, particularly
of the Supreme Court of the United States as the barrier to social
legislation and as the enemy to a new concept of law. That concept
was of a law that did more than keep the peace. It was of a law
that in this case, as in others, I can find no conceivable support for the comment in
the language of the section.") (regarding the October, 1949 Draft) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review). Ireton characterized the secured transaction article as having "had a
more definite and decided slant to the left than any of the other Articles in the
Code." J. Francis Ireton, The Commercial Code, 22 MIss. L.J. 273, 281-82 (1951).
Ireton further criticized the Consumer Credit proposals: 'This is embanking upon
social legislation, and there can be considerable doubt as to the propriety of
including such regulation in a statutory proposal relating to the security concepts."
J. Francis Ireton, The Proposed Commercial Code:A New Deal in Chattel Security,
43 ILL. L. REV. 794, 804 (1949); see also infra note 467 and accompanying text
(discussing a Bar Association of New York report that damaged the Code's
prospects).
147. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 320-21.
148. Robert T. Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession:An Answer
to Critics of the Modern Bar, 35 A.B.A. J. 89, 170 (1949).
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that would balance the interests of conflicting social and economic
groups. It would balance their interests not merely by preserving
private property and a theoretical liberty of contract but by
redressing the balance in favor of the economically weak. The
machinery of the state was to be used also to establish and enforce
rules of the game for the protection of the ethical , the better social
type and of the public generally. The law was to be used to rebuild
society nearer to the heart's desire of those filled with
humanitarian zeal-and
in some cases with envy of their
149
neighbor's wealth.

The criticism of "social legislation" was just part of the
conservative counter-revolution of the post-war era, the
extreme form of which is known as McCarthyism. At the
least there was a refusal to countenance any more social
change:
"Some American conservatives were avid for an all-out
effort to get rid of the New Deal and turn America back
toward unregulated capitalism. Others acquiesced in what
the New Deal had done but insisted 15upon
drawing a stern
0
line, beyond tis not one step further."
The Code had the misfortune to be seen as leftish or even
Communist inspired in one of the worst eras for proposing
progressive legislation.' As stated by Eric F. Goldman,
Everywhere in the United States, the fury against Communism
was taking on-even more than it had before the Korean Warelements of a vendetta against the Half-Century of Revolution in
domestic affairs, against all departures from tradition in foreign
polic&2 against the new, the adventurous, the questing in any

field.

The organizational support necessary for the passage of a
reformist Code just was not there. The American Bar
Association was going through a reactionary phase. In the
early 1950s, the Association adopted resolutions urging that
attorneys be required to file affidavits of non-membership in
149. Ben W. Palmer, Groping for a Legal Philosophy: Natural Law in a
Creative and Dynamic Age, 35 A.B.A. J. 12, 14 (1949).
150. ERi F.

GOLDMAN, THE CRUCIAL DECADE-AND ArER/AMERICA,

1945-

1960, at 9 (1973).
151. At least one New York banker thought the Code was Communist
inspired. Letter from Walter Malcolm to William A. Schnader (Apr. 13, 1954)
(on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
Buffalo Law Review).
152.

GOLDMAN,

supra note 150, at 214.
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the Communist Party and that all Party members and
of Marxist-Leninism be expelled from the practice
advocates
153
of law.

Organizations that could have supported the Code were
on the defensive. Ellen Schrecker points out that
'"McCarthyism destroyed the left."54 The war against
domestic Communism deradicalized social science, private
foundations, the entertainment industry, the media, and
labor unions. "Though the [Communist] party itself survived,
all the political organizations, labor unions, and cultural
groups that constituted the main institutional and ideological
infrastructure of the American left simply disappeared. An
entire generation of political activists had been jerked off the
stage of history."'55
The present U.C.C. is now presented as "traditional." But
the U.C.C. as a product of compromise with the reform
measures that survive, such as, the unconscionability section,
being just a remnant of a much broader system of business
regulation. The original U.C.C. is, in the words of Ellen
Schrecker, a thing "that did not happen":
As we assess the consequences of McCarthyism's assault on the
left, we encounter a world of things that did not happen: reforms
that were never implemented, unions that were never organized,
movements that never started, books that were never published,
films that were never produced. And questions that were never
asked. We are, in short, looking at "might have beens" and at a
wide range of political and cultural possibilities that did not
materialize.

II. THE ISSUES, THE DEBATE, AND THE OUTCOME

A. The ControversialSections of the 1949 Code
My article concentrates on certain sections that were the
sticking points in persuading the commercial world to accept
the Code. My list is somewhat arbitrary,'57 but it does include
153. ARTHUR SABIN, IN CALMER TnMEs 48 (1999).
154. ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES/MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA
369 (1998).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. For example, I do not discuss the debate over the specific rules only
applicable to merchants (the merchant rules), mainly because Professor Wiseman
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most of the issues that generated debate:
1. Whether the Code sections were to be presumed
permissible (subject to agreement) or mandatory. Section 1108,158 (now permissive, section 1-102(3)).
2. Objective or subjective good faith. Section 1-201(16)
(now section 1-201(19); section 3-304 (now section 3-103(4)).
3. Role of usage of trade and express terms. Section 1205.
4. Unconscionability (now and then section 2-302).
5. Beneficiaries of warranties. (Now and then section 2318).
6. Impleader and direct action against manufacturers for
breach of warranty, sections 2-718, 2-791 (now deleted;
became 402A products liability).
7. Contractual modification of remedies. Section 2-721
(now section 2-719).
8. The proto-truth-in-lending disclosures in the secured
transactions article, section 8-203 (now deleted in the Code;
enacted as federal law, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.).
9. Assertion of defenses against an assignee of a
consumer contract. Section 8-206 (now deleted; in federal law
as Federal Trade Commission Holder-In-Due-Course
Regulations 16 C.F.R. pt. 433).
10. Requirement of notice before repossession. Section 8603 (now deleted).
11. The floating lien. (Created by a set of interlocking
sections in the secured transactions article, then and now).
12. Contractual modification of article 4 (now section 4103).
One can group these topics into categories. One topic
relates to basic issues about regulation of contract: whether
the Code should be regulatory or rather provide back-up
provisions which apply only if the parties have not contracted
out of them. (Issue one.) Another, a related topic, is whether
commercial contracting should be subject to strong judicial
and trade regulation or whether business should be
autonomous, free of outside control. (Issues two, three, four
and seven.) Issues five, six, and seven involve the creation
and limitation of liability on sellers for warranty. For secured
transactions, issues eight, nine, and ten deal with consumer
has already done the job. See Wiseman, supra note 2.
158. References are to the 1949 Uniform Commercial Code, reprintedin 6, 7
U.C.C. DRAFTS (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
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debtor protection, while eleven involves the power of a
financier to obtain a lien on almost all the debtor's assets.
Issue twelve, involving banking, provoked a major
controversy.
The 1949 Code had a different set of rules to determine
the terms of a contract than we do today. First, Code
provisions were mandatory unless explicitly made subject to
agreement; today it is the other way around.'59 In 1949, there
was section 1-108 (1-107 in later drafts), which provided that
a Code section was to be mandatory unless it was explicitly
stated that it was subject to agreement. 6 ' This was
reversed-now every Code provision is subject to agreement
unless stated otherwise. 6 ' White and Summers explain the
modern rule:
Finally, most of the Code's provisions are not mandatory. The
parties may vary their effect or displace them altogether: freedom
of contract is the rule rather than the exception. Most commercial
law is therefore not in Code at all but in private agreements,
including course
of dealing, usage of trade, and course of
162
performance."

The Code stated the exact opposite until 1951.
All terms of all contracts had to be read in terms of
objective good faith.'63 Articles 3 and 4 further included the
objective definitions of good faith; section 3-304 defined the
notice component of being a holder-in-due-course in terms of
a "reasonable man" standard." The secured transactions
159. U.C.C. § 1-102(3), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1951),
reprintedin 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 477 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
160. "The rules enunciated in this Act are mandatory and may not be waived
or modified by agreement unless the rule is qualified by the words 'unless
otherwise agreed' or their equivalent." U.C.C. § 1-108, Official Draft: Text and
Comments Edition (1949), reprinted in 6 U.C.C. DRAFTS 31 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
161. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1989).
162. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 3, at 7.
163. " 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties and observance
by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in
which he is engaged." U.C.C. § 1-201(16), Official Draft: Text and Comments
Edition (1949), reprintedin 6 U.C.C. DRAFTS 33 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). In commercial
law talk, "honesty in fact" is seen as "subjective" good faith; defining good faith in
terms of an outside standard (reasonable commercial standards) is "objective."
WHITE & SUMMERS, supranote 6, at 517-18.
164. U.C.C. § 3-304, cmt. 2, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 6 U.C.C. DRAFMS 330 (E.Kelly ed., 1984).
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article defined a merchant to include a "financing agency." "'
Parties were directly bound by any course of dealing and by
usages of trade. 6 '
As to regulating agreements, both section 2-302 on
unconscionability and section 2-731 on contractual
modification of remedies allowed judicial policing of
unreasonablecontracts. Comment 1 to section 2-302 provided
that courts can regulate unreasonable contracts. "This
section is intended to apply to the field of sales the equity
courts'
ancient
policy
of policing
contracts
for
unconscionability or unreasonableness." Section 2-721,
comment 1 provided for invalidation of modifications of67
remedies if such modifications were unreasonable.
Comment 6 to section 1-205, usage of trade, again pointed out
that courts can regulate on the basis of reasonableness under
the unconscionability section and that reasonableness
depends on a balance of sellers' and buyers' rights. 6 '
Another set of issues involves warranty litigation: who
165. U.C.C. § 2-104, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 6 U.C.C. DRAFTS 53 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
166. Sections 1-205(2) and 1-205(3) state:
(2) A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing currently
recognized as established in a particular place or among those engaged
in trade or in a particular vocation or trade. Its existence and scope are
questions of fact.
(3) The parties to a contract are bound by any course of dealing
between them and by any usage of trade of which both are or should be
aware and parties engaged in a particular vocation or trade are bound
by its usages.
U.C.C. §§ 1-205(2), 1-205(3), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprinted in 6 U.C.C. DRAFMS 41-42 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). Today, course of
performance and usage of trade "give particular meaning to and supplement or
qualify terms of an agreement." U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1991).
167. U.C.C. § 2-721, cmt. 1, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 6 U.C.C. DRAFMS 257 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
168. Comment 6 of § 1-205 states:
The policy of this Act controlling explicit unconscionable contracts and
clauses applies to implicit clauses which rest on usage of trade and
carries forward the policy underlying the ancient requirement that a
custom or usage must be "reasonable." However, the emphasis is
shifted. The burden is no longer on the usage to establish itself as
being reasonable, for the very fact of commercial acceptance makes out
a prima facie case on that point. But in a market dominated by buyers
or by sellers as the case may be, practices can become standard which
are so unfair as to be unreasonable, and that aspect of the anciently
established policing of usage by the courts is continued.
U.C.C. § 1-205, cmt. 6, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949), reprinted
in 6 U.C.C. DRAFTS 44 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
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can sue (the beneficiaries of warranty) and whom they can
sue (by impleader and direct action sections). Article 2
contained three sections dealing with products liability which
raised strong protest: section 2-318 on beneficiaries of
warranties, section 2-718 on the impleader of a manufacturer
in warranty suits, and section 2-719 on direct action against
manufacturers. The 1949 U.C.C. allowed a buyer to implead
his seller "in a like manner and with like effect as is or may
be provided in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 69 Section 2719 provided for a "Direct Action Against Prior Seller":
Damages for breach of a warranty sustained by the buyer or by
any beneficiary to whom the warranty extends (Section 2-318) may
be recovered in a direct action against the seller or any person
subject to impleader under the preceding section. An action
against 17one
warrantor does not of itself bar action against
0
another.

This section was the remnant of the earlier proposal to
enact what would now be called strict liability in tort. 71 It hit
a raw nerve with manufacturers calling forth strong
opposition. The provisions were dropped and products
liability developed as judge-made tort law.72
The consumer protection and the floating lien sections of
the secured transactions article spurred debate. In general,
the 1949 predecessor to article 9 was kinder and gentler than
it is today. The Revision of Tentative Draft No. 2 (of the
secured transaction article) (February 3, 1949) retained the
prohibition against disclaiming warranties by the security
agreement. 17 The Tentative Draft Number 3 (March 1, 1949)
limited the self-help repossession where the consumer paid
more than a certain percentage of the obligation.17 4 Section 7169. U.C.C. § 2-718(1)(a), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 6 U.C.C. DRAMT 253 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
170. U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 6 U.C.C. DRAFTS 254 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
171. Proposed Revised Uniform Sales Act § 28 (1941), reprinted in 1 U.C.C.
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 21 (E. Kelly and A. Puckett eds., 1995); see John B.
Clutterbuck, Karl Llewellyn and the Intellectual Foundations of Enterprise
Liability Theory, 97 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131-51 (1988) (discussing how Llewellyn's
proposals formed the basis of strict products liability).
172. See Clutterbuck, supranote 171, at 1131-51.
173. U.C.C. § 7-106, Tentative Draft No. 2 (February 1949), reprinted in 5
U.O.C. CONFmENTIAL DRAmTS 176 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann Puckett eds.,

1995).
174. U.C.C. § 7-611, Tentative Draft No. 2 (February 1949), reprinted in 5
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106(2) prevented a security agreement from limiting or
disclaiming express or implied sales warranties, 175 and
section 7-321(3) stated that a merchant could always assert
claims amounting to a failure of consideration against an
assignee. 176 For non-merchant debtors, an assignee took
subject to any defenses which the borrower had against the
original financier.1 77 By May of 1949, a holder in due course of
a note secured by a consumer's goods had the option of
claiming on the note or as an assignee. If claiming on the note
as a holder in due course, the security interest would lapse; if
claiming as an assignee, he could not be a holder-in-due
course." This limitation on holders in due course in
consumer transactions was twenty-eight years ahead of its
time; the Federal Trade Commission finally prohibited the
status of holder in due course status in consumer
transactions in 1977.
Section 7-605 protected the consumer by requiring
twenty days notice before repossession if the consumer had
paid more than sixty percent of the obligation secured.'
Section 7-611 was also nineteen years ahead of its time in
providing for such credit disclosures as the cash price, the
credit service charge, and the amount of each payment
nineteen years before the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968.181
Gilmore wrote that these disclosure provisions "have
been attacked in toto as unnecessary and undesirable matter
for a Commercial Code, destructive of the right of freedom of
contract, and illustrative of a 'paternalistic,' even 'socialistic,'
U.C.C. CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 349 (E. Kelly & A Puckett eds., 1995).
175. U.C.C. § 7-106(2), Tentative Draft No. 2 (February 1949), reprinted in 5
U.C.C. CONFIDENTIAL DRAFMS 244 (E. Kelly & A. Puckett eds., 1995).
176. U.C.C. § 7-321(3), Tentative Draft No. 2 (February 1949), reprinted in 5
U.C.C. CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 294-95 (E. Kelly & A. Puckett eds., 1995).
177. U.C.C. § 7-321(2), Tentative Draft No. 2 (February 1949), reprinted in 5
U.C.C. CONFIDENTIAL DRAFMS 294-95 (E. Kelly & A Puckett eds., 1995).
178. U.C.C. § 7-612, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 169 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
179. See Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433
(1997).
180. See U.C.C. § 7-605(1)(b), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition
(1949), reprintedin 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 160 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
181. See U.C.C. § 7-611(1), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 167 (E. Kelly ed., 1984); Truth-in-Lending Act of
1968, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667(e) (1994). Generally, the early consumer protection
sections of the Code, which were rejected in the fifties, reappeared as federal
legislation in the sixties and seventies. Manufacturers direct liability re-emerged
as § 402A liability.
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attitude which is said to underlie much of the Code and

particularly article 92"8s" In the words of J. Francis Ireton, the

Chairman of the Division of Mercantile Law of the American
Bar Association, "this can be said about the article, that of all
the articles in the Code this article had a more definite and
decided slant to the left than any of the other articles in the
Code."'83
In the area of inventory financing, the 1949 Code
dropped many of its protections for non-inventory financiers
and other creditors. Section 7-323 (9), however, provided that
the debtor and any other secured creditor could sue the
inventory financier for damages for failure to follow the
prescribed default procedures. The section provided a safe
harbor by having the financier's actions approved by a court
committee and thus being immunized from
or creditor's
84
suit.

The debate over article 4, which was the most serious
controversy among the proponents is a story of its own. The
1949 version of article 4 was just not acceptable to the
bankers. They focused on article 4's restriction of freedom of
contract and believed that article was too detailed a
regulation of banking practice.'85 The drafters' proposal would
be jettisoned and Walter Malcolm would draft a replacement
article 4186

The drafters hoped that the regulatory 1949 Code would
be adopted without major changes. They were wrong.
B. The Debates and the Outcomes
There were several U.C.C. drafts between 1949 and the
December, 1953 Draft. A quick look at these, collected in
volumes 1 through 17 of Elizabeth Kelly's Uniform
Commercial Code Drafts, supplemented by her Confidential
Drafts, gives the impression that the changes contained in
these versions were incredibly complex. The reality is
simpler-almost all of the changes after 1949 were made at
182. Gilmore, supranote 133, at 37.
183. Ireton, supranote 1, at 281-82.
184. See U.C.C. § 7-323(8), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 8 U.C.C. DRAFrS 131 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
185. See Letter from Robert H. Brown, Assistant Vice-Pres., Bankers Trust
Company, to Herbert F. Goodrich (May 14, 1951) (on file with A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
186. Gilmore, supra note 133, quoted in Rapson, supranote 89, at 677.
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five stages:
1. The initial responses to the 1949 Draft, including the
American Bar Association's initial report on the Code and the
drafter's response in 1950."7
2. The American Bar Association's committee meeting of
January 13, 19511" and the responsive meeting of the
Enlarged Editorial Board on January 27 and 28.189
3. The Annual Meeting of the ALI and NCC in May,
1951.'90
4. The ALIfNCC Joint Session of September 15, 1951."
5. The referral of the Code to NYLRC in February of 1953
and the response to the NYLRC process.
The most important exception to the above process was
the drafting of article 4. In response to vigorous opposition by
the banking industry, the ALI and the NCC decided to drop
article 4 in May of 1951.192 Malcolm then took it upon himself
to redraft article 4 in the summer of 1951. His version, not
surprisingly pro-bank, inspired a rebellion by Gilmore and
Mentschikoff, with Schnader trying to silence this dissent. In
April of 1952, a compromise was reached which satisfied
187. See Resolutions adopted at meeting of the Council of the Section of
Corporation, Banking, and Business Law of the American Bar Association,
Washington, D.C. (May 16, 1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of
Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter Resolutions
(May 16, 1950)]; Report of the Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code,
Llewellyn Papers, JXfI.1.g (1950) (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University
of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter Report (1950)].
See generally Walter Malcolm, The Proposed Commercial Code, 7 Bus. LAW. 113
(1951); A.L.IJN.C.C. Consideration, supra note 71; Minutes of the Joint Editorial
Board Meeting 1, 1-3, Llewellyn Papers, JXII.e.f. (June 19, 1950) (on file with the
Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review); American Law Institute & The National Conference of Commisioners on
Uniform State Laws, Transcript of Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code
22, 22-40, Llewellyn Papers, JXIMI.1.i (May 19, 1950) (on file with the Llewellyn
Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
188. See American Bar Association Meeting, supranote 72.
189. See generally Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4.
190. ALINCC, Transcript of Proceedings at the Annual Meeting of the ALI in
Joint Session with the NCC, Llewellyn Papers, JXEII.l.d (May 16-18, 1951) (on file
with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
191. See NCC/ALI, Transcript of the Proceeding of the Joint Session between
A.L.IJN.C.C. (Sept. 15, 1951) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of
Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
192. See Meeting of the Enlarged Editorial Board (May 15, 1951) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
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Gilmore.
Some controversial sections survived this process, for
example, section 2-302 and objective good faith in article 3V93
A micro-analysis of each Code section in our period would
be tedious and unintelligible. I will focus on those sections,
set out above, that were the focus of controversy. All of these
sections would have restricted freedom of contract by
providing for legislative, judicial, or trade regulation of
commercial transactions.
1. ContractLaw.
a. Mandatory or Permissive. The May 1949 Code
provided:
Section 1-108 Mandatory Rules of This Act Not Subject to
Modification by Agreement
The rules enunciated in this Act are mandatory and may not be
waived or modified by agreement unless the rule is qualified
by
94
the words "unless otherwise agreed" or their equivalent.

This section drew much protest and was changed in 1951
to the present system in which the presumption is that all
sections are subject to agreement. It is, however, hard to say
what difference the change made. Many sections in 1949 did
say "unless otherwise agreed" and other sections, such as the
warranty and damages provisions, had specific sections (as
they do in today's U.C.C.) regulating contractual
modification.
Of course, one can only speculate as to how courts would
have interpreted a statute which was never enacted. The
"mandatory if not stated to be permissive" rule, however, may
have made a difference in certain sections. Under the 1949
version of section 2-207, for example, additional terms would
become part of the contract.9 If the section was mandatory, a
193. The latter finally died in the NYLRC process, only to reappear in the Code
in the 1990s. See U.C.C. § 3-103(4) (1991).
194. U.C.C. § 1-107, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 43 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). Since the section was
renumbered to 1-107 soon after, it will be referred to as 1-107.
195. Where either a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a
written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time states terms
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merchant could not contract out of having the additional
proposals become part of the contract. Similarly, section 2508, "Cure," would be mandatory. A buyer could not contract
out of the seller's right to cure. Another example was section
1-208, which then restricted the right of a creditor to
"accelerate" a debt; i.e., make it immediately due and payable
and thus
being able take control of the collateral for the
196

debt.

Mr. Milton P. Kupfer, a practicing attorney, pointed out
that section 1-208 read in conjunction with section 1-107
would require that
no holder of collateral would be at liberty to enforce the right to
liquidate at will according to the terms that he put into his
contract, except under the restrictions of 1-208-in other words,
that a provision in the contract that the holder of collateral,
whether it be a bank, a stock exchange house, or any other holder,
would not 197
be at liberty to liquidate his collateral for any reason or
no reason.

This would be wrong, according to Mr. Kupfer:
I have in mind the situation that confronted the stock exchange
houses in the hectic days of October, 1929, where they had to
enforce the terms of the customary and usual customers'
agreement that permitted them to demand payment of the debit
balance, and then for any reason-or for no reason, if you ipleaseliquidate the collateral if they felt themselves unsecured.

additional to those offered or agreed upon "(a) the additional terms are to be
construed as proposal for modification or addition; and (b) between merchants the
additional terms become part of the contract unless they materially alter it or
notice of objection to them is given within a reasonable time after they are
received." U.C.C. § 2-207, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. Drafts 85 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
196. Section 1-208, titled "Option to Accelerate At Will," states:
A term providing that one party may accelerate payment or
performance or require collateral not on stated contingencies but "at
will" or "when he deems himself insure" or in words of similar import
means that he has power to do so only in the good faith belief that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired but the burden of
establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power
is to be exercised.
U.C.C. § 1-208 (March 1, 1950); U.C.C. § 1-208, Official Draft: Text Edition (1949),
reprintedin 9 U.C.C. DRAFIs 17 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
197. A.L.IJN.C.C., Transcript, supranote 187, at 31-32.
198. Id. at 189. This passage also evidences how much of the Uniform
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The drafters probably did intend to prevent liquidation of
collateral for no reason. The mandatory section would have
prevented such individual contracting out of the Code
provisions. In any case, the objection to section 1-107 focused
more on its symbolic significance of being against freedom of
contract rather than any of its specific applications. Malcolm,
for example, objected that section 1-107 would stifle the
creative spirit of free enterprise:
Without appearing to wax eloquent, to me, two of the greatest
virtues of the Anglo-Saxon legal system as well as the free
enterprise economic system are the ability of these systems to
adjust to change and thus to encourage, rather than discourage,
dynamic forces in society. Assuming all the possible virtues in the
Code, I think there is a very real danger that the Code system
could materially injure these attributes. Under 1-107 as presently
written I believe the Code would injure them. Under the proposed
revision of 1-107 I think
199 such danger is materially reduced, if not
completely eliminated.

In May of 1950, the Council of the Section of Corporation,
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association
requested that the adoption of the Code be postponed,"'
particularly criticizing the "mandatory unless permitted"
section.2"'
Llewellyn defended section 1-107 at the Joint ALI/NCC
Meeting which took place two days after the ABA report. He
presented the problem as a technical drafting one: a statute
could either say that the rules are mandatory unless they
Commercial Code was written in response to the experience of the Great
Depression, which was in the memories of the drafters. In my Between-the-Wars
Social Thought, I argue that, 'Thus, the entire contractual framework of Article 2,
including its rejection of formal doctrines which made contracting difficult, and
provisions such as cover that keep contracts alive, were responses to the problems
created by the Depression." Kamp, supranote 25, at 390.
199. Letter from Walter Malcolm to Soia Mentschikoff (Oct. 31, 1950) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
200. See Resolutions (May 16, 1950), supra note 187, at 7.
201.
By way of disapproval, views by a substantial number of individual
members of the Section have been expressed to the effect that under
Section 1-107, the provisions of the Code are much too rigid, with the
result that it will seriously interfere with freedom of contract and the
necessary flexible development of commercial practices and
mechanisms.
Id. at 3.
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state that they are subject to agreement or are subject to
agreement unless they state they are mandatory.0 2
Furthermore, he just did not understand the idea that the
section restricted freedom of contract." 3 In the discussion,
Malcolm stated that if the Code were changed to permissive,
"the chances of the Code being accepted by large grouys of
people I should think would be materially enhanced."20 The
motion to strike the section lost, so the mandatory provision
survived a little longer."
In response to the ALI/NCC position, an ABA report
stated that "[r]ecognizing the inherent difficulties in the
problem this Committee does not think section 1-107 as
presently drawn is a satisfactory solution."20 6 Malcolm
informed Mentschikoff of the ABA position in October of
1950. He then made the statement that the mandatory
2 7
section would injure the "dynamic forces in society."
202. See A.L.IJN.C.C. Consideration, supra note 71.
203. "It is difficult for more to see how the discrimination between rules which
are subject to contract and rules which are not subject to contract, can possibly be
an interference with freedom of contract." Id. at 176.
204. Id. at 181.
205. The motion had been made by Professor Frederick K Beutel of the
University of Nebraska. He would go on to criticize the mandatory provision in his
The Proposed Uniform Commercial Code as a Problem, in Codification, 16 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 140, 162 (1950). "But for sheer presumptuousness and
impossibility of administration Section 1-107 takes all the prizes." Id. at 161.
206. A.B.A. Report, supra note 47, at 131.
207.
Entirely aside from the matter of reconciliation of views, I urge the
amendment of 1-107 along the lines discussed simply to improve the
Code and what I believe to be the sound development of law as affected
by the Code. Without appearing to wax eloquent, to me, two of the
greatest virtues of the Anglo-Saxon legal system as well as the free
enterprise economic system are the ability of these systems to adjust to
change and thus to encourage, rather than discourage, dynamic forces
in society. Assuming all the possible virtues in the Code, I think there
is a very real danger that the Code system could materially injure
these attributes. Under 1-107 as presently written I believe the Code
would injure them. Under the proposed revision of 1-107 I think such
danger is materially reduced, if not completely eliminated.
Consequently, I think 1-107 should be revised for these most basic
reasons. With due respect, I further believe you are seriously in error
in thinking the objection to 1-107 is largely happenstance and now has
developed into an emotional issue. On the contrary I believe that the
present 1-107 runs counter to instinctive reactions and considered
judgments that are basically sound.
Letter from Walter Malcolm to Soia Mentschikoff (October 31, 1950) (on file with
A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
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In his letter to Mentschikoff, Malcolm could not make
any promises:
Turning to what might be called the political aspects of your
question, I certainly cannot commit and I doubt if I can predict the
action of the Council on this matter. I will make one or two
guesses. The first one is that if 1-107 is not changed the action of
the Council is likely to be unfavorable, probably to the Code as a
whole. On the other hand if 1-107 is revised along the lines
discussed there will
2 8 still be basic opposition, but reasonable
0
chance of approval.

Malcolm first presented his solution to the problem at the
ABA Committee meeting of January 13, 1951. His proposal
forms the basis of today's Code sections 1-102(3) and (4):
(3) In construing and applying this Act to effect its purpose the
following rules shall apply:
(a) Definitions and formal requirements such as those
determining what constitutes a negotiable instrument, a bona fide
purchaser, a holder in due course, due negotiation of documents of
title and the like are not subject to variation by agreement.
(b) The rights and duties of a third party except as otherwise
provided by this Act may not be adversely affected by an
agreement to which he is not a party or by which he is not bound
by adoption, ratification or the like;
(c) The minimum obligations and warranties prescribed by this
Act such as good faith, due diligence, commercial reasonableness,
reasonable care and the like may not be disclaimed or limited by
agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations and
warranties is to be measured and such standards shall be
conclusive unless they are manifestly unreasonable;
(d) Subject to the foregoing sub-sections and except as otherwise
specifically provided in this Act, the individual provisions of this

Review).
208. Id.
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Malcolm introduced his proposal to the Enlarged
Editorial Board on January 27, 1951. Mentschikoff then
indicated that the Reporters were not in opposition to the
proposal. Section 1-107 was deleted and section 1-102 was
rewritten.21 °
So the Code switched from being mandatory to
permissive, making it possible for White and Summers to
write: "Finally, most of the Code's provisions are not
mandatory. The parties may vary their effect or displace
them altogether:
2 11 freedom of contract is the rule rather than
the exception."

209. A.B.A. Meeting, supra note 72, at 4-5.
210. See U.C.C. § 1-102(3), Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition (1951),
reprintedin 12 U.C.C. DRAFrS 43-44 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
(3) In construing and applying this Act to effect its purposes the
following rules shall apply;
(a) Definitions and formal requirements such as those determining
what constitutes a negotiable instrument, a bona fide purchase, a
holder in due course, due negotiation of documents of title and the like
are not subject to variation by agreement;
(b) Except as otherwise provided by this Act the rights and duties of a
third party may not be adversely varied by an agreement to which he is
not a party or by which he is not bound by adoption, ratification or the
like;
(c) The general obligations prescribed by Act such as good faith, due
diligence, commercial reasonableness and reasonable care may not be
disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be
measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable;
(d) Provisions of this Act which are qualified by the words "unless
otherwise agreed" or words of similar may be waived or modified by
agreement despite the provisions of subsection (c) and the absence of
such words contains no negative implication unless the subject matter
comes within the foregoing subsections;
(e) Subject to the foregoing subsections and except as otherwise
specifically provided in this Act, the effect of provisions of this Act may
be varied by agreement;
Id.
211. WHITE & SUAIMERS, supra note 17, at 7.
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b. Trade and JudicialRegulation of Contract.
(1) The Interlocking Sections. The 1949 Code provided
for strong trade and judicial regulation of contract, based on
a set of interlocking sections. These were:
1. Section 1-201(2), defining agreement
as being formed
2
by language and the usage of trade.

P

2. Section 1-201(16), defining good faith in terms of
reasonable commercial standards. The pertinent comment
states that the court can "inquire as to whether a particular
commercial standard is in fact reasonable." 13
3. Section 1-203. "Every contract within this
14 Act imposes
an obligation of good faith in its performance."

4. Section 1-205. This was (and is) a complex section
which attempted to regulate the relationship between the
explicit terms of an agreement, course of dealing, and usage
of trade.215 Section 1-205(3) provided that merchants were
directly bound by usages of trade. The comment states that
usages of trade are to be seen as prima facie reasonable, but
that courts can police them if the market is dominated by
sellers or buyers in a manner "so unfair to be
unreasonable."2'
5. Section 2-302, unconscionability, is explained by
212. U.C.C. § 1-201(2), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 44 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
213. U.C.C. § 1-201, cmt. 18, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition
(1949), reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFMS 49 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
214. U.C.C. § 1-203, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFT 52 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
215. U.C.C. § 1-205, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRATS 53-54 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
216. U.C.C. § 1-205, cmt. 6, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition
(1949); reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTs 56 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). The NYLRC
implemented the present system in which usage of trade works through the
contract language: "A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade
in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or
should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of
an agreement." U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1999). The pertinent comment explains:
This Act deals with "usage of trade" as a factor in reaching the
commercial meaning of the agreement which the parties have made.
The language used is to be interpreted as meaning what it may fairly
be expected to mean to parties involved in the particular commercial
transaction in a given locality or in a given vocation or trade.
U.C.C. § 1-205, cmt. 4, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949), reprinted
in 7 U.C.C. DRAFrs 55 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). No longer does usage of trade directly
regulate contract; rather, it forms the context in which the language is to be
interpreted.
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usages of trade. The comments state that the contract has to
be in "reasonably fair form."
6. Sections 2-720 and 2-721, on liquidation, limitations,
and consequential damages,2" provide for changes in the
remedy sections of the Code "only to an amount which is
reasonable." Parties may limit consequential damages, but
not in an "unfair or unreasonable manner."
Thus, the judge and the trade had the tools to regulate
commercial contracts. The judge could police contracts for
reasonableness under the unconscionability and damages
sections, and police trade usage under section 1-201(16) and
section 1-205. The trade could set standards of commercial
decency under sections 1-201(16) and 1-205 (good faith), and
the definition of agreement, section 1-201(2). Individual
contracting was to be subject to trade and judicial
supervision. The writer of a law review comment in 1950
realized that the unconscionability section "would make
extensive judicial policing possible" and that the Code's
approach might "cause notions
211 of fair exchange to replace
ideals of freedom of contract."

Both judicial and trade regulation were long-standing
programs of Llewellyn. To him, a judge should engage in the
"Grand Style" of judging, in which the court's role is "to
resolve the doubt according to wisdom, justice and situation
sense within the leeways accorded by the authoritative
sources."2 19 Under the "Grand Style" of jurisprudence, courts

should use their freedom to decide cases justly. The "Code
was drafted in the expectation that it would be interpreted by
common law trained lawyers and judges and in the hope that
209
they would adopt 'the Grand Style' in their approach to it."

The U.C.C. was written with "faith in the court's ability to
judge wisely whenever it understands the base lines for
judgment."M1 Certainly the 1949 Code gave the judge ample
power to police the reasonableness of trade usages, contract
provisions, and remedy limitations.
217. U.C.C. §§ 2-720, 2-721, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 267-69 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
218. Comment, Policing Contracts Under the Commercial Code, 18 U. CI.
L. REV. 146, 150-53 (1950).
219. WILLIA TWING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVMENT 213
(1973).
220. Id. at 312.
221. Id. at 340; see also SoiA MIENTScHIKOFF, COMIMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS,
CASES, AND MATERIALS 7 (1970).
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Llewellyn set out what he was trying to accomplish by
his reformulation of contract law in a document entitled
"Introductory Comments" or "General Comment on Parts II
and III" (General Comment). The General Comment
appeared in various forms from 1944 to 1948 but never
became part of an official draft.222
Language about the Code being interpreted to yield
Comment.
General
the
pervades
"reasonableness"
"'Reasonableness' is read into time and method of inspection
teams or as to facilities to be provided for receiving
delivery."223 Llewellyn stated that "[e]xpress terms shall
dominate only when such construction is reasonable."224 He
stressed "[tihe principle of reasonable construction and
225 and added, "This Act protects only the
against surprise,"
reasonable action and reasonable expectations of both
parties." 6 Thus the courts have the "power and du ... to
police against the unbalanced and the unreasonable.""
The trade through establishing custom and usage would
also regulate contract. Llewellyn's emphasis on the
importance of applying trade norms to regulate commercial
transactions was possibly the most important of his goals for
commercial law.22 For a variety of reasons, it was crucial that
a merchant's contract and conduct be subject to good usages
of trade. Section 1-201(16), which defined good faith in terms
of reasonable commercial standards, and section 1-205(3),
which bound merchants to usages of trade, together imposed
commercial norms on all commercial transactions.

222. See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Introductory Comment to Parts II and III,
Formation and Construction, Llewellyn Papers, J.IX.2.a (on file with the Llewellyn
Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227.
However, the insistence of the courts on the power and duty of the law
to police against the unbalanced and unreasonable remains as sound in
regard to "rules" and standard contract clauses as it does in regard to
non-codified usages of trade and the basic principle of this Act against
surprise and unconscionability contained in Section 2-6 (S 23) and
discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, recognizes this power explicitly
in the case of contract terms and a fortiori in the case of non-codified
usage.
Id. at 37.
228. See generallyKamp, supranotes 25, 57.

2001]

HISTORY OF THE U.C.C. 1949-1954

415

(2) Unconscionability.
(a) The Version of Spring 1950. The unconscionability
section, which had started as a section regulating form
contracts on the basis of reasonableness, changed again in
Spring of 1950. Explicitly giving the courts power to reform
contracts, it called forth criticism from the bar. In response,
the drafters limited its powers and in so doing turned away
from the original conception of Llewellyn. Today's section,
which has caused so much commentary and controversy, is
merely a remnant of what was a much more powerful and
meaningful regulatory system. 229
The practicing bar did not like unconscionability because
it interfered with freedom of contract, gave too much power to
judges to rewrite contracts, and made the enforcement of
contracts too indeterminate. In fact, the ABA in 1951 almost
decided to oppose any unconscionability clause.23
The drafters made changes to both the text and the
comment to section 2-302 in Spring of 1950. The 1949 draft
had provided that the court could "substitute for the stricken
clause such provision[s] as would be implied under this
article if the stricken clause had never existed." ' At the May,
1950, meeting, Llewellyn reported that "Section 2-302 has
met heavy fire primarily directed at the word "substitute" in
line 4. Apparently the conception of a court substituting a
clause for one which is written is a shocking conception.""
The "substitution" language was stricken and the section
read:
"If the court finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to be unconscionable, it may refuse to enforce the
contract or strike any unconscionable clauses and enforce
the
3
contract as if the stricken clause had never existed.",
The drafters also changed the comment to section 2-302.
229. White and Summers devote 28 pages to the concept and state that their
chapter is only an attempt, 'The task demands a book of its own." WHITE &
SUMMIERS, supra note 6, at 132.
230. A motion to strike in the A.B.A.'s U.C.C. Committee lost by a tie vote,
Enlarged Editorial Board supranote 4, at 196.
231. U.C.C. § 2-302(1), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFTs 94 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
232. Consideration of Proposed Final Draft of the Uniform Commercial Code
306 (May 18, 1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
233. Id.
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That of 1949 had spoken in terms of unreasonableness:"This
section is intended to apply to the field of sales the equity
for
contracts
of policing
policy
ancient
courts'
unconscionability or unreasonableness."2 In May of 1950, it
read: "This section is intended to make it possible for the
courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses
which they find to be unconscionable." 35 The shift from
unreasonable to unconscionable narrowed the power of the
courts to police contracts.
Furthermore, "superior bargaining power" was not to be
a factor:
The basic test is whether in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case the clauses involved are so one-sided as not to be expected to
be included in the agreement. The principal [sic] is one of the
of allocation
prevention of unfair surprises and not of disturbance
2 6
3
of risks because of superior bargaining power.

By rejecting unequal bargaining as a factor, the comment
turned away from one of Llewellyn's primary goals of the law:
achieving fairness by policing unequal bargains. It also
specifically rejected a goal of the prior drafts-judicial
regulation of unequal bargaining.
There was no discussion of this change in the ALI's
annual meetings in 1949 or 1950. Perhaps the change was
made in response to a letter sent to the ALI by Hiram
Thomas in 1949. In it he points out that the term
"unconscionable" has a legal meaning "which is far different
from what the Comment says." The comment "authorizes the
court to continue the 'ancient policy of policing contracts for
unconscionability or unreasonableness,' and it apparently
would make the various sections of the Act standards of
reasonableness." 7 In a second memo he observed: "There
seems to be a tendency in various sections and the comment
to prevent one of the contracting parties from making a
234. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFIM 95 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
235. U.C.C. § 2-302, cmt. 1, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (Spring

Kelly ed., 1984).
1950), reprintedin 10 U.C.C. DRAFTS 117 (E.

236. Id.
237. Memorandum from Hiram Thomas on the May 1949 Draft of the
Commercial Code, to the American Law Institute (May 1949) (on file with A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review)
(discussing article 2, Sales § 2-302).
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bargain more advantageous to238him then to the other party
even when it is done honestly."
The deletion of "unreasonable" and the addition of "not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power" could have been responses to meet
Thomas' objections. Maybe the phrase was not intended to
reject the Code's initial concern with equal bargaining power,
but merely to point out that a judge should not invalidate a
contract because one party got a better deal than another.
Read literally, however, the comment states that equal
bargaining power is not a concern of unconscionability." 9 The
changes in the comments represent the final failure of an
effort to include a general requirement of equal bargaining in
commercial law. The ban on unequal bargaining at the
extreme continued under section 2-302, but the idea that a
commercial law should police contracts for equal bargaining
died with this change in the comment.
The idea of equal bargaining had been a key concept of
the Code and a prime concern of Llewellyn, indeed of many
economic and social thinkers. In several writings, Llewellyn
insisted on its importance. In his 1930 sales casebook, he
stated, "Note that if the contract form has become really
standardized among competitors, or if the other bargaining
party is at a bargaining disadvantage (the small apartment
renter, the factory laborer, the shipper of goods by railroad,
the purchaser of steel or of insurance), we have something
approaching legislation by one group on its relations with
another group."24 In 1938, Llewellyn again was concerned
with the "little man."24 '
238. Memorandum from Hiram Thomas on the May 1949 Draft of the

Commercial Code, to the American Law Institute (August 1949) (on file with A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review)
(discussing paramount public safety).
239. This change contradicted the comment to section 1-205 which in spring of
1950 still spoke in terms of "domination" by sellers or buyers. "But in a market
dominated by buyers or by sellers as the case may be, practices can become
standard which are so unfair as to be unreasonable, and that aspect of the
anciently established policing of usage by the courts is continued." U.C.C. § 1-205,
cmt. 6, U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft (1950), reprintedin 10 U.C.C. DRAFMS 72 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
240. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 51
(1930).
241. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U. L.Q. 183, 185 n.47 (1938) ("Leaving the matter to clauses does result,
however, in penalizinglittle men where bigger outfits bargain out; and this is not
wise lawmaking wherever the level either of factual expectation or of commercial

418

BUFFALOLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Llewellyn's desire for equal bargaining derived from the
views of the institutional economists, whose thought formed
the basis of Llewellyn's economic assumptions. These
economists saw equal bargaining as a central concern.2 42 The
institutional economist, John Commons, a major influence on
Llewellyn,243 saw bargaining outcomes as "better" if they
derived from equal bargaining.
An agreement was considered by Commons to be truly "fair" only if
arrived at solely through persuasion (assuming no fraud is
involved) or, alternatively, if coercion is absent. By the term
coercion Commons meant more than the threat of violence, or
duress. An individual's "willingness" to agree to another's terms is
profoundly influenced by his/her power to wait for the other to give
in. The one with larger resources can generally wait longer than
the other, thereby using his/her power (to wait) to favorably
influence the terms of exchange. This type of "economic coercion"
was regarded by Commons, like physical coercion, to be "unfair."
"Fair" therefore implies: "as resulting from bargaining between
parties with equal physical and economic power." Accordingly,
outcomes will be "better" as they come progressively closer to the
outcomes that would obtain if everyone actually possessed equal
power to wait for the other to give in, that is, equal bargaining
power. The same interpretation of "better" would obviously apply
equally to the working rules that shape those outcomes.

Equal bargaining would promote cooperative behavior
and effective laws:
Commons believed two principles were of special import to the
development of a process that would actually function to promote
reasonable value. The first reflected his belief that without willing
cooperation, no law is likely to be effective. It was Commons's
conclusion, based on his reading of American industrial and labor
history, that when genuine bargaining between equals takes place,
individuals are far more likely to think of the agreed-upon-rules as
"fair," and therefore to cooperate with them, than when rules are
handed down "from above." In other words, rules arrived at
decency is such as to make the clauses normally desirable.").
242. See Kamp, supra note 25, at 368-70.
243. Llewellyn listed Commons as an influence in 1925 in his first work, The
Effect ofLegal Institutions Upon Economics, 15 AM. EcoN. REv. 665, 665 n.1 (1925)
[hereinafier Effect], and in his last, THE COMION LAW TRADrrION DECIDING
APPEALS 14, 218 (1960).
244. Yngve Ramstad, From Desideratum to Historical Achievement: John R.
Commons's Reasonable Value and the "NegotiatedEconomy" of Denmark, 25 J.
EcoN. ISSUES 431,434 (1991).
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through a process approximately, as closely as possible,
equalitarian collective bargaining were seen by Commons as more
likely to elicit cooperation and thus to be adhered to, than rules
mandating compulsory "social responsibility" as determined by
legislators or "experts.""'

Commons's advocacy of regulatory commissions to be
"charged with the task of formulating the general contours of
'reasonable' working rules, that is, those representing a
genuine 'compromise' between the conflicting interests, and
to resolve disputes arising out of their application to specific
circumstances."2 46

Commons's proposal resembles the proposed Revised
Uniform Sales Acts of 1940 and 1941 which provided for
judges working in conjunction with juries of merchants to
determine reasonable and good commercial practices.
Llewellyn's Commercial Code was to substitute a system of
equally-bargained-for trade rules, with supervision by judges
and merchant tribunals, for a system of individual,
unregulated bargaining.
Section I-C of 1941 Draft evidenced Llewellyn's concerns.
Although the section was withdrawn, it was the ancestor of
section 2-302.247 Under section 1-C, the judge was to
determine if a "bloc" of provisions in a form contract was "fair
and balanced" or not.
1. If the bloc as a whole is shown affirmatively to work a
displacement of the Act in an unfair and unbalanced fashion
not required by the circumstances of the trade, then the party
wanting to apply a provision must show the other party
intended the provision to displace or modify the relevant
provision of this Act.248
2. On the other hand, if the bloc as a whole is "shown
affirmatively to work a fair and balanced allocation of rights
and duties in view of the circumstances of the trade, its
incorporation into the particularized terms of the bargain is

245. Id.
246. Id. at 435.
247. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability ant the Code-the Emperor's
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
248. Proposed Revised Uniform Sales Act § 1-C(1)(d) (1941), reprinted in 1
U.C.C. CONFMENTIAL DRAFTs 18-21 (E. Kelly and A. Puckett eds., 1995). The
withdrawn § 1-C can be found in a letter from Karl N. Llewellyn to Underhill
Moore (Sept. 5, 1941) (on file with the Yale Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review).

420

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

presumed.249
In the General Comment discussed above, Llewellyn sets
out two guides to determine '"hether a set of standard
provisions call for sympathetic and expansive application or
for a hostile attitude."2"' "The first index is found in the
provisions of this Act itself."25' The Act's "prime characteristic
is a balanced adjustment of the rights and interests of both
the buyer and the seller."252 The second index is the origin of
the rules as standard form. The comment distinguishes
built up
between "balanced contracts and those contracts
25
bargain."
the
of
side
one
for
and
from
wholly
The rejection in the unconscionability comment of any
concern with equal bargaining power jettisoned this longtime goal of Karl Llewellyn for commercial law. It also
drained much of the meaning from section 2-302. Prior to the
change, one could judge any deal from the standpoint of the
key question posited by the institutional economists: what
kind of an agreement would be made by two parties with an
equal bargaining power? This would have been an objective
standard to judge unconscionability. Instead, as pointed out
by Professor Lefts definitive article, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, unconscionability
became to be defined in terms of itself.
(b) The 1951 Changes in Section 2-302. The next
change in unconscionability came in the Enlarged Editorial
Board Meeting of late January, 1951. There Malcolm
that
concluded
had
ABA
the
that
reported
unconscionability should be retained within narrower
limits, after Section 2-302 had narrowly survived a motion
to strike.
Mr. Bernard Broeker, who represented Bethlehem
Steel,254 pointed out that the problem was in the comments:
249. R.U.SA_ § 1-C(2)(a), Proposed Revised Uniform Sales Act (1941),
reprintedin 1 U.C.C. CONFIDENTIAL DRAFrs 18-21 (E. Kelly and A. Puckett eds.,
1995).
250. Id. at 38.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 40.
254. See ABA Meeting, supra note 72, at 1. Note that "Broeker" is there
spelled "Brocker." Id. Bernard D. Broeker was the Assistant Secretary and
Assistant to Vice President, Bethlehem Steel Company. See Bernard D. Broeker,
Articles 2 and 6: Sales and Bulk Transactions,15 U. PNT'. L. REv. 541 (1954).
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"Unconscionable" is certainly not "unreasonable" or "unfair." And
not only here but in other Sections of this Code, the Comments
make it clear that the word "unconscionable" means
"unreasonable."... I see no reason why I should not be allowed to
make an unreasonable contract.... Quite often I know each party
to a contract thinks there are some unreasonable provisions in it,
but it is the best deal he can make.

He referred also to a comment of section 2-721, which
"talks about good faith, decent commercial practice, and

reasonable care, which is to me a clear indication that the
reporters are using the word 'unconscionable' as meaning
nothing more than 'unreasonable.' ,25 These comments were
later changed, to shift the Code from regulating on the basis

of "unreasonable" to "unconscionable."
Then Professor Robert Braucher made his contribution to
the unconscionability section, which is now section 2-302(2).257
That sub-section provides for the introduction of evidence as
to the commercial purpose and setting of challenged contract
language. Llewellyn loved Braucher's proposal.258
Professor Leff questions whether this sub-section gives
any help in a typical unconscionability case and creates a few
hilarious scenarios in which the slick merchant testifies that
the practice is to "make money."'59 Leff notes that what
255. See Enlarged Editorial Board, supranote 4, at 172.
256. Id. at 173.
257. "When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable, the court may afford the parties an opportunity to
present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose, and effect as used." Id. at
173. Robert Braucher was at that time a professor of law at Harvard; later he
became a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. See BRAUCHER
& RIEGERT, supra note 17, at iii.
258. See Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 174 ("The Drafting Staff
will welcome that, will welcome such a subsection. It clarifies definitely the
meaning of the Section and addresses the cours attention to vitally important
stuff.").
259.
Counsel: What is the effect of this provision?
Seller: It's hard to tell, but we think it helps a little.
Counsel: Helps do what?
Seller: Helps make more money.
Counsel: What about commercial setting? Does everybody use this
clause?
Seller: How would I know? What am I, some kind of conspiracy? I guess
whoever can use it uses it.
Counsel: What would happen if you didn't use such a provision in your
contract?

422

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Braucher had in mind was "testimony on the technical
business requirements of particular business complexes"
which would help judges "to regulate the agreements within
industries on an ad hoc basis."26 Braucher indeed justifies his
proposal by explaining that if a court can ask whether a trade
has regulated itself properly or whether a form contract used
by an industry is unconscionable, the court should look at the
particular circumstances, which may reveal that a seemingly
unconscionable provision "may not be in the light of the
conditions in the trade."26 '
Braucher and Llewellyn differ from Leff in that they saw
unconscionability as a device to regulate group or mass
contracting-in trade agreements or form contracts. Leff sees
section 2-301 in terms of individual contracting. Where
individual A has bilked B it makes no sense to investigate
"commercial setting, purpose, and effect," but it does if
section 2-302's main purpose was to regulate contracts made
on a mass basis, through standardized forms or standardized
trade agreements. It is this difference in conception which is
a root cause of the difficulty of interpretation of section 2-302.
It is yet another irony of the Code that the drafters' main
purpose for section 2-302, the regulation of commercial
contracts en masse, is seen to be a side issue by
commentators and the courts. 62
(c) The Change in the Comments: "Unreasonable" to
"Unconscionable." In 1950, the comments encouraged courts
to police trade usage, contract language, and commercial
dealing for reasonableness and decency. The intent was to
create a "kinder, gentler" commercial world.263 Section 1Seller: I'd make less money.
Counsel: What if you sold only to people who could afford it?
Seller: I'd make much less money.
Counsel: Doesn't your conscience bother you?
Seller: Wha?"
Leff, supranote 247, at 545.
260. Id. at 543.
261. See Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 174.
262. See, e.g., W=IT AND SUTmIaMRS, supra note 6, at 155 ("As we remarked
earlier, courts have not generally been solicitous of business persons in the name of
unconscionability.").
263. Section 1-203, comment 1, stated, "This Act adopts the principles of those
cases which see a commercial contract not as an 'arm's-length' adversary venture,
but as a venture of material interest, when successful, and as involving due regard
for commercial decencies when an expected favorable outcome fails." U.C.C. § 1-
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205, "Course of Dealing and Usage of Trade," explicitly
authorized judges to police one-sided trade usages," and
the comment of section 2-721 equated "unfair and
unreasonable" with "unconscionable.'
The late 1953 version of the U.C.C. was the last one
which contained comments until that of 1956.26 The
comments of late 1953, the last version before the NYLRC
hearings, gave less scope for the court to regulate the
"reasonableness" of commercial contracts. The change in the
statute from objective to subjective good faith meant that
applicable comment no longer could talk of "commercial
decency." Section 1-205's comment still spoke in terms of
"unfair" and "unreasonable,"26 ' while the comment under
section
2-719
substituted
"unconscionable"
for
"unreasonable."2 6
M

203, cmt. 1, U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft (1950), reprintedin 10 U.C.C. DRAFrs 68
(E. Kelly ed., 1984). The Comment to the definition of good faith pointed out that
merchants "must also conform to reasonable commercial standards," which were
not "the lax standards sometimes permitted to grow up but is intended to permit
the court to inquire as to whether the commercial standard is in fact reasonable."
U.C.C. § 1-201(18), cmt. 18, U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft (1950), reprinted in 10
U.C.C. DRAFTS 64 (E. Kelly ed., 1984) (emphasis added).
264. "But in a market dominated by buyers or by sellers as the case may be,
practices can become standard which are so unfair as to become unreasonable,and
that aspect of the anciently established policing of usage by the courts is
continued." U.C.C. § 1-205, cmt. 6, U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft (1950), reprintedin
10 U.C.C. DRAFrS 72 (E.Kelly ed., 1984) (emphasis added).
265. "Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of
this Article in an unfair or unreasonable manner is subject to deletion as
unconscionable and in that event the remedies made available by this Article one
applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed." U.C.C. § 2-721, cmt. 1,
U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft (1950), reprinted in 10 U.C.C. DRAFTS 303 (E. Kelly
ed., 1984) (emphasis added).
266. The late 1953 version is entitled, "UJNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
OFFICIAL DRAFT, TEXT AND COMMENTS EDITION, 1952, WITH CHANGES
AND MODIFICATIONS APPROVED BY THE ENLARGED EDITORIAL BOARD
AT MEETINGS HELD ON DECEMBER 29,1952, FEBRUARY 16,1953, MAY 21,
1953 AND DECEMBER 11, 1953." U.C.C. Official Draft: Text and Comments
Edition (1953), reprinted in 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 1 (E.Kelly ed., 1984).
267. Now the comment speaks in terms of "unconscionable" and "dishonest"
and leaves out "domination" by buyers or sellers. U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt.6 (1995). "But
the anciently established policing of usage by the court is continued to the extent
necessary to cope with the situation arising if an unconscionable or dishonest
practice should become standard." Id. (emphasis added).
268. "Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of
this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion." U.C.C. § 2-719,
cmt. 1, U.C.C. Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1953), reprintedin 16
U.C.C. DRAFTs 289 (E. Kelly ed., 1984) (emphasis added).
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Even though after these changes there was less room for
judicial oversight, the Code was still criticized for giving too
much power to the courts.269
2. The Change From Objective to Subjective Good Faith.
The 1949 Code provided that good faith was objective, being
defined in terms of reasonable commercial standards.2
This was changed to today's version in May of 1951, with
good faith being defined as honesty in fact. Articles 2 and
3 retained objective good faith, 72 defined in terms of
conformity with trade norms. The change from objective to
subjective good faith was another major change which
rejected a long-standing goal of Llewellyn's for commercial
law, the idea that commercial law should be regulated by
"good" merchant practices.
Llewellyn wrote of the necessity of enforcing trade norms
against the merchant outlaw in his first article, "The Effect of
Legal Institutions Upon Economics."27 To Llewellyn, law's
purpose is to restrain the individual who violates community
norms, whether he be the criminal or the contract breaker:
The rules of law against assault come into active play only at the
individual margin when passion crosses the threshold of selfcontrol, and come into play socially only with that marginal
individual who falls below the standard of self-control commonly
developed by early education. For it seems clear that, if the
marginal individual were not restrained at least in the bulk of
269. The bankers stated it would "constitute an open invitation to the courts to
ignore the provisions of the Code and of commercial agreements whenever their
own predilictions [sic] tempt them to do so." Report of Special Committee of
American Bankers Ass'n. on Proposed Uniform Commercial Code 5 (1954),
Llewellyn Papers, J. XVI. 1.b. (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of
Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
270. U.C.C. § 2-102(16), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (May
1949), reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFMS 45 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
271. U.C.C. § 1-201(19), Proposed Final Draft, No. 2 (Spring 1951), reprintedin
12 U.C.C. DRAFTS 35 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
272. U.C.C. §§ 2-103(1)(b), 3-302, Proposed Draft, No. 2 (Spring 1951),
reprintedin 12 U.C.C. DRAFTS 43, 127 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). Article 3 changed to the
subjective good faith standard in 1955. U.C.C. § 3-302(1), U.C.C. Supplement, No.
1 (January 1955), reprintedin 17 U.C.C. DRAFTs 336-37 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). This
section was changed recently and is now objective. See U.C.C. § 3-103(4) (1995).
Article 3 changed to subjective good faith in 1955. U.C.C. § 3-302(1), U.C.C.
Supplement, No. 1 (January 1955), reprintedin 17 U.C.C. DRAFTS 336-37 (E. Kelly
ed., 1984). The section was changed recently and now is objective. 1995 U.C.C. § 3103(4).
273. See Effect, supranote 243.
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cases, either in self-defense or by imitation, laxity in the matter
would spread through the group; such is the process of cut-throat
competition. So, too, with the enforcement of contract obligation;
and this regardless of delays,
costs, and occasional acquiescence in
274
the breach of contracts.

Certainly Llewellyn and Mentschikoff kept pushing for
including good trade standards in the commercial law. In
1951, he wanted to add "and fair dealings" to section 1-203.275
Mentschikoff wrote a memo to the NYLRC in 1954 arguing
(unsuccessfully) that requiring the observance of reasonable
commercial standards for notes was not a new concept but
was the actual law of New York.2 6
The U.C.C., with its emphasis on enforcing trade norms,
good practice, and commercial decency, can be seen as an
attempt to carry on the program of the National Recovery Act
after it was declared unconstitutional.2 7 ' The New Deal's first
and primary program to end the Depression, the National
Recovery Administration, was to establish trade standards
and enforce them. The theory held "that overproduction led to
lower prices and "chiseling," the lessening of the quality of
goods and cheating, which further caused lower wages,
decreased demand, overproduction, and finally, lower prices
and chiseling again.
The NRA was to establish and enforce
fair commercial practices.7 9
The NRA failed in part because it was unable to establish
codes of fair competition. Business could not agree on what
fair competition should be. As stated by Donald R. Brand,
"the social consensus necessary for the NRA to succeed
simply did not exist."2 80
History repeated itself in the early 1950s, when the
lawyers of the American Bar Association resisted Llewellyn's
program to police commerce in terms of commercial decency.
274. Id. at 682.
275. Minutes of Small EditorialBoard Meeting Uniform Commercial Code 2
(Nov. 14, 1951) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law

Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
276. See Memorandum by Professor Soia Mentschikoff Relating to Section 3302(1)(b) 2 (Aug. 16, 1954) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
277. United States v. A.LA Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
278. Kamp, supra note 25, at 365.
279. BERNARD BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA 36-38 (1975).
280. DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: A STUDY OF THE
NATIONALRECOVERYADMINISTRATION 105 (1988).
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In 1950, the ABA Committee in the Proposed Commercial
Code published a report critical of the proposed good faith
standards.28 ' The Report observes:
Prima facie it is reasonable to require good faith in the
performance of contracts. However, it is of interest that this
provision and certain others in the same vein have produced quite
a violent reaction on the part of some businessmen and business
lawyers. They say: "Why should the Code draftsmen tell us to be
good? Businessmen, or at least most of them, carry on business
ethically and did so long before the Code was ever conceived. The
Code should not try to prescribe morals."
Undoubtedly the Code draftsmen would reply: "Such a reaction
merely evidences oversensitivness. If a businessman acts honestly
and observes reasonable commercial standards he has no cause for
worry. We are merely aiming at the businessman who does not."
To this the businessman might reply: "Yes, but it is unwise to
prescribe in words such a rigid standard. I do the best I can and I
am as honest as the next fellow, but businessmen and business
houses are frequently faced with 'strike' suits. If some disgruntled
customer does not like what I do I may be faced with a suit where
it will be contended that I haven't observed reasonable commercial
standards. 282

The ABA Committee had two problems with including
"observance of reasonable commercial standards" in the
definition of good faith. The first was the problem of proving
what a particular standard would be.
Assuming, however, that within the term there should be added
to "honesty" some meaning of "commercial decency" the phrase
"observance of reasonable commercial standards" carries with it
the implication of usages, customs or practices. If this is true there
immediately arises the very difficulty problem of what usages,
customs and practices are those intended to be included in the
standard. Any lawyer who has ever attempted to prove what a
usage or custom is will immediately recognize how litigious such a
standard could grow to be.283

281. See September 1949 Report Developments, supra note 47.
282. Id. at 16.

283. Id. at 18-19.
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Llewellyn always assumed that it would be possible to
ascertain good trade practices. Practicing lawyers were never
as sanguine.
The second problem was that the standards could refer
only to the practices of a specific time "and thereby destroy
the flexibility absolutely essential to the gradual evolution of
therefore
Committee
The
practices." 2'
commercial
recommended a possible definition: "Good faith means
and
honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned
285
the absence of trickery, deceit, or improper purpose."
In response, the drafters dropped objective good faith
from article 1 in Spring of 1951, while retaining it in part in
articles 2 and 3. 2 6 The result was the present-day anomaly of
having differing definitions of good faith depending on the
article in today's U.C.C.
The drafters thought that in providing for extensive
regulation of contract that they were in tune with the spirit of
times. Gilmore wrote in 1948: "Although the political water is
doubtful, nothing is less likely than that the future will see a
protracted period of unregulated private agreement.... What
is certain is that a 19th century laissez-faire code, or a code
drafted with such an underlying bias, will be far from
adequate in an economy which has scrapped laissez-faire
principles." 8 '
Practicing attorneys, the organized bar, and the affected
industries, however, were not as enthusiastic about judicial
or trade regulation of commerce. They managed to water
down these provisions, enlarging the scope of individual
contracting free of such oversight. The oversight provisions
that do remain are only remnants of the original system of
control.
3. The Warranty Provisions.The 1949 Code contained a
set of provisions concerning what now is called product
liability.
In 1949, section 2-318 on warranty beneficiaries
provided:
A warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
284. Id. at 19
285. Id.
286. See supranotes 271-72 and accompanying text.
287. Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE
L.J. 1341, 1358 (1948).
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person who is in the family or household of the buyer or who is his
guest or one whose relationship to him is such as to make it
reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be
affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this
section.

The comment provided
that "employees of an industrial
28 9
consumer are covered."

Section 2-718 provided for impleader by an intermediate

seller and its seller.291 Section 2-719 upset manufacturers the

most by providing for a direct action against the prior
seller.29 The comment indicates that the section's purpose in
part was to relieve the smaller retailer.2
288. U.C.C. § 2-318, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (May 1949),
reprintedin 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 130-32 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
289. On the other hand, employees of an industrial consumer are covered and
the policy of this article intends that neither the privity concept, nor any gaps in
Workmen's Compensation Acts, nor any technical construction of "employment"
shall defeat adequate protection under this section. U.C.C. § 2-318, cmt. 2, Official
Draft: Text and Comments Edition (May 1949), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 13032 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
290. Section 2-718, titled, "Impleader by Buyer; Notice to Defend," provides:
(1)Where a buyer resells and is sued for any breach with regard to
which he would have an action over against his seller he may
(a) implead his seller in like manner and with like effect as is or may
be provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or
(b) give seasonable notice to his seller to come in an defend the action.
(2) Failure of a seller to defend after receiving such notice renders any
adverse judgment in the action conclusive against him and makes him
liable for all costs of the action including reasonable attorney's fees.
U.C.C. § 2-718, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (May 1949), reprinted
in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 265 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
291. Section 2-719, titled, "Direct Action Against Prior Seller," provides:
Damages for breach of a warranty sustained by the buyer or by any
beneficiary to whom the warranty extends (Section 2-318) may be
recovered in a direct action against the seller or any person subject to
impleader under the preceding section. An action against one
warrantor does not of itself bar action against another.
U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (May 1949), reprinted
in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 266 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
292. The purposes were:
[tlo give a direct remedy to the party injured so as to avoid any
pyramiding of damages and to put the original defense in the hands
best equipped to handle it while relieving from actual suit those
smaller dealers who might otherwise be put out of business by an
injury which they have no adequate means of preventing.
U.C.C. § 2-719, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (May 1949), reprinted
in 7 U.C.C. DRAFTS 266-67 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
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The 1949 version of the direct action had been derived
from a much more radical section in the 1940 draft which
provided for a 402A-like liability against manufacturers.293
But even the watered-down liability sections of the 1949 Code
were deleted by 1951.
In 1950, there were no major changes, although there
was an interesting discussion on products liability at the
NCC/ALI meeting. There Llewellyn explained that the
purpose of the direct action section was to avoid circuitry of
action and provide enforceable judgments for the people who
really have been injured. On the other hand, it would
increase costs of litigation for manufacturers, although it
would not change their legal liability.294 Mr. Jenner argued
that there was no reason or complaint to change the law. 5
He stated that the processors were objecting to "the spelling
out of these principles in section 718" and having plaintiffs
lawyers sue the processors rather than the retailer "which
really he should concentrate on in 95 or 99 out of 100
cases.

296

Jenner stated that in most cases the injury would

293. Section 28, titled, "(New) Obligation To Consumer Where Defect Is
Dangerous," provides:
(1) Where it can reasonably be foreseen that goods, if defective in
design, workmanship or material, will in the ordinary use thereof
cause danger to person or property, the manufacturer thereof by selling
them or delivering them under a contract to sell, when they are so
defective in a manner not apparent to the ultimate users thereof,
assumes responsibility to any legitimate user thereof who in the course
of ordinary use is damaged in person or property by such defects.
(2) "Manufacturer," within the meaning of this section, includes any
person who processes or assembles goods which he thereafter markets
for ultimate use in consumption, and any person who by brand,
tradename or otherwise assumes the position of a manufacturer or
supervisor of manufacture.
(3) This section is subject to control by contact under section 18 only in
contacts to sell or sale made by a merchant with a merchant and only
so far as concerns use by the merchant buyer.
Section 28, Draft of Uniform Sales Act (1940), reprinted in 1 U.C.C. DRAF 199
(E. Kelly ed., 1984).
294. See A.L.IJN.C.C. Consideration, supra note 71, at 324-25.
295.
I have heard no general complaint, either by a law review or Bar
Association, that there is in this field any social implication which
necessitates our shifting the burden which has existed over a period of,
let us say, one hundred years in this field, of having the retailer, the
distributor, undertake the defense which in normal course will be
properly resting on his shoulders because of intervening events.
Id. at 325-26.
296. Id. at 326.
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involve foodstuffs."' Mentschikoff replied that it "Would be a
tragic mistake to leave these sections out of the Code
originally." Schnader, however, predicted a "terrible fight on
this section by the manufacturers and processors of
perishable goods." 98
The above discussion reveals two important points about
the contemporary thinking on products liability. One, the
typical products liability case was seen to be one involving
tainted food. The U.C.C. drafters just did not contemplate the
range of cases under strict products liability. Second, the
thought that a manufacturer should be directly liable to
someone injured by its product was a novel one. Williston, for
example, pointed out that "Sections 2-718 and 2-719 propose
to introduce new law.... There are numerous cases opposed
to both these sections." He doubted the advisability of the
direct action. 9
The proposals for expanded product liability would die in
the development of product
the first part of that year, leaving
3 09
liability to the field of torts.

297. Id. at 325.
298.
MENTSCHIKOFF: But it would seem to me personally-and on this I
have not consulted my brethren on the Reporting Staff-that it would
be a tragic mistake to leave these sections out of the Code originally;
that what that would be doing would be saying that because we fear
that in some legislatures these sections will be stricken, even though
we recognize the importance of this kind of procedure and the actual
desirability of it in the commercial law field, we still do not have
sufficient courage of our convictions to put it in to inform these
legislatures that in that area at least, such practice is desirable.
CHAIRMAN SCHNADER: I would like to ask the Reporter a
question, if I may. Do you think there is any state in the United States
in which you would not have a terrible fight on this section by the
manufacturers and processors of perishable goods?
MISS MENTSCHIKOFF: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN SCHNADER: I don't.
MISS MENTSCHIKOFF: Well ....
Id. at 332.
299. Williston, supranote 129, at 587.
300. The disappearance of these sections from the Code has also produced the
non-integration of warranty and tort law.
In a classic law review article, Professor Marc Franklin foresaw the
coming collision between warranty and contract on the one hand and
the torts of strict liability, negligence, fraud and misrepresentation on
the other. The collision has .produced even more chaos and has had
more significant reverberations than Professor Franklin anticipated.
WHITE & SUMMEIS, supra note 6, at 383-84. See generally Marc Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimersin Defective Products Cases, 18
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At the A.B.A. meeting of January 13, 1951, Broeker, of
Bethlehem Steel, and Dierson, representing grocery
distributors and drug manufacturers, attacked the Code's
product liability sections. Broeker complained that "extension
of the tort rule to contract" would be O.K. in case of Coca
Cola, but not "to all kinds of goods." Furthermore, liability
would extend to the future! 1
Dierson stated that the food industry would object to
sections 2-314, 2-318, 2-718, and 2-719. "The lawyers in the
industry think the provisions are very harsh. " "' Malcolm
noted that the products liability issue "is the most serious
issue that exists." Ireton, the head of ABA Division of
Mercantile Law, stated, "Please come in with suggestions.
Ultimately we are going to approve
this Code. Now let us
' °
make it as good a code as we can. 3 3
The parameters of the negotiation, therefore, were that
the Code was going to be approved but that its provisions
were negotiable. The affected industries thus had every
incentive to come up with language more favorable to
themselves. Ireton directed those concerned: "I think in many
STAN. L. REv. 974 (1966) (claiming that for the worlds to collide, they first had to
be separated, and they were so only in response to the lobbying which omitted

direct manufacturers' products liability from the Code).

301. ABA Meeting, supra note 72, at 22 ("Example: A manufacturer of railroad
cars sells freight car to Pennsylvania Railroad. If a wheel falls off 15 years from
now and kills 50 people all they show is the wheel fell off. They don't have to show
negligence. You could not even insure against this.")
302.
DIERSON. Food Industry will object to the following: Sec. 2-314, 2318, 2-718, 2-719. I am not going to give a technical analysis. The
lawyers in this industry think the provisions are very harsh. The
argument you can insure against the risk does not answer the objection
of unfairness. (1) They think this is liability without fault. (2) It creates
liability without privity of contract. (3) It is new language. (4) Where
the consumer has direct action against the manufacturer we do not
glance at facts. Example: Jar is broken in transportationmiddleman-housewife. This is an area which the manufacturer can't
check at all. (5) The word "protection" appears. The consumer should
sue the person on the spot. It is social insurance to take away the
responsibility from the middleman. Does consumer suffer at the hands
of manufacturers? Some years ago Mr. Dunn went into this. A code was
worked out. Very fair. Eliminated fraud. The draftsman of this code
made changes to take care of difficulties which don't exist. For every
case that it litigated in food law 10,000 are settled out of court. There is
a great deal of fraud in these cases.
Id. at 23-24.
303. Id. at 24.
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cases the Code has been worked out ex parte.30 Now
that you
4
have notice go ahead and work something out."

Two weeks later, on January 27, 1951, the Enlarged
Editorial Board met to hear the ABA's concerns. Malcolm
reported that Dierson "in the Division of Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Law, advises me that with tremendous energy and
drive he has been attempting to pull together representatives
of the industry and draft specific suggested changes, and has
not completed them."0 5 Ben Heineman °6 reported that the
General Counsel of Sears "did not want the liability, as Sears,
the seller at retail, to extend to the members of the family,
when the wife or husband purchased, or whatever." 07 r.
Broeker reiterated his complaints about products liability.0 8
He saw no reason to expand to the public at large:
Certainly I do not see any reason at all for saying a manufacturer
of an ordinary article of commerce, whether it is steel or railroad
cars or adding machines, or anything, why you must put on that
manufacturer obligations to people with whom he has no relations,
people whom he never knew.

Gilmore suggested that section 2-318 be revised to limit
the warranty to "any person who is in the family or
household of a buyer or who is a natural person." 10 Broeker
objected to the Code's making issues of liability into questions
of fact and said the very reason manufacturers exclude
consequential damages "is that the issue of fact is so difficult
to try and so expensive and time consuming that we just
refuse to be put in a position of having to try it."" Dierson
304. Id. at 25.
305. Id. at 81.
306. Ben Heineman went on to be the founder and chairman of Northwest
Industries, and a member of the board of directors of several business and civic
organizations. WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 2000, at 2113 (54th ed. 1999).

307. See Enlarged Editorial Board, supranote 4, at 163.
308.
There may or may not be reason for making that new law as applied to
food products or something like that, but I do not believe there is any
reason for extending it to industry generally, particularly, the industry
with which I work sells steel. I think this Article puts us in the position
where we have got 150 million people that can sue us and there is
nothing we can do about it.
Id. at 110.
309. Id. at 115.
310. Id. at 121.
311. Id. at 123.
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then spoke for the food and drug industry. He first spoke of
the problem of fraud in these claims: "[Wie have known that

suits are encouraged by quick settlement of insurance

companies and that they rapidly create a serious trade evil
when they are permitted to be handled in that way."'

Also, the fault is usually not that of the manufacturer,
but is that of the "intervening distributor or the consumer
himself."13 The consumer is "very, very well protected by

National Food and Drug Laws and by those of states and

municipalities." 14 Leaving the manufacturer to "the tender
mercies of the jury" has "astonished
the lawyers who have
15
tried to defend the manufacturer."
Shortly after the January Meeting, the Editorial Board
decided to delete sections 2-718 and 2-719.316 During the first
half of March, 1951, counsel for food and drug manufacturers
31
met with Soia Mentschikoff over the warranty provisionsY.
It

was agreed that section 2-318 would extend warranties only

to "any natural person who is in the family or household of
3 ' The Spring 1951 Draft
his buyer."
adopted the proposed

language."' 9 The comments to section 2-3 18 adopted in the
312. Id. at 127
313. Id. at 131.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 132.
316. Letter from J. Randolph Wilson, representing the National Canners
Ass'n, to the Hon. Herbert F. Goodrich, Chairman, Editorial Board, Uniform
Commercial Code (March 15, 1951) (on file with AL.I. Archives, University of
Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review) (noting the Board's
decision to delete § 2-718 and § 2-719).
317. Letter from Frank T. Dierson to the Hon. Herbert F. Goodrich, Director,
American law Institute 4 (Mar. 16, 1951) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University
of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
In conclusion I record the fact that we invited to these conferences
counsel for various food and drug manufacturers who are members or
representatives of one or more of the following organizations: Division
of Food, Drug and Cosmetic Law, Section of Corporation, Banking and
Business Law, American Bar Association; Section on Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Law, New York State Bar Association; Grocery
Manufacturers of America, Inc.; and American Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers' Association.
Id.
318. Id. at 3.
319. Section 2-318, titled, "Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or
Implied," provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural
person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest
in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
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1952 Draft, reproduce the recommendations by the National
Canners Association. Comments 1 and 2 to section 2-318 of
today's Code read almost exactly the same as the Canner's
recommendation.320
This deal ended the dispute between the manufacturers
and the Code drafters. Dierson afterwards wrote John
MacDonald, the Executive Secretary of the NYLRC, that "the
text and comments of article 2 were adopted in a form

consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by
breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section.
U.C.C. § 2-318, U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft, No. 2 (Spring 1951), reprinted in 12
U.C.C. DRAFTS 64 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
320. Memorandum, Warranty Provisions-Recommendations by the National
Canners Association 8-9 (March 13, 1951), Llewellyn Papers, J. XIII.2.a. (on file
with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review); see U.C.C. § 2-318, Official Draft. Text and Comments Edition
(1952), reprintedin 14 U.C.C. DRAFTS 148-49 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). The 1952 Official
Draft comments read:
1. The last sentence of this section does not mean that a seller is
precluded from excluding or disclaiming a warranty which might
otherwise arise in connection with the sale provided such exclusion or
modification is permitted by Section 2-316. Nor does that sentence
preclude the seller from limiting his own buyer's remedy, or any
beneficiary of a warranty under this section, in any manner provided in
Sections 2-718 or 2-719. To the extent that the contract of sale contains
provisions under which warranties are excluded or modified, or
remedies for breach are limited, such provisions are equally operative
against beneficiaries of warranties under this section. What this last
sentence forbids is exclusion of liability by the seller to the persons to
whom the warranties which he has made to his buyer would extend
under this section.
2. The purpose of this section is to give the buyer's family, household
and guests the benefit of the same warranty which the buyer received
in the contract of sale, thereby freeing any such beneficiaries from any
technical rules as to "privity." It seeks to accomplish this purpose
without any derogation of any right to remedy resting on negligence. It
rests primarily upon the merchant-seller's warranty under this Article
that the goods sold are merchantable and fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used rather than the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose. Implicit in the section is that any beneficiary of a
warranty may bring a direct action for breach of warranty against the
seller whose warranty extends to him.
3. This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its
provisions the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond
this, the section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the
developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
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acceptable to all parties."3 21
Unfortunately for those represented by Mr. Dierson, the
"novel theory of manufacturers' liability without fault" reemerged as strict products liability in tort. In retrospect, the
results obtained by Dierson were the worst possible for his
clients the food and drug industry. If products liability had
remained in the Code, its development would have been
under the control of the legislatures and subject to lobbying
by the manufacturers. Because it was dropped from the Code
and left to the courts, it escaped political control. Dierson and
his clients won the sales battle but lost the tort war.
4. Secured Transactions.
a. The 1949 Code. Professor Richard L. Barnes
describes differences between articles 2 and 9 in today's
Code in terms of their normative content: "In my view,
Article Two is due great deference when it establishes a
rule of commercially correct behavior, as in its provisions on
unconscionability and disclaimers of warranty. By contrast,
321. The letter reads:
I have received a report that I, and those for whom I have spoken, are
in opposition to the sales article of this Code. This is untrue, and I
desire to clarify any misunderstanding.
Representing Mr. Charles Wesley Dunn, and in behalf of the Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Law Section of the New York State Bar Association,
the Corporation and Banking Law Section of the American Bar
Association, and Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., and the
American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Association, Inc., I have for
several years conferred with the American Law Institute and its
Editorial Board about Article 2, particularly as regards the law of
implied warranty in the sale of food, drugs and cosmetics. The original
draft of these provisions proposed a novel theory of manufacturers'
liability without fault whereby necessary incentives for proper
handling, storage and delivery of these products by intervening dealers
were seriously weakened to the likely detriment of the consuming
public. Over the years I organized meetings of counsel for the affected
industries, some of which were attending by representatives of the ALI,
and finally the text and comments of Article 2 were adopted in a form
acceptable to all parties. I have regularly informed industry counsel
about progress and development of the Code and have as often invited
further comment on its status. As of this date I have no criticism to
offer on this subject, and I approved the present language of Article 2
in my statement before the Commission on February 15, 1954.
Letter from Frank T. Dierson to John W. MacDonald, Executive Secretary, State of
New York, Law Revision Commission (Jun. 21, 1954) (on file with A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
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Article Nine is less devoted to correct commercial behavior,
instead emphasizing proper procedures such as public
notice."322 Article 2 speaks in terms of the standards of good
faith and commercial reasonableness while article 9 is
concerned with bright-line rules of creation, attachment,
and priority of property interests.
In 1949, however, the articles were just starting to
diverge. Remember that objective good faith still applied to
the entire Code, not just to article 2. Article 9 itself continued
several provisions, soon to be omitted, that protected the
debtor and limited the power of the secured lender.
The floating lien had not yet developed into the unitary
device covering present and future assets which is today's
supreme security interest. Prior to the March 1949 meeting,
the secured transactions drafters had questioned the primacy
of the inventory financier. They noted, "[a]s now drafted, a
financing institution can so get a lien on the inventory of a
business as to claim all the assets ahead of other creditors." '23
It was fair to protect secured lenders against other lending
institutions, but "laborers and small merchandise and service
The drafters
creditors" may also need some protection.
proposed a resolution that some creditors be allowed to reach
a certain percentage of inventory. Moreover, they questioned
whether it was "good policy to permit inventory liens on the
inventory of retail establishments?" 25 They proposed that
"bulk mortgages" on retailers be permitted only if the
proceeds of the loan were put into the business.32
The May 1949 Draft still distinguished between "general"
and "special" inventory liens. 7 A "special inventory lien" did
not include after-acquired inventory.28 Furthermore, the
322. Richard L. Barnes, Toward a Normative Framework for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 120 (1989).
323. Preliminary Questions of Policy for Consideration in Connection with
Article VII 1 (undated) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review). The document's reference to Article
VII and to "the March meeting" probably places it in early 1949. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 2.
326. Id. at 3.
327. U.C.C. § 7-302, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFrs 109 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
328. "[A] financer does not acquire an interest in accounts or chattel paper as
they arise," but "a special inventory lien given for new value in current course
containing a term that it secures other indebtedness is a lien for new
value." U.C.C. § 7-313, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 119 (E.Kelly
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security interest did not automatically attach to accounts or
chattel paper."9 The May 1949 Draft provided for a
preference if the security interest was not for new value and
insolvency proceedings were begun within four months of the
later of attachment or perfection.
Speaking of the early inventory secured finance
procedures, Mr. Ireton declared them to be unworkable:
The other kind of inventory lien that could be taken was a lien on
a conglomerate mass, such as a pile of coal or cotton seeds in a
warehouse; this was a general lien and on default the lender was
under the obligation of giving all creditors notice, calling them in,
securing the borrower's consent, then proceeding with liquidation
of the lien with the obligation of a trustee. You can imagine what
these provisions would have done. There just would be no
financing. Small business would suffer irreparable
inventory
harm.330

The May 1949 Code provided for certain debtor
protections. All non-merchants could not waive defenses
against assignees and merchants could not waive defenses
3 1
A purchase
that amounted to failure of consideration.1
money security agreement could not limit or disclaim
warranties,332 and a note containing a security agreement
was not negotiable in the first place.3 Acceleration could only
be done "in the good faith belief that the prospect of
performance is impaired. 34 For consumer goods, disclosures
of financing terms were required. A holder of a note secured
by consumer goods would waive his status as a holder-in-duecourse if he asserted any rights against the goods.335
Repossession without notice was banned if the consumer had

ed., 1984).
329. U.C.C. § 7-313, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFMS 119 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984)
330. Ireton, supra note 1, at 282.
331. U.C.C. § 7-108, May 1949 Draft, reprintedin 8 U.C.C. DRAFMS 89 (E. Kelly
ed., 1984).
332. U.C.C. § 7-108, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAM'S 119 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
Kelly
333. U.C.C. § 7-108, May 1949 Draft, reprintedin 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 89 (E.
ed., 1984).
334. U.C.C. § 7-109, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRATS 590 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
335. U.C.C. § 7-612, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 169 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
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paid more than sixty percent of the obligation."6
By spring 1951, the restrictions on the floating lien's
automatic attachment to after-acquired property would
disappear and the consumer protections would be severely
limited or dropped altogether.
b. The Background of the Controversy. In considering
the proposed protections for consumer lending and also for
lending against inventory and receivables, we should
realize that our present consumer culture, with its
infrastructure of advertising and financing, was just getting
started in the post-war years. Banks were not doing
consumer lending and consumer finance was done more on
a local level.3 Asset-based lending was a minuscule
fraction of what it is today. In 1946, there was only $5.8
billion of secured loans outstanding in total. 38 By 1994,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation had made a single
offering of $8 billion."
Gilmore characterized the fight over the consumer
protection sections of article 9 to be "one of the most violent in
the history of the Code's drafting."40 It was, along with the
banking conflict, one of the few disputes that surfaced into
public knowledge, but whether it was that violent is
questionable. The objectors to the early drafts were not angry
336. U.C.C. § 7-605, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 160 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
Kripke strenuously objected to the sixty-day notice provision: "Lenders do not
attempt to repossess without several notices to repossess.... The real risk is
concealment, not destruction, damage or loss." Editorial Board Report to the
Council and the Commercial Acts and Property Acts Sections 20 (Mar. 1, 1950) (on
file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review). The secured lender was given the right to repossess without notice
and judicial process in the 1950 code. U.C.C. § 9-503, Proposed Final Draft: Text
and Comments Edition (Spring 1950), reprintedin 11 U.C.C. DRAFTS 297 (E.Kelly
ed., 1984).
337. See Homer Kripke, The Importance of the Code, 21 U. TOL. L. REV. 591,
593 (1990). It was argued that consumer legislation was not needed because a
local lender's concern for its reputation would prevent abuses. His comment
shows that the drafters saw the commercial world as smaller, more personal,
more locally shared than today's. See Note, Negotiability of Conditional Sales
Contracts:The Consumer and Article III of the Commercial Code, 57 YALE L.J.
1414, 1417 (1948).
338. Albert R. Koch, Economic Aspects of Inventory and Receivables
Financing,13 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 566, 572 (1948).
339. SIDNEY RUTBERG, THE HISTORY OF ASSET-BASED LENDING 3 (1994).
340. 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 293 (1965).
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and in fact agreed with many of the goals of the proposals.
They did have severe doubts about their practicality.
Kripke and Ireton represented the voice of experience in
secured transactions; as mentioned above, they thought of
the drafters as inept reformist amateurs, an opinion shared
by Schnader" 4 Kripke saw the secured transaction proposals
as "paternalistic.' 42 Ireton saw article 9 as "the most
leftish." 43 As reported by Gilmore, "It is said that Article 9
betrays an earnest reformist zeal, reminiscent of the
crusading moralism of the lush days of the New Deal,
entirely out of place in a commercial codification.""4 The
archives do not reveal any parties outside the drafters who
wanted more consumer and merchant protection, other than
Ben Heineman, who was in favor of the provisions for
disclosure of credit terms and wanted the Code to have the
support of "broad public groups."345 According to
Mentschikoff, Gilmore felt that the disclosure provisions were
inadequate and the matter should be left to an
administrative agency."' Mentschikoff and Llewellyn,
however, were in favor of the disclosure provisions. In fact, it
was in the middle of the discussion on the disclosure
provisions that Mentschikoff made her statement that "In the
last two years as amendments have been made to the Code,
and changes in policy made, the Code has consistently moved
and away from a
onto a special-interest type of legislation
'
public-interest type of legislation. 41
The Enlarged Editorial Board of January 1951 noted the
lack of political support for the consumer protection
sections. 4b The drafters decided to jettison consumer
341. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
342. Letter from Homer Kripke to A.L.I., supra note 146, at 1 ("Earlier drafts
of Article 9 contained much paternalistic protection of the debtor against the
lender who was assumed to be ruthless. This material has been largely eliminated,
except with respect to consumer transactions. Similar paternalism still appears
elsewhere in the Code, however, and has reflections in Article 8.")
343. "Since last December this Article has been almost completely re-written;
but this can be said about the Article, that of all the Articles in the Code this
Article had a more definite and decided slant to the left than any other Articles in
the Code." Ireton, supranote 1, at 281-82.
344. Gilmore, supra note 62, at 37.
345. Enlarged Editorial Board, supranote 4, at 292-94.
346. See id. at 314-15. In 1964, the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601,
required such disclosures and gave the Federal Reserve Board regulatory

authority.
347. Enlarged Editorial Board, supranote 4, at 284.
348. See id. at 293-96.
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protection from article 9; the floating lien emerged as a
security interest without restrictions. The most leftish of all
the articles, first written under the assumption that the
debtor needed protection from the financiers, became the
article which gave unrestricted power to the financiers.
c. The FloatingLien.
(1) The Arguments for the Floating Lien. The
restrictions on the floating lien soon disappeared. Ireton,
who occupied the commanding position of being the
Chairman of the ABA Division of Mercantile Law,"4was
critical of the division between "specific" and "general
liens."350 In 1949, Ireton had criticized the concept of the
general lien and the original default rule, in which the
financer would liquidate the inventory as a trustee for the
benefit of creditors. "The effect of such a provision would
merely be that no financer would ever seriously take a
general lien."351 On the other hand, a specific lien would
limit the security "to a definite collateral value per unit.""
Kripke also published an article in 1949 criticizing the
secured transactions provisions. He could see no reason for
preserving the distinction between special and general
inventory liens. Moreover, he made an argument which today
seems peculiar. In 1949, inventory financing was not common

349. Of the Section of Corporation,Banking and Business Law-Divisionsand
Committees, 6 Bus. LAWYER 210, 217 (1950).
350.
At one time there was a provision in there that a secured lender,
insofar as lending on an inventory was concerned, could only take one
of two types of lien. He could take a specific lien in connection with
specific and separately described items but on default under such a lien
the lender could not get the benefit of any equity over and above the
related collateral value on each separate item. The other kind of
inventory lien that could be taken was a lien on a conglomerate mass,
such as a pile of coal or cotton seeds in a warehouse; this was a general
lien and on default the lender was under the obligation of giving all
creditors notice, calling them in, securing the borrower's consent, then
proceeding with liquidation of the lien with the obligation of a trustee.
You can imagine what these provisions would have done. There just
would be no inventory financing. Small business would suffer
irreparable harm.
Ireton, supra note 1, at 282.
351. Ireton, supranote 146, at 815.
352. Id.
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and was only done by a few specialized lenders."3 In the late
forties and early fifties, banks were not making secured loans
to small businesses and consumers.354 Now it is common, and,
thanks to article 9, the first to file an inventory lien takes
precedence over almost all other creditors. 55 Kripke argued
that since inventory financing was experimental, it should
have few legal restrictions on it that would discourage its
growth.356 Llewellyn had questioned whether it was a good
idea to allow inventory liens on small retailers, e.g., 'The
'poppa and momma store.' " Kripke felt, however, that the
small amounts and minimal worth involved would make such
financing unattractive. "Thus, without any real danger the
useful result will have been achieved that the law will
provide a mechanism by which the business and financial
practice can be developed if it stands the test of trial." Today,
353. See Homer Kripke, The "Secured Transactions"Provisionsof the Uniform
Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REV. 577, 600 (1949).
354. See Kripke, supra note 337, at 593.
355. For example:
In the early days of the commercial finance industry, which really
began to get off the ground in the 1920s and 1930s, the business was
linked with companies that were on the brink of bankruptcy. Rates
were high, risks were high, and the business was small. The total loan
volume of the commercial finance industry in 1934 was estimated at
$50 million, and 20 years later it had increased to around $500 million.
In 1987, loan volume of the asset-based financial services industry
topped $75 billion.
In recent years, Wall Street has discovered asset-based lending and,
starting with the popular mortgage-backed securities, it has moved
into packaging consumer accounts receivable and selling paper secured
by them. The largest underwriting ever was the sale of $4 billion
(that's right, billion) in securities backed by automobile receivables. In
a deal managed by First Boston Corp., 54 billion was raised on Oct. 16,
1986, through the sale of receivables General Motors Acceptance had
amassed in a promotion offering GM car buyers 2.9 percent and 4.8
percent annual interest rates. (In 1994, GMAC had registered a shelf
offering of asset-backed paper totaling $8 billion.)
RUTBERG, supra note 339, at 3.
356.
Inventory financing is still a relatively new field, and a particularly
unattractive one in an unsettled economy. The financer who uses it is
still a pioneer. Some financiers will have none of it. Others who have
gone into it extensively have taken heavy losses. It has been resorted to
by the most marginal types of borrowers. To impose legal restrictions
on the right of the financer to salvage his position on default would
and financial
business
further
to discourage
have been
experimentation with this form of financing.
Kripke, supra note 353, at 600.
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anyone can be a secured lender. By removing the complexity,
the U.C.C. enabled anyone to take a security interest. The
experimental, esoteric inventory financiers became the
dominant creditors in the financial world. 5'
(2) The Statutory Changes-The End of Restrictions.
One of the first limitations on the security interests to go
was the preference provision of the May 1949 Code."'
Kripke noted that the Code provision dropped the then
federal requirement of knowledge of insolvency and
criticized the provision for making it too easy to invalidate
liens. 59 The provision disappeared by the September 1949
Revisions. 6 '
The distinction between "special" and "general" inventory
liens also disappeared. 61 By the October 1949 Revisions,
restrictions on after-acquired property clauses also
disappeared. The only restriction was on future crops and

357.
While the UCC made life simpler for commercial finance companies
by standardizing the requirements for protecting collateral, it removed
much of the complexity that made the expertise of the entrepreneur
essential. No longer did the manager of a commercial finance company
need to know regulations in 50 different states nor deal with a mass of
differing and often conflicting laws.
Said A. Bruce Schimberg, of the Chicago law firm of Sidley & Austin,
with the passage of the UCC, "you didn't have to be smart to be in the
business. You didn't have to create ten different forms. It diluted the
expertise of the key people who could cope with the complications."
RUTBERG, supra note 339, at 8. Another writer with a clouded crystal ball argued
that the law should not provide for inventory financing because such financiers
would be wiped out in the inevitable post-war depression. "Indeed, in view of the
extraordinary high current price level and volume of business sales, most concerns
with inventory or receivables on hand financed in whole or in part by bank or other
debt would do well to liquidate their debt at the earliest opportunity." Koch, supra
note 338, at 578.
358. Section 7-111, titled, "Security Interest to Secure Obligation Not For New
Value; When a Preference," provides: "A security interest may be avoided in
insolvency proceedings to the extent it is not for new value if insolvency
proceedings are begun within four months from the date when the security
interest attaches or is perfected, whichever is later." U.C.C. § 7-111, May 1949
Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 89 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). "Preference" laws
prohibit a debtor from paying ("preferring") one creditor over another. The concept
is codified in federal bankruptcy law, 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2000).
359. Kripke, supra note 353, at 601-03.
360. U.C.C. § 7-111, September 1949 Revisions of Article 8, reprinted in 8
U.C.C. DRAFTS 281-82 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
361. Id.
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consumer goods." 2
In the September Revisions, the Secured Transactions
Article finally coalesced the various types of security devices
into a unitary security interest. In May of 1949, the article
had been divided into 'Tarts," each with its own type of
security interest. 63 In July, Schnader proposed merging the
various security devices, thus creating the modem unified
article 9 security interest." By September, these Parts were
discarded, and the U.C.C. security interest applied to all
types of collateral. The drive to simplify wiped out the
distinctions.
The end of restrictions on after-acquired property and the
merger of the distinct security interests created today's
unitary security interest and the primacy of the floating lien.
d. The Consumer Provisions.
(1) Waiver of Defenses. The May 1949 U.C.C. prohibited
a debtor from waiving defenses against an assignee and
prevented a note containing a grant of a security interest
from being negotiable. Even a merchant could not waive
defenses amounting to a failure of consideration.365 The
provisions drew a lot of criticism, with various proposals
being made. "66 Mentschikoff proposed a compromise367 which
362. U.C.C. § 8-203, October 1949 Revisions of Section 1-105, Bank Collections
Part of Article 3, Section 6-303 and Articles on Secured Transactions and Bulk
Transfers, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 488-89 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
363. Part 2 "Pledge," Part 3 "Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,"
Part 4 "Equipment Financing," Part 5, "Agricultural Financing," Part 6,
"Consumer's Goods Financing," Part 7, "Bulk Transfers," and Part 8, "Vehicle
Liens." U.C.C. Article 7, May 1949 Draft, reprintedin 8 U.C.C. DRAFrS 20, 20-23
(E. Kelly ed., 1984).
364.
Schnader: Is there anything in Article 7 as redrafted which would not
be applicable to agricultural financing? to [sic] consumer goods
financing? You may be able to run through your general stuff and then
have an index section referring to the section of the general material
which particularly affect your particular financing.
A.L.I., Minutes of Meeting of July 25-27, 1949 6 (on file with A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
365. U.C.C. § 7-108.8, May 1949 Draft, reprinted in 8 U.C.C. DRAFTS 87 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
366. Transcript of Discussion on the Uniform Commercial Code, Joint Meeting,
The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws 273-79 (May 1950) (on file with the Llewellyn Archives,
University of Chicago Law Library, and with the Buffalo Law Review).
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she was not happy with, but she did feel it represented the
majority view.' Thus, the blanket prohibition was replaced
by a complicated compromise which lasted until 1957 when
the present neutral position of article 9 was adopted.369 Also,
the Spring 1950 Draft allowed a negotiable instrument to
refer to the taking of security and still be negotiable."'
(2) The DisclosureProvisions.The 1949 and 1950 drafts
included mandatory disclosures of credit terms in consumer
transactions. The opposition to them was based on a variety
of grounds. One was the philosophical one that disliked
such legislation as "social" and felt that it did not belong in
a commercial code.3
367.
MISS MENTSCHIKOFF: The motion is to the effect that the section
9-205 206(3) be amended so as to permit the creation of a holder in due
course of a note which would be necessarily a conditional sale or chattel
mortgage in the type of situation envisaged by Section 9-205, but with
the proviso that if a holder in due course is created, at his option he can
either maintain that status, in which case the defense of breach of
warranty is cut off, or he can waive his holder-in-due-course status and
rely upon his security with the commercial paper article, of course,
dealing with the question of whether he has such notice as to make
him a holder in due course or not a holder in due course.
Id. at 278.
368.
And it really seems to me that what this amendment does is to
represent the composite view of the people who have worried about the
problem in a way which is more representative of their thinking than
in my opinion is really justified by what the right answer ought to be.
Id.
369. The present section 9-206 reads:
(1) Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule
for buyers or lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or
lessee that he will not assert against an assignee any claim or defense
which he may have against the seller is enforceable by an assignee who
takes his assignment for value, in good faith and without notice of a
claim or defense, except as to defenses to a type which may be asserted
against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under the
Article on Negotiable Instruments (Article 3). A buyer who as part of
one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument and a security
agreement makes such an agreement.
U.C.C. § 9-206 (1999). The language is almost identical to that adopted in U.C.C. §
9-206, Official Text (1957), reprintedin 20 U.C.C. DRAFTS 161 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
370. U.C.C. § 3-112(1)(b), Proposed Final Draft: Text and Comments Edition
(Spring 1950), reprintedin 10 U.C.C. DRAFrs 334 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
371.
It has been stated that the primary concern of Chapter 1 dealing with
Consumer Credit is the protection of the debtor against the
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Another problem was that the idea of consumer
disclosure was a new one. At the Enlarged Editorial Board
Meeting of January, 1951, Mr. Pantzer pointed out that
such information was not disclosed to consumers:
In the second place, you are not required to disclose whether the
refrigerator is gas-operated or electrically operated, whether you
are buying a Servel or a Frigidaire, whether you are getting nine
cubic feet of storage space or four. You don't have to warrant that.
Finally, you don't have to warrant-which I think is the most
important disclosure of all-whether it will last
or whether it will
3
continue to operate for one year or five years.

Today, the buyer of a refrigerator gets disclosures of all
features, plus Truth-in-Lending, Magnusson-Moss Warranty,
and energy efficiency.
There were two technical problems with the disclosures.
First, Ireton doubted that the local finance companies and
merchants had the time or the technical expertise necessary
to make the correct disclosures on interest and insurance
charges. 4 Another problem was that the disclosure of
overreaching creditor. Competition usually takes care of this supposed
inequality. This is embarking upon a field of social legislation, and
there can be considerable doubt as to the propriety of including such
regulation in a statutory proposal relating entirely to security concepts.
Ireton, supra note 351, at 804. Mentschikoff reported that Grant Gilmore took the
position that such regulation should be done by an administrative agency, not by
the U.C.C. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 314-15.
372. An Indiana attorney who was active in the Code drafting. See Letter from
Kurt Pantzer to William Schnader, supra note 127. See also Enlarged Editorial
Board, supra note 4, at 293.
373. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 293-94.
374.
MR. IRETON: It does not affect our volume of business. Where it has
an adverse effect along that level is that where you do a mass volume
of business-for example, I think the company I represent is buying
notes at the rate of nine or ten million dollars a day. When you have a
volume flowing through like that, that has to be routine to a point
where everything is done as a matter of form. The minute you have to
lift anything out of that routine and hand-handle it, or do a tailor-made
job on it, you begin to lose money on that deal.
But that is not the only point about this disclosure. We run anywhere
from 30 to 35 per cent errors. The Pennsylvania Department has had
us on the carpet for a year and a half. They have threatened to take our
license away. With the help that the companies have, you just can't get
that percentage of error down. But the impracticability and the
unfeasibility of the thing, of course, is one thing.
Id. at 301-02.
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interest charges could conflict with the "time price doctrine",

a device which allowed sellers and financiers to side-step the
usury laws. That doctrine held that a car dealer, for example,
selling at an interest rate higher than allowed by the usury
laws, was actually just selling at a higher price, and not
charging interest.3 5 Ireton pointed out that because the Code
used the term "secured lender" and the disclosure section
the laws."
Code 6could subject the
used the term "any other lender,"
usury
and
interest
state
to
seller
time
On the other hand, Mentschikoff felt that the consumer
should be informed. 7 Consumers should be made aware of
the possibility "of shopping for rates of interest, that that
would materially reduce the rates which are now being
charged." 78 She felt that if groups such as labor unions and
women's groups could be educated, they would support the
reform efforts of the Code:
We are not convinced that this means it will always have tough
sledding. We think part of the answer to that again lies in the
education of the groups that have not been consulted about the
Code, know nothing about the Code, (and here I speak of labor
union groups and women's groups in particular), and that political
power of such groups, if it is subject to arousement at all, is really
in our opinion considerably more effective than the political power
of the groups which have been effectively organized up to this
poin.

Ireton had a different take on the political realities.
Eleven or twelve years previously, he had tried to get a bill
enacted and received no help from labor unions. Banks would
oppose the legislation. Furthermore, the local financer would
fight it: "Your opposition is going to come from your local time
seller who lives at every crossroads throughout any state you
go into, who wields a powerful influence. Your public support
375. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 262 S.W. 425, 429
(Mo. Ct. App. 1924) (holding that a sale is not a loan, that "this was a bona fide
sale of the automobile; and... Reuter [the dealer] had the right to sell the car on
time for more than the cash price thereof).
376. Letter from J. Francis Ireton to Herbert Goodrich, Director, A.L.I. (Apr.
24, 1950) (on file with A.L.I. Archive, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and
the Buffalo Law Review).
377. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 282.
378. Id.
379. "I know this, because I did it. I went to a labor union to enlist their aid,
and got nowhere. They just weren't interested." Id. at 292-93.
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would be somewhat apathetic, I think. I don't think you will
arouse much support over this thing.8 '
Evidently, the drafters decided to side with Ireton as the
consumer disclosure
provisions were dropped in the April 15,
3
1951, draft. 81

The debate over the consumer-lending provisions did
have a strange but temporary effect in section 1-102(g) which
read 'Prior drafts of texts and comments may not be used to
ascertain legislative intent."' 2 It was felt that the dropping
the consumer sections would be used by opponents of such
legislation to argue that the ALI and the UCC did not think
such legislation was needed. Schnader then stated, "Isn't the
answer to that that we ought to change 102 to say, 'neither
lobbyists nor courts shall look at the legislative intent?'
(laughter)."83 Evidently, Schnader's suggestion was codified
as section 1-102(g). That section was dropped in 1956. 3
Article 9 emerged as the stripped down version that
exists today, with its empowerment of the secured party and
its exclusion of consumer protection. We again see the
triumph of business autonomy over a regulatory system.
With the change from objective to subjective good faith in
article 1,3 15 the rejection ofjudge-made limitations on secured
transactions, 386 and the disappearance of the consumer

protection requirements, a financier could make loans
without disclosures, to use any type of collateral as security,
and to realize on that collateral in any manner. Secured
transactions law was left to the private agreement of the
lender and the debtor.8 ' And that contract may deprive
380. Id. at 296.
381. U.C.C. Proposed Final Draft No. 2, Text Edition (Spring 1951), reprinted
in 12 U.C.C. DRAFTS 1 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
382. U.C.C. § 1-102(g), Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1952),
reprintedin 14 U.C.C. DRAFTS 44 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
383. Enlarged Editorial Board, supra note 4, at 281.
384. U.C.C. § 1-102(g) (deleted), reprintedin 18 U.C.C. DRAFTS 26 (E. Kelly ed.,
1984). For a different, and excellent, treatment of what ignoring drafting history
could mean, see John M. Breen, Statutory Interpretation and the Lessons of
Llewellyn, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 263 (2000).
385. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
386. See U.C.C. § 9-208, Proposed Final Draft, Text and Comments Edition
(May 1950), reprintedin 11 U.C.C. DRAFTS 240 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). Today, U.C.C. §
9-205 repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,268 U.S. 353 (1925), which required a
financier to police actively its collateral in order to preserve its lien. See U.C.C. § 9205, cmts. 1-5 (1991).
387. U.C.C. § 9-201, Proposed Final Draft No. 2: Text Edition (Spring 1951),
reprinted in 12 U.C.C. DRAFTS 273 (E. Kelly ed., 1984) ("Except as otherwise
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others, who also have claims against the debtor, of their
ability to collect their debts.
It was the codification in article 4 of this ability of A and
B to agree to deprive C of rights that did create the most
violent controversy in the Code's history, the battle over the
banking article.
5 The Banking Article.
a. The Opposition of the Bankers. The story starts with
Fairfax Leary, then a young professor at Penn, drafting the
banking law component of the Code. Bankers immediately
opposed even the idea of having the Code regulate their
activities. The Federal Reserve Board's Special Committee
on the Code questioned whether the Code proposals were
needed. It felt that the check collection was well enough
governed by contract and Federal Reserve Regulations. The
new Code would create more problems than it would
solve."'
Leary brought up the Fed's objections at the NCC/ALI
meeting in May 1949. He argued that legislation was
necessary to end the chaos in banking law created by
conflicting state decisions." 9 Willard B. Luther, a bank
lawyer from Massachusetts, pointed out that the Fed and the
American Bankers Association had that veto power over any
9 The ALIfNCC continued to draft bank
banking provisions."
legislation, with the realization that the bankers and the Fed
had a veto power. In 1950, Schnader also warned that the
Code would have to be acceptable to lobbies and regulatory
bodies. However, Professor Frederick Beutel, who would
become the first major academic opponent of the Code,
provided by this Act... a security agreement is effective according to its terms
between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and against creditors.").
388. Memorandum of Comments submitted by Special Committee of Counsel
of the Federal Reserve Banks (Apr. 5, 1949) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Comments] (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library,
and the Buffalo Law Review).
389. "[Alnybody who attempts to analyze the current course of decisions under
the free contract gets a feeling of rather helpless bewilderment when he looks at
the national picture as a whole. The cases are very complex. You can find authority
for practically any proposition... that you want." 3 PROCEEDINGS 145 (26th
Annual Meeting of the A.L.I. in joint session with the Nat'l Conf Commissioners,
May 18-21, 1949) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
390. See id. at 147-49.
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wanted to stand firm for principle."'
The bankers, however, remained adamantly opposed to
the Code. Some dropped their opposition with the revision
prepared by Malcolm in 1951, but others remained
steadfastly opposed, even labeling the Code as "Communist
inspired.' " Gilmore, who took over the drafting of article 4
after Leary left, called it "the bloodiest battleground in the
entire history of the Code. While Steffen (and others)

attacked it as being "pro-bank," bank counsel (particularly

the New York group) attacked it as a Communist plot
designed to destroy the American banking system.""
Why were the bankers so opposed to the Code; in fact
being the one group that remained in opposition even after
the compromises of 19511 4 It may be because the bankers
391.
CHAIRMAN SCHNADER: One thing I think all of us have to
remember is that we are not restating the law here; we are preparing a
statute which we hope to get through the legislatures, and we cannot
go too far, because there are such things as lobbies in this country and
in the various states. If we try to do things that are just not practical,
we might as well forget the Code.
MR. BEUTEL: It is part of our job here-and I think it is very
important that we understand it is part of our job-to make a statute
which is fair and which we, as American lawyers in the American Law
Institute and the Commissioners, regard as fair.
Of course we are up against lobby pressure, but we ought to stand
firm for what we regard as fair, regardless of lobby pressure.. [sic] If
the bankers are opposed to the thing, the bankers ought to know we
have considered it and have passed what we consider is a fair rule. It is
not our job to simply pass something that the lobby people will agree
to. If this Code is not a fair Code it isn't going to get by any legislature.
CHAIRMAN SCHNADER: I didn't say anything about bankers.
MR. BEUTEL: Well, I did! [Laughter]
CHAIRMAN SCHNADER: I was talking about certain regulatory
bodies, regulatory bodies that are so powerful that if they say no to this
Article it won't be passed. That is what I am saying. We have to keep
that in mind, because we are not just working this Code for mental
exercise; we want to see something enacted.
A.L.IIN.C.C. Consideration, supra note 71, at 97.
392. Fairfax Leary, Jr. and Michael A. Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some
Good News from Articles Three and Four, 43 OH. ST. L. J. 611, 614 (1982); Letter
from Walter Malcolm to William A. Schnader 2 (April 13, 1954) (on file with A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
393. Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson (Oct. 8, 1980), in Donald
J. Rapson, Review of the Law ofModern Payment Systems andNotes, 41 Bus. LAW
675, 677(1985).
394. For the depth of feeling see, for example, Letter from William L. Kleitz,
President, Guaranty Trust Co., to Lloyd D. Brace, President, First National Bank
of Boston (Jan. 2, 1953) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania
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felt they were "performing almost a gratuitous and public
service" in processing checks and thus should not be
regulated. 95 Another reason may have been that the bankers
had never been under a NCC or ALI uniform act, unlike
merchants of goods or secured financiers. The only prior
uniform act governing them had been the American Bankers'
Association Bank Collection Code, which had been drafted by
the Bankers' Association itself.9 Most bankers did not feel
any need for change.397 Now the ALI and the NCC, at best a
bunch of self-appointed left-wing reformers, at worst,
Communist-inspired radicals, were gratuitously attempting
to butt in. Despite the drafters' effort to reach a compromise,
the animosity of the bankers to the Code managed to delay
its adoption by years.
b. Malcolm Steps Into the Breach. In face of the
opposition, by May of 1951 the ALI/NCC voted to delete
article 4 from the Code. 98 Walter Malcolm then took it upon
himself to salvage article 4 and prepared a new draft over
the summer."'
There are differing views on exactly what happened.
Professor Rubin writes:
Article 4 had a stormier history. Leary produced a draft that
represented a reconceptualization of the field, and thus a
significant departure from the American Bankers Association's
Bank Collection Code. It reflected a thorough knowledge of the
check collection process, and combined a realistic recognition of
industry needs with a rare sensitivity to consumer interests. But
the New York Clearing House Association reacted with fury,
promptly informing Llewellyn that it would oppose the passage of
Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review). Klein wrote, "What I am really hoping
is that we can kill the thing [the U.C.C.] entirely." A.B.A. Committee Disapproves
Proposed Uniform Commercial Code in Its Entirety; Report of Special Committee
of American Bankers Association on Proposed Uniform Commercial Code and
Accompanying Press Release (Oct. 20, 1954) (on file with Llewellyn Archive,
University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
395. Ireton, supra note 1, at 281.
396. See Hal S. Scott, The Risk Fixers, 91 HARV. L. REV. 737, 762 (1978).
397. Memorandum of Comments, supranote 388.
398. Letter from Robert Goodrich, Director, to Members of the California Bar
on Article 4 (May 28, 1951) (on file with A.L.I. Archives, University of
Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
399. Letter from Walter Malcolm to Arthur Littleton (May 30, 1950) (on file
with A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo
Law Review).
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the entire U.C.C. if Article 4 remained. Llewellyn responded by
relieving Leary of his duties, and eliminating Article 4. The
bankers then decided that it would not be a bad idea to have a
bank collection article after all, provided that they were the ones
to draft it, and Llewellyn graciously agreed. So a committee of
bank counsel, headed by Walter Malcolm, set to work and
produced a refurbished version of the Bank Collection Code. With
relatively few alterations, this became the current Article 4.400

Gilmore in 1952 wrote that Leary "withdrew from active
participation in the drafting of article 4 during the summer
' 1 of
1950 because of the increasing demands of his practice. 4
Malcolm describes his revising article 4 as a volunteer
effort, done to rescue article 4 from being discarded.4 2° Aware
of conflicts of interest, he justified his ambiguous situation by
stating that he and his fellow American Bar Association
members working on the Code had "exercised great care to
recognize at all times that the Code would affect all segments
of the business community and the public generally, and
consequently, to refrain as much as reasonably possible from
being special pleaders for the particular lines
0 3 of business in
which we were engaged in private practice."'
400. Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3
and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 555 (1991).
401. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE L. J. 364, 374 n.22 (1952).
402.
By May of 1951, I had acquired the personal conviction that though
Article 4 still had some serious "bugs" in it, and had some sections
somewhat unfavorable to banks, on the whole it was fairly close to
being a workable Article and in addition, at that time was
substantially more favorable to banks than the converse. By saying
that the Article was favorable to banks I do not mean that the various
sections stated rules giving banks unfair advantage at the expense of
depositors or the public generally but rather that in section after
section a rule was stated in a form satisfactory to banks where
previously the area covered was in doubt and contained dangers to
banks.
Having this personal conviction I was disappointed when at the
meeting in Washington in May 1951, the Sponsors voted to set Article
4 on one side. Since I believed that without too substantial change from
the general framework of the Article it should be possible to eliminate
the really serious "bugs" existing in it, on my own initiative I tried
rewriting enough of the sections of the Article to meet at least the
major objections that I knew about.
Letter from Walter Malcolm to J.F. Shuman (Oct. 22, 1951) (on file with A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
403. Id.
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By 1980, Grant Gilmore had a different slant on it:
[A] committee of bank counsel, headed by Walter Malcolm of
Boston, was authorized to prepare what became the final (1952)
draft-an arrangement I once described as tantamount to
appointing a committee of dogs to draw up a protective ordinance
for cats (feelings ran high in those days). Malcolm, who was a man
of the highest personal integrity, understood that it was his
function to do whatever was necessary to placate
4 4 the New York
group (who, nevertheless, refused to be placated). 0

Malcolm did work over the summer and came up with a

revised version of article 4. According to Beutel, the new
article was mailed, in fragmentary form, to the members of

the ALI and NCC less than three weeks before the
September 15, 1951 meeting.45 At the Meeting of the NCC
Committee of the Whole (September 10 through September
15, 1951), Malcolm explained that he was, in his individual
capacity, proposing certain revisions. Other than certain
revisions he termed "technical," he made two basic policy
changes. One was substituting the negligence standard of
"[t]he exercise of ordinary care" for the phrases "improper
handling" or "proper handling." 46 The second was the issue
that started the firestorm of protest-the extent to which
In my own case, in the case of Article 4, I attempted to solve this
matter of possible conflict of interest between the banking industry and
to the public generally something along the following lines. If in any
particular case I observed myself or learned from bankers or bank
lawyers that a particular provision simply would not work or was

completely unacceptable to a substantial segment of the industry, I felt

justified in pointing out these facts to the Reporters and Sponsors. I
also adopted the practice rather early, in cases of this kind, of
suggesting specific redrafts that I thought might work or might be
acceptable. Since this has been going on for two years to more, a fair
number of my suggested revisions were accepted by the Reporters and
incorporated in the drafts. On the other hand, in cases where the
Reporters or Sponsors had a policy decision to make which involved
drawing some sort of line between banks on the one hand and
depositors or the public generally on the other hand, and the line
drawn was reasonably fair and workable, I did not feel justified in
urging that the line be drawn more favorably to banks, and I did not do
SO.
Id.
404. Letter from Grant Gilmore to Donald J. Rapson, supra note 393, at 677.
405. Beutel, supra note 132, at 359 & n.141.
406. Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners Committee of the
Whole 24-25 (Sept. 10-15, 1951) (on file with the A.L.I. Archives, University of
Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
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banks could contract out of article 4.
Malcolm saw the problem as one "of extending and
solidifying the basic principle of freedom of contract.' 07 He
saw "solidifying this principle of freedom of contract" as a
move away from the ivory tower "to a point where it would be
acceptable by the market place. 4 ' He, as way of background,
described how check-clearing operated at high-volume,. 9 and
thus, only "a fast-moving, streamlined operation" would
work."' Also, the items moved nationwide, going from San
Francisco to New York to Maine to Washington, and
elsewhere.41 '
Because of the high volume and the large number of
banks involved across the country, one could not have rigid
rules:
One basic principle on which I operated was that it was unwise
and rather naive to think that it would be possible to lay down
absolutely the rules that would control that type of operation and
not make mistakes, or to be able to lay down the rules that would
control that type of operation and would control them successfully
five years to ten years from now in the manner in which they
would be controlled at the present time.412

Another underlying problem was that local banks adopt
procedures on how handle items in a certain city, but this
adopted procedure may affect people nationwide.
Malcolm proposed two solutions. The first was freedom of
contact: "The first one was to provide for almost absolutely
complete freedom of contract, to make provision for the future
change or development or development or the development of
unforeseen conditions which none of
413 us can appreciate or
fully understand at the present time."
The second solution was to provide for flexibility so that
not everyone "affected by the multiple transactions involved"
would have to join in agreement.4 4
407. Id. at 25
408. Id.
409. 'They undoubtedly run to the stage of several million every day." Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 26. Malcolm's basic principle was that the virtue of both a free
enterprise society and freedom of contract was their being able to adjust to new
circumstances. See discussion supranote 108 and accompanying text.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
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Thus Malcolm proposed his version of section 4-103. 4' 5
Malcolm was proposing a system whereby A and B could
agree to affect the rights of C. He did, however, wish to keep
his proposal within narrow bounds.
So far as I was concerned, at no time did I ever intend that that
principle of varying the provisions of this article by agreement
without the concurrence of the interested or affected parties would
go any further than a narrow or a reasonably narrow area, and
that narrow area is simply where there is a general agreement of
the type of federal reserve
regulations or operating letters or
416
Clearing House rules.

He proposed two definitions to keep his proposal limited
in scope: one of "general agreement" to mean "Federal
Reserve regulation or operating letters, Clearing House rules
or the like," and "special agreement" to mean "an agreement
between affected parties with respect to particular items or
particular situations. '
Mentschikoff seconded the motion to amend section 4103, stating that "with the two definitions present, the fears
which were envisaged by the Section as to the possible
meaning of (1) in particular, Section 4-103, become materially
415. See section 4-103, titled, "Variation by Agreement; Measure of Damages":
(1) The effect of the provisions of this Article may be varied by general
or special agreement except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's
responsibility or limit the measure of damages for its own lack of good
faith or failure to exercise ordinary care.
(2) The measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary care in
handling an item is the amount of the item reduced by an amount
which could not have been realized by the use of ordinary care and
where there is bad faith, it includes consequential damages, if any.
(3) Action or non action approved by this Article or pursuant to a
general agreement between banks or, in the absence of special
instructions, consistent with a practice or usage of banks, in ordinary
care.
(4) The specification or approval of certain procedures by this Article
does not preclude an agreement authorized by subsection (1), nor
constitute disapproval of other procedures which may be reasonable
under the circumstances.
Note: The Comment to this Section must make it clear that the phrase
"ordinarycare" is used in the ordinary tort sense, and not in a special
sense relatingto bank collections.
U.C.C. § 4-103, Article 4-Bank Deposits and Collections: Text Edition (Sept. 3,
1951), reprintedin 12 U.C.C. DRAFTs 343-44 (E. Kelly ed. 1984).
416. Meeting of the National Conference of Commissioners Committee of the
Whole, supranote 406, at 27.
417. Id.
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reduced, if not nonexistent."' 8
Something seems to have happened between September
15 and October 30, 1951, which set off Mentschikoff and
Gilmore, since the acquiescence shown at the September
meeting was replaced by enraged protest. Malcolm's article 4
drew the only pointed academic criticism of the Code in
Professor Beutel's The Proposed Uniform[?]Commercial Code
Should Not Be Adopted and also drew forth the bitter
exchange of letters among Gilmore, Mentschikoff, and
Schnader.
Beutel's article has become a minor classic. Called "the
first publication of the Critical Legal Studies movement," the
article represents the only example of legal scholarly writing
which positively attacked the Code. Other professors, the best
example of whom is Williston,419 took the position that the
Code should not be enacted because it would not be an
improvement over present law. Beutel attacked the U.C.C.
with a battle-ax, arguing that it would make commercial law
worse. Because the banking conflict was one of the few
instances where the dispute over policy entered
4 2 public
discourse.. it is often cited in articles about the U.C.C.
The private correspondence between Beutel and the ALI
reveals that he may have been holding a grudge. He had
written the ALI suggesting changes in terminology, but the
ALI did not respond. On July 19, 1951, he wrote to Goodrich,
the ALI Director:
Over a month has now passed since we had our exchange of
correspondence on correlating the terminology in the Commercial
Code.
I had a short letter from Prof. Bunn before yours came, written
in reply to the carbon copy of the first letter which I sent you, but
have had no further indication that the editorial board is
interested in any comments from me.
I take it I live on the wrong side of the tracks. Let's forget the

418. Id.
419. See Williston, supranote 129.
420. See HULL, supra note 86, at 298-300.
421. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 400.
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whole matter. 2

Later, on August 22, he wrote, "The side of the tracks
may not have anything to do with it, but it is perfectly clear
to me
that your Editorial Board does not want any help from
4 23
me.

One can read a lot into "I take it I live on the wrong side
of the tracks." The statement could refer to the fact that
Professor Beutel taught at the University of Nebraska, not at
the elite schools of Columbia, Pennsylvania, Yale, and
Harvard as did the drafters. He was out West, not located on
the East Coast where the drafting was centered. Beutel's
latter criticism of article 4 as "vicious class legislation"
indicates that to him "wrong side of the tracks" did have a
class connotation: he felt he was being excluded from the
Eastern elite legal establishment.
Beutel's article attacked the Code on several fronts. He
starts by saying it was a rush job, and goes on to criticize the
Code's draftsmanship, prolixity, and terminology. For article
4, he let loose and called it "A Piece of Vicious Class
Legislation." 24 According to Beutel, article 4 would put all
risks on the bank customer while insulating the bank from
liability.4 5 "A careful examination of the wording of the act
will show that this article was drafted entirely with the
purpose of protecting the banks so that they could carry on
their business at the risk of the customer.""25 He
4 7 ends by
accusing the ALI and NCC of a deliberate sell-out.
422. Letter from Frederick M. Beutel, Professor, University of Nebraska
College of Law, to Herbert Goodrich, Director, A.L.I. (July 19, 1951) (on file with
the A-L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law

Review).
423. Letter from Frederick K. Beutel, Professor, University of Nebraska
College of Law, to Herbert Goodrich, Director, A.L.I. (Aug. 22, 1951) (on file with
the A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law

Review).
424. Beutel, supra note 132, at 357.
425. Id. at 360-61.
426. Id. at 361.
427. Beutel asserts:
This article is a deliberate sell-out of the American Law Institute and
the Commission of Uniform Laws to the bank lobby in return for their
support of the rest of the "Code."... The banks now have a piece of
class legislation more favorable to their interests than the American
Bankers Association Bank Collections Code which their lobby failed to
put over on the legislatures. This one-sided piece of class legislation is
now backed by the prestige of the American Law Institute and the
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Gilmore wrote a reply to Professor Beutel in his usual
erudite and witty style. 2 After dismissing most of Beutel's
points, he agreed with him as to article 4. He also saw section
4-103 as the objectionable section.
This Section as drafted provides that banks may by general or
special agreement contract out of any of the rules laid down in the
balance of the Article, provided only that a bank may not disclaim
responsibility for the exercise of good faith and ordinary care. The
proviso is, however, subject to a double-barrelled exception: 1)
banks may agree on what constitutes ordinary care; 2) even in the
absence of agreement, any action taken by a bank which is
consistent with "a banking usage" is ordinary care. It should be
noted further that the "general agreements" by which banks may
amend the Article as they see fit, or agree on what ordinary care
is, are agreements between banks to which the customer who
deposits an item for collection is not a party but by which he will
be bound.4 29

Letting the banks contract out of article 4 and allowing
them to decide for themselves the meaning of ordinary care
was "carrying a good joke too far."" °
Gilmore advised keeping cool and suggested a
compromise:
Let us not overstate the case. I do not believe that it is time to man
the barricades. Our way of life will not be in jeopardy even if
Article 4 is enacted. Luncheon at the Bankers' Club is not given
the poor customer
over to devising ways and means of hoisting
4
each day a little higher on his own petard.

If the article "were revised so as to place appropriate
limitations on contracting out of the statute, there would be
Commission on Uniform Laws. Such a sell-out is beneath the dignity of
both organizations and is a tremendous blow to their prestige as
scientific bodies ....
If the "Code" in its present form is pushed through the New York
Legislature by its high sounding backers, the Act will mark the
beginning of the end of fairness and uniformity in the commercial law.
Id. at 362-63.
428. Grant Gilmore, The Uniform Commercial Code: A Reply to Professor
Beutel, 61 YALE L.J. 364 (1952).
429. Id. at 375 (footnote omitted).
430. Id.
431. Id. at 376.
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no insuperable objections to the balance of the article." ' 2
Gilmore's restrained tone in his reply was not present
in his correspondence with the ALI and his fellow drafters.
In fact, his and Mentschikoffs letters constituted a
rebellion in the ranks of the ALI.
c. The Article 4 Rebellion. It seems that Malcolm's
drafting the comments to article 4 as well as drafting the
article was what set off the controversy. Perhaps
Mentschikoff and Gilmore, after having lost on the direct
action against manufacturers of article 2 and the consumer
protection of article 9, felt that having the bankers draft
article 4 and its comments was the last straw. On October
30, 1951, Grant Gilmore wrote Llewellyn and many others,
protesting Schnader's authorization of Malcolm to draft
article 4's comments.433
Schnader responded vigorously. He started by correcting
Gilmore:
'Yfour very first paragraph contains a serious
misstatement
of fact." He stated he merely persuaded
Malcolm to prepare a draft of the comments. Furthermore,
Malcolm had not worked with bankers but rather had
prepared a draft on his own. He felt that the ALI, the NCC,
and the drafting staff owed "a great deal to Walter Malcolm.
Indeed, in my view, if it had not been for the work which
Walter did, the whole Code effort would have blown up in our
faces. 'A34 He then questioned Gilmore's ethics:
432. Id. at 377.
433. Gilmore wrote:
I have a warm personal regard for Walter as well as great admiration
for his professional ability. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a most
unhappy arrangement that the Comments as well as the statutory text
are to be prepared by the banking group without the least pretense of
supervision or control by either the Law Institute or the Conference of
Commissioners. One might as well commission a group of dogs to draft
a protective ordinance for cats.
For the past several weeks I have been studying the present draft of
Article 4 in detail. If at the time of the New York meeting I had
understood some of its implications as well as I believe I do now, I
would have spoken on the floor against its adoption.
Letter from Grant Gilmore, Professor, Yale University Law School, to Karl
Llewellyn, Professor, University of Chicago Law School (Oct. 30, 1951) (on file with
the A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law

Review).
434. Letter from William A. Schnader, Esq., Schnader, Harrison, Segal &
Lewis, to Grant Gilmore, Professor, Yale University Law School 2 (Nov. 1, 1951)
(on file with the A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
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Finally, I question the ethical propriety of anyone who has been a
paid employe of the drafting staff of the Code writing any article
urging that a part of the Code be deleted. It would at least be bad
taste for anyone who was
435 a salaried employe of the drafting staff
to write such an article.

Mentschikoff then entered into the fray, repenting of her
acquiescence at the New York meeting. 43 She then lit into
Malcolm: "First, Walter Malcolm has not been a friend of the
Code and his services have not produced anything which will
make Code passage easier."" Malcolm's appraisal of ABA
politics "has been consistently incorrect-he simply does not
know how that organization runs.""' He also did not
understand state legislators. It was not necessary to sell out
on article 5439 and Wall Street did not have power over the
New York legislature."0 Outside knowledge that New
Yorkers and Bostonians had drafted part of the Code would
be the kiss of death." The Code proponents have been
Buffalo Law Review).
435. Id.
436. Letter from Mentschikoff to Schnader, supra note 111, at 1 ("I was silent
in New York and I now think that was a mistake for which the Code in due course
will suffer.").
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Mentschikoff argued: 'The second major false impression under which I
think some of you have been laboring is that it was politically necessary to sell out
to a few New York banking counsel on Article 5." Id. at 2.
440. Mentschikoff stated:
Somehow, we ought to find time for a long exchange of views on
political expediency for the sources of information of some of you seem
to be at considerable odds with mine and with my experience with
various groups. We must not act at cross-purposes as the Code gets
polished and put into the hopper. Especially we must not cross purpose
on New York. Let me say again, the Wall Streeters do not have either
understanding of or a significant influence on the course of legislation
in Albany. As an ex-Wall Streeter, I had shared the illusion common to
most of us that what we thought was legislatively important. Since I
have been meeting with some of the legislators, I have discovered it is
not so.
Id.
441.
A close approximation of the kiss of death in Illinois would be general
knowledge that Articles 4 and 5 had been drawn by New Yorkers or
Bostonians. We almost lost Ben Heineman's and Bert Jenner's support
in September. Ben still refuses to commit himself. If we do not have
their support, we have lost Illinois. This seems a big price to pay for the
appeasement of Backus or Malcolm.
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seriously mistaken:
You gentlemen have been playing with fire without adequate
knowledge of its nature and as a result are in danger of losing
enthusiastic friends in exchange for politically non-significant
lukewarm adherents. I cannot help but feel that you are making a
serious mistake which must be rectified as much as possible by the
comments since the text is now out of our hands. I think that
. 442
Grant's letter should be looked at in the light of this situation.

To say that Schnader went ballistic in response would
not be an exaggeration. On November 8, he fired back a
letter, making several points. One was that the bankers had
a veto over the Code." 3 The Code was not intended to be
reform legislation.4 " He maintained that the Code should
have the approval of the industry it governed. 5
Then Schnader took the debate to an entirely different
level. He attempted to silence the drafters, reminding them
that they were, after all, the hired help:
So far as concerns the propriety of a member of the drafting staff
attacking any part of the Code, it just seems to me that you and I
have different standards of professional ethics. It is not a case of
academic freedom about which the teaching staffs of our
educational institutions sometimes get themselves excited.
Rather, it is a situation similar to one in which a lawyer
employed to do a reorganization job for a corporation, accepted
Id.
442. Id. at 2-3.
443. Schnader wrote:
One thing that I am sure of is that if in Pennsylvania the important
bankers of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, the State Bankers Association,
and the Federal Reserve people were to let the legislature know that
they disapproved of a part of the Code, there would not be a
Chinaman's chance of obtaining enactment.
Also, what you said about Wall Street may be perfectly true, but I am
satisfied that if the New York State Bankers Association and the
important bankers in Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and the other large
cities outside of New York City, plus the Federal Reserve, were to
express opposition to the Code, it would not be enacted in New York.
Letter from Schnader to Mentschikoff supra note 84, at 2.
444. "1Ido not think that anybody entered upon the Code undertaking with the
idea that it was to be a piece of reform legislation and that the persons who should
be consulted about it should be the social service agencies." Id. at 3.
445. Id. at 2. Schnader's view is discussed supra at note 116 and accompanying
text.
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compensation for his work, and then stepped out and attacked the
plan with a view to getting the stockholders to defeat it.
Goodness knows, nobody on the drafting staff was silenced at
any time as far as the Editorial Board or the membership of either
Conference or Institute was concerned; but after a joint meeting
has spoken and placed it approval on the product, it seems to me
that it would be the worst of bad taste, to say the least, for any of
the paid
44 6 staff to start a campaign to defeat all or any part of the
Code.

In Schnader's opinion, the Code was not under the
control of Karl Llewellyn, but the Editorial Board: 'My
understanding was that the entire Code project was in charge
of the Editorial Board and that it made assignments of work
to various people. Apparently, you have a different
understanding and feel that that is Karl's prerogative." '
Schnader's attempt to silent the drafters drew a protest
from Professor Charles Bunn, who had been working on
redrafting comments at the University of Wisconsin. He
stated that he would resign if he were "bound not to oppose
any part of the Code." 8 He made a distinction between public
and private issues:
Is not the true position rather this:
The adoption of the Code in any state is not a private issue, but
an important public question. On such questions, the public has
the right to the honest judgment of all informed persons. People
who have worked on the Code, whether for pay or not, have some
knowledge of its contents and some judgment of its probable effect.
The public has a right to that knowledge and that judgment. Their
public duty therefore is neither silence nor a party line, but honest
public statement of what they really think. And
since the question
44 9
is a public one, the public duty is controlling.

Herbert Goodrich, the Director of the ALI, tried to calm
446. Id. at 4.
447. Id. at5.
448. Letter from Charles Bunn, Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School,
to William A. Schnader, Esq., Schnader, Harrison, Segal & Lewis 1 (Nov. 9, 1951)
(on file with the A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the
Buffalo Law Review).
449. Id. at 1-2.
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things down. On November 15, observing that "[e]motional
thermometers have recorded much too high a degree of
tension for the good of the circulatory system of those
involved,""0 he requested that Bunn redraft the comments for
articles 4 and 5 in neutral fashion. "The Board is unanimous
in wanting Comments that do not slant either way but are, so
far as possible, a fair expression of the text as adopted by the
Joint Meeting.""' He wanted to get the job done:
A moderate amount of violence between persons, as I understand
from the psychiatrists, is a valuable method of letting off steam.
But I really think on the Comments to Articles 4 and 5 we have
had plenty
4 2of steam and now it would be a good thing if we got the
job done.

Later, on December 5, he again wrote to Bunn, trying to

smooth the waters.
The Institute has never said anything and I am sorry that
anybody else has. I would rather not say anything at this moment.
But after some of the smoke dies down I think we can get a
statement that will satisfy you and everyone else. Of course I am
none of us has the slightest desire to gag you or anyone
sure 4 that
53
else.

Malcolm evidently again redrafted article 4 and came up
with compromise acceptable to both Gilmore and the Federal
Reserve Board. On April 12, 1952, Schnader wrote Professor
Maurice H. Merrill, who had joined Gilmore in opposition,
announcing the agreement over Malcolm's redraft.
Several days ago I received from Walter Malcolm, Chairman of
the Committee on Commercial Code of the Section on Corporation,
Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, a
letter containing a revised draft of the entire section, together with
comments thereto.
As I understand it, this draft has the approval of Professor
Gilmore of Yale University Law School, who joined you in vigorous
450. Letter from Goodrich to Bunn, supra note 122, at 1.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Letter from Herbert F. Goodrich, Director, A.L.I., to Charles Bunn,
Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School (Dec. 5, 1951) (on file with the A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
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opposition to the section as it originally stood, and also of counsel
for the Federal Reserve System, although the latter 454
are always
very careful to say that they are not speaking officially.

The compromise version of section 4-103 has lasted with
few changes to the present day. It permits banks to contract
out of article 4 and allows some contracts between banks to
affect the rights of third-parties, the customers of banks. Its
complicated provisions reflect the fact that it was a product of
negotiation.
Section 4-103(1) states that the article's provisions may
be varied by agreement, but "no agreement can disclaim a
bank's responsibility or limit the measure of damages for'55
its
own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care. 4
Subsection (2) departs from the rule that a contract
between two parties cannot deprive a third party of rights by
stating:
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1-102(3)(b),
Federal Reserve Regulations and operating letters, clearing house
rules, and the like, have the effect of agreements under subsection
(1), whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested
in items handled.
Furthermore, action pursuant to such regulation, agreement,
and general banking usage constitutes prima facie ordinary care:
(3) Action or non-action approved by this Article or pursuant to
Federal Reserve regulations or operating letters constitutes the
exercise of ordinary care and, in the absence of special
instructions, action or non-action consistent with clearing house
rules and the like or with a general banking usage not disapproved
by this Article, prima facie constitutes the exercise of ordinary

454. Letter from William A. Schnader, Esq., Schnader, Harrison, Segal &
Lewis, to Maurice H. Merrill, Professor, University of Oklahoma Law School 1
(Apr. 12, 1952) (on file with the A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
455. This language is identical to that of § 4-103(1), titled "Variation by
Agreement," which was also proposed by Malcolm. U.C.C. § 4-103, Official Draft:
Text and Comments Edition (1952), reprinted in 16 U.C.C. DRAFs 477 (E.Kelly
ed., 1984). The language was first proposed in U.C.C. § 4-103, Proposed Changes in
Article 4 (May 16, 1952), reprintedin 13 U.C.C. DRAFMS 111 (E.Kelly ed., 1984).
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Comment 3 attempted to limit what "and the like"
meant. It would include agencies and additions of banks that
function like clearinghouses, but it would not include all
agreements between banks.5?
Because conformance "with clearinghouse rules or the
like or with such banking usages" constitutes only the prima
facie exercise of ordinary care, the courts had "the ultimate
power to determine ordinary care in any case where it should
appear desirable to do so. The prima facie rule does, however,
impose on the party contesting the standards to establish
that they are unreasonable, arbitrary or unfair."58
The compromise section 4-103 gave the bankers great
flexibility and freedom to modify the statutory rules. It
represents again the triumph of contract. "Contract" is
stretched to include the fine print in banking forms and
general authorizations." 9 Contracts between banks acting in
concert can also affect others' rights.
III. THE CODE FROM 1952 TO 1954

A. The Failureof Immediate Enactment
Unfortunately for the Code, the bankers were not
456. U.C.C. § 4-103, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1952),
reprintedin 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 477 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
457. "An agreement between a number of banks or even all the banks in an
area simply because they are banks, would not of itself, by virtue of the phrase
'and the like,' meet the purposes and objectives of subsection (2). U.C.C. § 4-103,
cmt. 3, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1952), reprinted in 16 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 481 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
458. U.C.C. § 4-103, cmt. 4, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1952),
reprintedin 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 482 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
459. For example, comment 2 states:
The agreement may be direct, as between the owner and the depositary
bank; or indirect, as where the owner authorizes a particular type of
procedure and any bank in the collection chain acts pursuant to such
authorization. It may be with respect to a single item; or to all items
handled for a particular customer, e.g., a general agreement between
the depositary bank and the customer at the time a deposit account is
opened. Legends on deposit tickets, collection letters and
acknowledgments of items, coupled with action by the affected party
constituting acceptance, adoption, ratification, estoppel or the like, are
agreements if they meet the tests of the definition of "agreement."
U.C.C. § 1-201(3), cmt. 2, Official Draft: Text and Comments Edition (1952),
reprintedin 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 478 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).

2001]

HISTORY OF THE U.C.C. 1949-1954

465

mollified. Malcolm's draft of article 4, even though bitterly
criticized by Beutel, Gilmore, and Mentschikoff as a sell-out
to the bankers, still did not assuage that group. The bankers
still hoped to kill the entire U.C.C.4 11 and remained in
opposition.46 ' The Code was adopted in Pennsylvania, but the
bankers' opposition damaged its chances of adoption in
Indiana, and most importantly, persuaded Governor Dewey
to defer its passage until after review by the NYLRC.46'
New York, however, was the key state. At first the Code's
proponents were hopeful about enactment there. Governor
Dewey, however, seemed to have cold feet. Schnader wrote
Mentschikoff that the Governor was not backing the Code
strongly:
As far as New York is concerned, things there are not in the cozy
situation in which you seem to feel they are. I personally had a
long talk with Governor Dewey's Legislative Counsel a day or so
ago. He told me that there had been a misunderstanding about the
Governor's position; that until the text and comments of the Code
were available, the Governor was clearly not in a position to
advocate passage of the Code; and that the only thing that he
deemed possible was to have the Governor mention the Code in his
1952 message and ask the Legislature to study it prior to the 1953
session.

460. See Letter from Kleitz to Brace, supranote 394.
A committee of the Commerce and Industry Association of New York,
of which I am acting chairman, brought in a recommendation, which
was unanimously approved by the directors of the Association, to ask
Governor Dewey to postpone consideration of the Code for at least a
year.... What I am really hoping is that we can kill the thing entirely.
Id.; see also Letter from Marcus E. Conrad, Vice President, The Chase National
Bank, to James G. Hall, Executive Vice President, First National Bank,
Birmingham, Alabama (Feb. 9, 1953) (characterizing the Code as making
"extensive and radical changes" and requesting an effort "to have the introduction
of this legislation delayed until there has been an opportunity to study it and make
changes which we believe would be advantageous") (on file with the A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
461. See, e.g., News Release of American Bankers Ass'n News Bureau, A.B.A.
Committee Disapproves Proposed Uniform Commercial Code in its EntiretyRecommends Incorporation of Desirable Sections into Existing Statutes by
Amendments (Oct. 20, 1954), Llewellyn Papers, J. XVI.1.b. (on file with the
Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library, and the Buffalo Law
Review); Twining, supra note 219, at 293.
462. See Letter from Pantzer to Schnader, supra note 127, at 1-2 (concerning
Indiana); TWINING, supra note 219, at 293 (concerning New York).
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That is a shocking disappointment to me, but it just emphasizes
the fact that now is no time for any of us to start fighting with
each other because somebody doesn't463like the work which
somebody else did on Code or Comments.

In a letter of May, 1952, Schnader speaks of "Governor's
change of heart" making "it impossible for us to proceed with
our plan to let the text, as adopted by the New York
Legislature in 1952, become the official text by action of the
Institute and the Conference at their May and September
meetings, respectively."'
In the same letter, Schnader describes how Llewellyn
went off on his own and introduced his own version of the
U.C.C. in the New York legislature! Perhaps Llewellyn,
sharing his wife's sanuine view of the Code's chances in the
New York legislature, 65 decided to take matters in his own
hands.466 Evidently, Schnader's pessimistic view of the Code's
changes were more accurate than Llewellyn's, for nothing
more was heard of Llewellyn's initiative.
The Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, presented on January 20, 1953, further damaged
the Code's prospects.6 7 The Association came out against the
U.C.C.'s enactment, saying it needed more study. The bar
group noted that the proposed act was "social," which at that
time meant that it would work toward redistributing wealth
and power in society.4 69 The Report did object to the new
meanings and complicated nature of the language of the
Code, but moreover commented that the Code revealed "new
social tendencies."7' ° Later, the Report lists unconscionability
and the regulations on limiting consequential damages as
463. Letter from Schnader to Mentschikoff, supra note 84, at 3.
464. Letter from William A. Schnader, Esq., Schnader, Harrison, Segal &
Lewis, to Martin J. Dinkelspiel, Esq. 5 (May 5, 1952) (on file with the A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
465. See Letter from Mentschikoff to Schnader, supra note 111, at 2.
466. "Incidentally, after the Executive Committee meeting in Chicago, Karl
Llewellyn took himself to Albany and made thirty-five changes in the text of the
Code, and, as thus modified, the Code was introduced into the New York
Legislature in the closing hours of the 1952 session." Letter from Schnader to
Dinkelspiel, supranote 464, at 2.
467. The Association's Report is reprinted in 15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 309-50 (E.
Kelly ed., 1984).
468. Id. at 318.
469. Palmer, supra note 149, at 14.
470. Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, reprinted in
15 U.C.C. DRAFMS 317 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
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new social concepts.47 ' The Report's Appendix pointed out
that "The Code would extend the 'public policy' concept to
areas where neither statutes nor decisions have heretofore
reached."'72 It notes that article 2 would change contract law,
for example, in allowing indefinite contracts and firm offers
by merchants.473 All in all, the New York Bar Association was
negative, recommending further study.
The Code drafters thought they were done in 1951. "The
UCC is now finished and here it is. '" 74 One year later, they
stated, "We hope that these may be the last changes which
the Editorial Board may find it necessary to approve. 475 They
had bad luck, however. In Indiana, the opposition of the
Chase National Bank "did a great deal of damage." Moreover,
the Code had to compete in the Indiana legislature with a
proposed Model Probate Code and a Criminal Code, which
both "took up very much of the time of the legislators." Then
the Code stepped into the middle of a fight between the
Eisenhower Republicans in the Indiana House led by
Governor Craig, and the Taft Republicans in the Indiana
Senate. Since Governor Craig was in favor of the bill, a key
committee
chair who was a Taft Republican did not support
4 76
it.
In Massachusetts, the Code hit another road block. The
chair of a key committee was one Senator Ralph V. Clampit,
"a man of very limited capacity and [who] at the same time
has an exalted opinion of his position and his role in the
legislature' 7 7 He took the position that "he personally had to
check, argue about, and be convinced of substantially every
471. Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, reprintedin
15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 327-28 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
472. Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, reprintedin
15 U.C.C. DRAFrs 321 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
473. Report of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, reprintedin
15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 325-26 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
474. Forward, U.C.C. Final Text Edition (Nov. 1951), reprinted in 12 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 414 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
475. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Recommendations of the Editorial Board (Dec. 29,
1952), reprintedin 15 U.C.C. DRAFTs 352 (E. Kelly ed., 1984); see also Letter from
Milton P. Kupfer, Esq., Kupfer, Silberfeld, Nathan & Danziger, to Herbert F.
Goodrich, Director, A.L.I. (Feb. 5, 1952) (stating that his suggestions about
proposed comments must be narrow "since we all should now regard the Text as
'frozen'") (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
476. See Letter from Pantzer to Schnader, supranote 127, at 3.
477. Letter from Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., Bingham, Dana & Gould, to Carl W.
Funk, Esq., Drinker, Biddle and Reath 1 (Oct. 6, 1954) (on file with the A.L.I.
Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
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provision in it."78 He also wanted the Code to be subject to
interstate compacts. Since Senator Clampit did not
understand all the Code, he set out to stall it. Thus the
Massachusetts proponents of the Code decided not to run the
risk of having the Code defeated by his opposition and
decided to wait till 1955 to reintroduce it.479
All hopes of quick passage were dashed by Governor
Dewey's referral of the U.C.C. to the New York Law Revision
Commissions on February 8, 1953. The arduous NYLRC
review process took three years and cost "nearly one-third of
a million dollars." ' ° The drive to have the Code enacted was
postponed. In the words of Malcolm, "I have picked up from
several sources that state after state is waiting to see what
New York does.""' Pennsylvania enacted the Code in 1953,
but it remained the only state to adopt the Code until
Massachusetts in 1957.48 The drafters and proponents again

had to wait and continue to amend their work. Here, one has
to step back and express one's respect, admiration, and awe
at the proponents' tenacity. In 1942, Llewellyn had predicted
completion by 1946.483 By 1953, after working for thirteen
years, the drafters were faced with another massive process
of revision, but undertook it and finally succeeded, years
later, in obtaining the Code's enactment.
B. InitialResponse to the NYLRC Proceedings
There were few changes to the Code between 1951 and
the start of the NYLRC process. As stated above, a
compromise was reached as to the banking article. One
change was caused by the Surety Association's sudden
realization that a Uniform Commercial Code was in the
works and that it might affect its members. As drafted,
section 9-312(7) gave priority to a secured party over a
Surety Association's
construction surety. In response to the
48
protest, that sub-section was stricken.

1

478. Id.
479. Id.
480. TWINING, supranote 219, at 293.
481. Letter from Malcolm to Schnader, supra note 141, at 1.
482. Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 798 (1958).
483. Commercial Law, Time Schedule (1942) (on file with the A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
484. See U.C.C. § 9-312, Recommendations of the Editorial Board (Dec. 29,
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The drafters were gearing up to deal with the NYLRC.
Malcolm felt that the Commission or at least part of it had a
"friendly disposition toward the Code.... On the other hand,
the public reaction to the Code in New York is predominantly
hostile. A major part of this hostility is traceable to the New
York City banks, abetted and perhaps led by some of their
counsel." Malcolm felt that the Commission was bound to be
affected by the bank's opposition. The bankers criticized
every section of articles 4 and 9 going so far as to claim the
Code was "communist inspired.'
In response, Malcolm proposed the creation of groups
that would consider and respond to criticisms of the Code.
These could work with the NYLRC and the opposing groups.
The drafters' groups would cooperate with the NYLRC to find
mutually satisfactory solutions."0
The Code Editorial Board instituted Malcolm's proposals
at its meeting of June 14, 1954. Teams were set up to study
objections, answer them, and in the case of well-founded
objections, prepare revisions to the sections." These
subcommittees were formed and prepared reports."8
Furthermore, the NYLRC agreed to distribute the reports of
NYLRC meetings to the Code subcommittees. 9 Thus the
Code drafters could change the Code in response to the
NYLRC before that organization's final report. Many of the
subcommittee's recommendations appeared in "Supplement
No. 1" of 1955."' °
The end result of the NYLRC process was that the
U.C.C., which had started as a commercial system in which
merchants were subject to regulation by trade norms,
merchant tribunals, mandatory legislation, and judicial
1952), reprintedin 15 U.C.C. DRAFTS 414 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
485. Letter from Malcolm to Schnader, supra note 141, at 2.
486. Id. at 3-5.
487. See Herbert F. Goodrich, Chairman, Minutes of the Meeting of the
Editorial Board of the U.C.C. 1 (June 14, 1954) (on file with the A.L.I. Archives,
University of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
488. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code, Report of Subcommittee on Article 2
to Editorial Board of Sponsoring Organizations (Sept. 30, 1954), Llewellyn Papers
J.XVI.2.a. (on file with the Llewellyn Archives, University of Chicago Law Library,
and the Buffalo Law Review).
489. See Memorandum from the NYLRC to Members of the Enlarged Editorial
Board of the U.C.C. 1 (Nov. 30, 1954) (on file with the A.L.I. Archives, University
of Pennsylvania Law Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
490. See U.C.C. Supplement No. 1 (1955), reprintedin 17 U.C.C. DRAFMs 307507 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
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oversight, became even more based on laissez-faire.
The 1957 Official Text adopted an explicit mention of
"freedom of contract" as a purpose of the Code.49' 'Usage of
trade's" role of directly governing merchant behavior was
changed to that of a principle of contract interpretation. The
1956 Recommendations changed the rule that usages of trade
bound contracting parties to today's language, in which a
course of dealing and any usage of trade "gives particular
meaning to and supplements or qualify terms of an
'
agreement." 92
The pre-1956 U.C.C. provided
an
"agreement" could be found equally from either that
contract
language or usage of trade.493 Now usage of trade was
demoted to be only a way of understanding the controlling
language of the parties." 4
Thus ended Llewellyn's drive to put in place the folkways
of merchants, the norms of decent commercial behavior, as
the cornerstone of commercial law.
The doctrine of unconscionability, another basis for
regulating private contracts, was also cut back. In response to
the initial NYLRC hearing in 1955, the drafters amended
section 2-302 to make clear that the issue was a matter of law
and that unconscionability had to exist "at the time it [the
contract] was made. ' 9 5 Juries were not to be turned loose on
business behavior; nor could judges consider developments
occurring after a contract was made.
Section 4-103 was changed to allow the parties to a
banking transaction (i.e., the banker) to determine the
standards to measure "good faith" and "ordinary care."49 The
491. "Subsection (3) states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of
contract is a principle of the Code: 'the effect' of its provisions may be varied by
'agreement.' " U.C.C. § 1-102, cmt. 3, Official Text (1957), reprinted in 16 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 477 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
492. U.C.C. § 1-205(3), Recommendations (1956), reprinted in 18 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 40 (E. Kelly ed., 1984). The change was made to meet "an objection made
on behalf of the American Bankers Association." U.C.C. § 1-205(3),
Recommendations (1956), reprintedin 16 U.C.C. DRAFTS 477 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
493. Agreement could be found in "the language of parties or in course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance." U.C.C. § 1-201(3),
Recommendations (1956), reprintedin 18 U.C.C. DRAFTS 32 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
494. "This act deals with 'usage of trade' as a factor in reaching the
commercial meaning of the agreement which the parties have made." U.C.C. § 1205, cmt. 4, Official Text with Comments (1957), reprinted in 19 U.C.C. DRAFTS 65
(E. Kelly ed., 1984).
495. U.C.C. Supplement No. 1, § 2-302(1) (1955), reprinted in 17 U.C.C.
DRAFTS 326 (E.Kelly ed., 1984).
496. U.C.C. § 4-103, Recommendations (1956), reprinted in 18 U.C.C. DRAFTS
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"Reason" given read: "The additional changes
', 97 are to reconcile
this Section 4-103(1) with Section 1-102(3).
Allowing private contracting to set standards in banking
has its own peculiar ramifications. The bank's customer has
no power to bargain for favorable standards. Also, the
banking article defines agreement to include "Federal
Reserve regulations and operating letters, clearing house
rules and the like,"S so standards may be set inside the
banking industry with no customer participation whatsoever.
Llewellyn's program to achieve equal bargaining and
participation in law making and adjudication here met total
defeat.
A similar defeat occurred in article 9, where the 1956
Recommendations edited out the last vestiges of the
consumer protection provisions. Section 9-206 had provided
for some preservation of consumer defenses against the
secured lender or an assignee. This protection was deleted in
1956. 499 In 1951, Grant Gilmore had written that financiers
were being offered a deal: a vastly improved secured
transactions law in return for consumer protection."'0 By
1956, the financiers had an unhindered security device, but
the consumer protection sections were gone.
C. The Assumptions of the NYLRC Proceedings
As we have seen, the NYLRC shifted the Code to be even
more based on private, unregulated contract. Most of its
work, however, was on the details of the Code, perfecting and
polishing the Code language. Although the NYLRC would
spend one-third of a million dollars and three years critiquing
the Code, the issue of ultimate approval was never really in
doubt. In October of 1954, Walter Malcolm had a confidential
conference with Professor John MacDonald, the Executive
Secretary and Director of Research of the NYLRC. Malcolm
reported that the Commission wanted a Code, that it
accepted the basic framework, organization and structure of

159 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
497. U.C.C. § 4-103, Recommendations (1956), reprintedin 18 U.C.C. DRATS
159 (E. Kelly ed., 1984).
498. Id.
499. U.C.C. § 9-206, Recommendations (1956), reprintedin 18 U.C.C. DRAFMS
294 (E. Kelly ed., 1984.
500. See Gilmore, supra note 62, at 47.
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The Commission did have problems with

501. A portion of Malcolm's Confidential Summary is set out below:
CONFIDENTIAL October 14,1954
Summary of Conference With
Professor John MacDonald
and his assistant, October 13, 1954
1. Emphatically Professor MacDonald (and he thinks the Commission)
would like to see a Code. They have no desire to kill the Code.
a. If the Code were killed or died, the Commission would have "twenty
years" of work to achieve much that is in the Code.
2. The Commission questions the original policy decision to treat the
subject matter of the various articles all at one time, as distinguished
from dealing with particular subject matters piecemeal. The
Commission criticizes strongly the failure of the Code's sponsors and
reporters to thoroughly research all subject matter first and then draft
on the basis of such research. However, now that the Code has reached
the stage that it has, the Commission is prepared to accept the basic
framework of the Code as is.
a. There has not been and is not now any serious criticism of the basic
organization and structure of the Code, e.g.
1. The treatment of bonds and debentures in Article 8 under the
general heading of Investment securities.
2. The shift from the title theory in Article 2 on Sales.
3. The general treatment of secured transactions in Article 9.
b. In fact, Professor MacDonald indicated that the Commission agreed
with these major decisions.
c. The objections the Commission has to the Code have to do with
individual sections or in a few instances specific problems appearing in
up to, say, five or six sections.
3. In the area of individual rules appearing in single sections or groups
of sections, the Commission thinks there is a lot of work still to be done
on the Code.
a. The Article causing most trouble and concern is Article 2 on Sales.
1. Article 2 contains many excellent rules which the Commission likes.
2. However, in many instances, Text and Comment are inconsistent or
Comment definitely goes beyond Text and states substantial rules of
law not in Text.
(a) In many instances the Comment states a desirable rule that either
is not in Text or is inconsistent with Text.
3. A number of the defects in Article 2 would throw the law back fifty
or seventy-five years.
4. Illustrations of defects include:
(a) The rules regarding insurable interests, anticipating breach.
(b) The use of language in regard to offer and acceptance, etc. broad
enough to apply to the general law of contracts as distinguished from
the law of sales.
(c) Failure to provide a statute of frauds for an outright sale of
accounts, e.g. by a dentist, selling by practice. Professor Braucher's
answer to this in his report is not sufficient.
(d) The definition of "merchant" Professor MacDonald does not object in
the least to separate rules for a "merchant"-in fact, likes them very
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individual sections, however, particularly with those of article
2. The worst case scenario would be that the report of the
NYLRC would say that twenty-five percent of the sections
needed changes but that there was "a strong desire to
continue and extend cooperation between the Commission
and the sponsors (presumably to the end that the
Commission could approve the Code, with amendments).""2
much.
(e) Treatment of creditors [sic] rights.
5. Proper redrafts of objectionable sections would not materially
lengthen present Text. In many places would shorten.
b. The proposed changes in Article 4 in our sub-committee's draft
report eliminate 75% of Commission's problems with Article 4.
c. Article 9 is in quite good shape and was a well-drafted article.
d. Articles 7 and 8 are farther behind other articles in processing by the
Commission. In Article 8, the Commission is disturbed by problem of
"allocation securities", the full implications of which I did not get.
4. The work and future activities of the Commission are affected by
political considerations. Governor Dewey has taken a definite interest
in the Code. This interest in the Code has definitely not been one of
hostility but rather one of "where do we go from here?" (Presumably to
get a Code.). The Commission is not sure what the reaction of either of
the present candidates for Governor will be.
5. The present appropriations of the Commission will expire on March
31, 1955, but this does not mean it must stop work on the Code at that
time. It should be able to get further appropriations.
6. The Commission must fill some sort of report out early in 1955.
Professor MacDonald is sure this will not be a report that the Code
should be enacted in New York in 1955. No decision has yet been made
as to what report will be filed.
a. If the relative attitudes of the sponsors and the Commission should
be non-cooperative, the report might say that 25% of the sections
needed changes. (This was not stated by Professor MacDonald but
since this is a present estimate of "defective" sections, this possibility
should be envisaged.)
b. If further and more extensive cooperation between the two groups
could be developed, it would be perfectly possible for the Commission to
file in early 1955 some innoxious interim report of "progress" and
merely publish the report of the hearings.
7. On the assumption that further means of cooperation between the
two groups could be developed, I inquired as to the Professor's estimate
as to how long it would take to get the "25%" of questionable sections in
shape so that the Commission would be satisfied with the Code. His
first rough estimate was 18 months. However, later he thought it
would be entirely feasible to get all work done so that a bill could be
filed, e.g. in Massachusetts, in time for the 1956 legislature.
Walter Malcolm, Summary of Conference with Professor John MacDonald 1-6
(Oct. 14, 1954) (on file with the A.L.I. Archives, University of Pennsylvania Law
Library, and the Buffalo Law Review).
502. Id. at 7.
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Thus the NYLRC process did not focus on the basic
assumptions that underlay the Code's drafting. Such
fundamental concepts as using trade usage as commercial
law norms, the flexible contract provisions, the non-inclusion
of consumer legislation, and the unitary and all-powerful
article 9 security interest were not debated. Since then,
almost ali Code commentary has been on the details rather
than the whole. Most commentators on the U.C.C. start with
the NYLRC's study of the Code." 3 In doing so, they ignore the
fundamental decisions about commercial law made by the
drafters. And so we leave our study of the Code where others
start.
D. Where are They Now (or the Return of the Repressed)
Like seeing a trailer at the end of a movie which tells of
the fate of the characters, it is entertaining to see what
happened to the proposals we have studied. Many of the
proposed reforms rejected by the Code drafters have come
back into the law by other routes. Turning back to the
original list on page 399, we see that article 3's objective good
faith, dropped in the NYLRC process, re-enters as today's
section 3-103(4). The sections about beneficiaries of
warranties and the use of direct actions against
manufacturers re-emerges as the tort law of product liability.
The consumer disclosures of article 9 reappear as the federal
Truth-in-Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1601). The assertion of
defenses against an assignee of a consumer contract is now
enabled by the FTC Regulation (16 C.F.R. pt. 433). The
floating lien has been somewhat restricted in the bankruptcy
law (11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5)). The flexibility of Malcolm's article
4 has been limited by the FRB's Regulation CC (19 C.F.R. Pt.
229), which closely regulates the return of unpaid checks.
Llewellyn's changes in contract law have been adopted
outside of the confines of article 2 by the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts.
But, as the controversy over product liability shows," 4 the
503. "The 'legislative history' has come to mean the New York Law Revision
Commission's Report of 1954-56 on the 1952 Official Draft and the subsequent
revisions." Wiseman, supranote 2, at 467 (footnote omitted).
504. See, e.g., A Symposium on the ALl's Proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts:ProductsLiability, 61 TENN. L. REv. 1043 (1994); Special Issue:Review of the
System of Products Liability Law, 36 So. TEx. L. REV. 227 (1995); Products
Liability Symposium, 30 U. MICH. J. L. REFoRm 197 (1997). In 1998, the ALI
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wars over these issues are far from over. The compromises
made by the Code drafters and the affected parties were only
temporary truces made in an ongoing conflict.
CONCLUSION

Under the original proposals, merchants would contract
under the control of trade norms, judicial supervision, and
legislature dictate, with their fellow merchants reviewing
their performance. The deviant merchant would be controlled
by the Code and the judge acting together with merchant
tribunals to decide commercial issues using standards given
by trade norms. The judge and the merchant tribunals would
measure the reasonableness of the contract and the contract
performance by using the yardsticks of equal bargaining
power, trade norms, and the provisions of the Code.
The original version changed into today's U.C.C., which
exists more as a set of default rules that govern only if the
private contracting does not cover the issues. Many sections
just give green light/red light rules (e.g., F.O.B., C.I.F.,
F.A.S.) which formally allocate rights and responsibilities in
the absence of contrary agreement.
Today the U.C.C. serves as a framework for private
contracting. This means that the seller of consumer goods,
the banker, and the financier get to structure the terms of the
deal. A statute that originally was to empower the trade as a
whole, the small decent merchant, and the consumer turned
into one that empowers commercial entities. Freed of
outmoded rules and restrictions, sellers, bankers, and
financiers can now get what they want. "Freedom of
Contract" submerged the academic-regulatory proposals. But
these proposals still surface in such provisions as
unconscionability, the objective good faith of articles 2 and 3,
the reading of trade usage into contract language, and the
"reasonables" pervading the Act. There is still much
opportunity for judicial and trade regulation. Federal law and
tort law now embody the discarded consumer protection
sections. Much of the litigation generated by the U.C.C.
stems from the conflict between the ideals of business
autonomy and the achievement of good trade practices by
regulation.
The change from the original proposals to what we have
promulgated its RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1998).
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now has taken sixty years. It has not been a process of
applying neutral expertise to craft a technically perfect
commercial law. It has been a political process that has
created winners and losers. The present controversies over
such issues as strict liability in tort, bankruptcy, and
consumer rights, show that the battles over such values are
not over and that we can decide on these values anew.

